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The focus of this research is to examine the Electronic Commerce/Electronic
Data Interchange (EC/EDI) implementation plans within the Marine Corps and its
various procurement offices. The primary intent is to evaluate the plan and determine
if the Marine Corps can meet the Presidential Mandate that agencies adopt EC/EDI
by 1997. This research analyzes, compares, and contrasts the plan to commercial
EC/EDI implementation practices. Additionally, this thesis identifies the obstacles
and virtues of the Corps' EC/EDI implementation plan. Finally, recommendations
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Electronic Commerce (EC) and Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) are
alternative electronic methods which businesses and Government use to conduct
various day-to-day operations. Purchase orders, invoices, letters, correspondence, and
advertising are just a few examples of current EC/EDI capabilities. These new
computer-based systems are creating a new electronic procurement cycle. EC/EDI
transforms the paper-based procurement paradigm to an electronic-based paradigm.
Industry is re-engineering their operations in order to capitalize on EC/EDI
technology. Generally, firms realize lower procurement costs, increased service and
response time, and decreased procurement lead time. Thus, in many respects, EDI,
has been viewed as a "competitive advantage" vehicle. The desire to gain a
competitive or strategic advantage through price, quality, or service, real or imagined,
has been a major driving force for the enduring and continued growth of EDI.
On October 26, 1993, President Clinton mandated EC/EDI usage for all
Federal Government purchases after 1997. The Department of Defense (DOD)
aggressively lead the conversion to EC/EDI. An EC/EDI office was formed and the
responsibilities ofEC/EDI were assigned to Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition Reform (DUSD(AR)), Ms. Colleen Preston. At the request of Ms.
Preston, aDOD Process Action Team (PAT) was formed to determine the application
ofEC/EDI within DOD. This report has evolved into DOD's EC/EDI implementation
plan. The Marine Corps has attempted to follow behind DOD's lead and the other
Services.
The focus of this research is to evaluate whether the Marine Corps'
implementation ofEC/EDI has achieved the desired goals and objectives in order to
accomplish the 1997 EC/EDI Presidential Mandate. This evaluation is accomplished
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by examining the implementation plan throughout the Marine Corps. It also provides
an in-depth study of how the plan is being implemented at the various contracting
activities under the control of the Field Contracting Support Branch (LBO) Head-
quarters, Marine Corps (HQMC). The investigation also studies the implementation
ofEC/EDI and its effect on the contracting offices, focusing on obstacles, drawbacks,
and virtues of the plan. Finally, recommendations and improvements to the Marine
Corps' plan, ifneeded, are made based upon private industry EC/EDI implementation
practices.
A. OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this research involve identifying and analyzing the U.S.
Marine Corps EC/EDI implementation plan. It looks at industry examples and
literature of successful EC/EDI implementation models and apply/compare such
lessons toward the Marine Corps EC/EDI implementation model. Any changes or
recommendations to the Marine Corps EC/EDI implementation plan, if needed, are
designed to make the transition from a paper-based paradigm to an EC/EDI-based
paradigm successful for both the Marine Corps and its vendor base.
B. RESEARCH QUESTION
1. Primary Research Question
What are the obstacles the Marine Corps faces in its implementation of
EC/EDI and what plans can be made to successfully manage the implementation of
EC/EDI in order to accomplish the 1997 EC/EDI Presidential Mandate?
2. Subsidiary Questions
1. What is EC/EDI?
2. What are successful indicators or models associated with industry's
EC/EDI implementation efforts?
3. What is required to conduct EC/EDI within the Marine Corps?
4. What is the implementation plan and current status ofEC/EDI within
the Marine Corps?
5. What is necessary for the Marine Corps to implement, manage,
conduct, and abide with the 1997 EC/EDI Presidential Mandate?
C. METHODOLOGY
The methodology of this research includes an extensive EC/EDI literature
search, EC/EDI industry examples and usage, and lessons learned in the
implementation ofEC/EDI. Interviews were conducted with numerous private, DOD,
and USMC officials by phone, in person, or through e-mail correspondence. This
group included individuals at the Office ofthe Secretary ofDefense (OSD), Secretary
for Acquisition Reform, Department of the Army (SARDA), Headquarters Marine
Corps (HQMC), and progressed down to the installation level.
A comprehensive literature search for contemporary EC/EDI articles was
accomplished. The review of various data bases and sources of potential EC/EDI
material included: 1) Defense Technical information Center (DTIC), 2) Defense
Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE), 3) Lexus-Nexus, 4) computer/
electronic publications, 5) EC/EDI publications, 6) internet.
A formal research survey was also conducted based, in part, on Robert M.
Monczka's Interview Guides. [Ref. l:p. 3] The survey was sent to 28 of the Marine
Corps contracting offices, Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM),
LBO, and the EC/EDI Program Manager (PM) located at Logistics, Planning and
Policy, System Branch (LPS), HQMC.
D. LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
1. Limitations
This thesis concentrates on a methodical approach to help current USMC
EC/EDI implementation efforts. Because of this focus, research is limited to the
plans, policy, personnel, and management of EC/EDI implementation issues. The
intent of the research is to look at industry examples and literature of successful
EC/EDI programs and apply/compare such lessons toward the Marine Corps EC/EDI
implementation model. Hence many technical, hardware, and software issues of
EC/EDI are not addressed. Another limitation is the small number of contracting
offices, 28, and an even lower number of responses to the survey, 15. Therefore
surveys were used in a qualitative manner, as a trend or attitude indicator, instead of
more rigorous quantitative manner. Lastly, any suggestions or recommendations must
be able to work within both the USMC parameter as well as the current DOD
environment.
2. Assumptions
Although later chapters of this thesis discuss EC/EDI concepts, the reader is
assumed to understand basic EC/EDI fundamentals and contracting processes.
Additional familiarity of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) is another built
in assumption. Lastly, a basic understanding ofDOD and USMC structure, activities,
and missions is required.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This research is organized into seven chapters. Chapter I provides an
introduction to the origins and objectives of this study. Chapter II provides a
commercial EC/EDI model as a benchmark for comparison to the Marine Corps
implementation model. A historical context of EC/EDI, contained in Chapter III, is
required to understand the general issues and progression associated with USMC
efforts in EC/EDI. Chapter IV presents industry's successful indicators for EC/EDI
implementation efforts. Comparing and contrasting the identified successful
indicators with the current USMC EC/EDI model follows in Chapter V. Chapter VI
recommends improvements to or development of a USMC strategic campaign plan
based upon successful implementation concepts. Lastly, Chapter VII includes a
conclusion and proposes areas of further study.

II. CONCEPTUAL EC/EDI MODEL
EDI implementation methods have been documented over the past 20 years.
Monczka and Carter, in particular, have developed a model that illustrates the
requirements for successful EDI implementation. [Ref. l:p. 15] The model and its
associated check list appear in Appendix A. As indicated in the model there are
several cross functional areas that must be coordinated and managed. In the private
sector, Monczka's model would be an ideal reference in planning for EDI
implementation. This research, however, focuses on a different problem; DOD and
U.S. Marine Corps implementation. As such, the model must be adapted to fit within
the Marine Corps framework. A recent study by Cats-Baril and Thompson confirms




Given the greater interdependence across organizational boundaries, the
need for clear project goals, leadership, and specific responsibilities is
increased.
2. Given the turnover of top level administrators and the constraints
imposed by red tape, the need to convince employees to change the
existing organizational processes is greater and the difficulty to
implement change is increased.
3. Given the incremental nature of governmental decision making, the
criteria to justify radical technological innovations are more stringent.
4. Given that Management Information Systems (MIS) directors tend to
have less authority than their private sector counterparts, the careful
choosing of a project leader with both technical knowledge and
political clout is essential. [Ref. 2:pp. 559-566]
Furthermore, it is generally accepted that private industry is much more
flexible and responsive to market or customer demands. Public organizations exhibit
greater cautiousness, rigidity, and less innovation. [Ref. 3:p. 5] Decision making
autonomy and flexibility of the manager is limited as compared to his private
counterpart. [Ref. 3:p. 62] For instance funding for EDI implementation in private
industry is far easier than the DOD congressional budgeting process required for EDI
within DOD and the Federal Government. Another example that highlights the
differences concerns one of the first steps in the EDI model: analyze EDI's
opportunity. Monczka states even in large firms within the study, analyzing EDI
opportunities should take two people approximately 30 days. DOD's evaluation
required nine process action team advisors, 27 process action team members, and
countless others in support during its 60 day evaluation process. [Ref. 4:pp.
xxix-xxxv] Another difference between industry and Government concerns profit
incentives.
Industry differs from the public sector in a significant way; private firms are
motivated to make a profit for its owners. The public sector is not concerned with
reducing costs because savings are not directly felt on the profit margin. The public
sector lacks daily market pressures and competition. [Ref. 3:p. 5] Government
bureaus are essentially non-market organizations. This lack of market forces denies
the Government an the informational feedback loop, in the form of prices and profits,
that benefit private firms. [Ref. 3:p. 12] Typically a disincentive for savings occurs
in the public sector. Unobligated budgets, which could represent savings in a new
EDI process, are considered bad or acts ofpoor management in the public sector. A
penalty will follow in future budgets of Government agencies which have excess
unobligated budgets. Budgeted outlays for future years will automatically be reduced
by the amount of unobligated funds left over in EDI savings. Unfortunately,
Government employees dislike shrinking operational budgets. [Ref 5:p. 14]
Government employee positions are also rated on how large an organization
is and how large a budget is allocated to it. Hence, there isn't an incentive to size
down and become a lean and efficient organization. Efficient operations may mean
fewer Government Service (GS) employees with lower ratings. This equates to lower
pay and smaller budgets. If anything, there is an incentive to justify growth, larger
budgets, and higher rated GS positions. Thus the private sector has a strong profit
incentive and motivation to try new more effective and efficient methods, while the
public sector has a disincentive for obtaining savings. The National Performance
Review (NPR) confirms this viewpoint. Supervisory positions are frequently created
as a means of providing Government employees with higher grades. Government
employees micromanage to justify their existence adding layer upon layer of
management. [Ref. 6:p. 22] Additionally Federal workers rationalize requests for
larger staffs and position upgrades on the ever more complex regulation their agencies
must enforce. [Ref. 7:p. 2]
Another difference between Government and industry concerns the power of
the paycheck and bonus possibilities. In the private sector, an incentive to implement
EDI could involve a bonus to employees. Many firms typically give out bonuses to
EDI program managers ifthe EDI implementation can be accomplished in an efficient
manner. Two factors private industry often use to determine bonuses are schedule
and budget factors. Through the use of bonuses, firms provide incentives to their
employees in order to implement EDI on schedule and on budget. The closer EDI
implementation is to its schedule and budget targets, the higher the bonus. The
evaluation and distribution of bonuses is often a simple process; the project manager
or his superior has the authority to disperse bonuses. Some even distribute the
project's first year ofEDI savings as bonuses to the implementation team members.
Bonuses are commonly and quickly used to motivate individuals and performance.
[Ref. 8 :p. 1 ] A negative incentive also exists in the private sector; employees who
do not want to use new EDI tools, can be replaced or fired. In contrast to industry,
DOD lacks the flexibility and responsiveness that private firms have in providing
incentives or disincentives for their workforce.
Although the Government does have limited merit pay incentives, typically for
Senior Executive Service (SES) Government employees, it does not award bonuses
to employees as often or as easily as the private sector. [Ref. 9] An individual who
forwards a cost saving idea for the DOD's Suggestion Program may receive a small
portion ofthe first year's anticipated savings as an award or bonus. However, in DOD
the funding source of the bonus is deducted from the unit's current operations budget.
This creates a disincentive to provide individuals with monetary awards because the
parent unit must pay for the bonus. Because units may have to divert precious
resources to award a suggestion, many suggestions within DOD are typically
recognized with a military award such as a Navy Commendation Medal. In order to
disperse a monetary award, the Government requires documentation, justification,
review and approval by the respective authorities. In order to handle the
documentation and award process, an Incentive Award Board was created. Bonuses
greater than $10,000 must also be approved by the Office of Personnel Management
and greater than $25,000 by the President. In many cases the approved bonuses arrive
years after the submission ofthe suggestion, and are often reduced. In reducing bonus
awards, boards often cite that the suggestion is a standard process within the office;
awards should not be dispersed for an existing process. In this manner, the board
often neglects the difference in time and the old process the suggestion replaced.
Suggestions often quickly became new office standards due to rapid implementation
by managers who seek immediate cost savings for the Government. By the time
evaluators look into the merits of the bonus, the suggestion already has been adopted
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as an office standard process. [Ref. 9] In this manner, the Government devalues
suggestions over time as well as in the actual value of the bonus. Also in contrast to
the private sector, the Government makes firing a Government employee a difficult
and long process.
Rigid civil service systems hinder removing unproductive workers and
providing financial incentives to productive ones. [Ref. 3:p. 62] According to the
NPR, Government supervisors view the process for dealing with poor performers as
unduly difficult and time consuming. The slowness of the process discouraged some
supervisors from taking any serious action against a poor performer. [Ref. 6:p. 39]
Work evaluations and fitness reports are tools that can change behavior in the
workplace, but time and proper documentation are required in order to fire a
Government employee. As one Government employee stated in a visit to a
contracting office, "I don't have to use EDI, you can't make me use it, and you can't
fire me for not using it." In general, the private sector has the ability to eliminate or
re-assign employees who refuse to use new processes such as EDI. Although
wrongful termination litigation has forced industry to better document and justify
employee firings, private firms continue to have a wider choice of options and can
more quickly bypass or re-assign individuals who inhibit business process
re-engineering. The Federal Government lacks such options.
Due to the inherent differences between the public and private sector, several
parts of Monczka's EC/EDI model need to be removed for it to work within the
Government framework. These items are: analyze EDI opportunity, develop cost
benefit analysis, develop legal approach, establish support for a standard, establish
auditing approach, develop a prototype, stabilize system design and approach. (See
Appendix B) The reason for altering the model is twofold.
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1.
The executive branch and DOD leadership has mandated EC/EDI use.
The Marine Corps will implement EC/EDI or face the consequences of
non-compliance. Therefore two steps in Monczka's model, analyze EDI opportunity
and develop cost benefit analysis, are eliminated. The decision to choose if EDI is
applicable or appropriate for the Marine Corps is immaterial and unnecessary. The
decision to use EDI has already been made by senior leaders. The Marine Corps must
implement EDI.
2. Because the Marine Corps is part of DOD, many items such as the
standards issue, have either been addressed or are the responsibility of other
Government agencies. The following items in Monczka's model are the responsibility
of agencies other than the Marine Corps:
• Develop legal approach - Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).
• Establish support for a standard (ANSI XI 2) - Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA).
• Establish auditing approach - Defense Financial and Accounting
Service (DFAS).
• Develop a prototype - Air Force.
• Stabilize system design and approach - Air Force and DISA.
Therefore the Marine Corps model will eliminate these items due to the
inability to control and execute these specific items in Monczka's model.
The elimination of such steps, EDI experts such as Monczka may argue,
invalidates the implementation ofEDI or will ensure its failure. This is certainly not
true. The division of such tasks into functional areas does not eliminate the
requirements to complete implementation; they are transferred to an agency other than
the Marine Corps. This in no way abrogates the responsibility of accomplishing the
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tasks indicated by Monczka. As mentioned earlier, it does make implementation
more difficult to coordinate as well as lengthen the time necessary to implement.
Even ifsome ofthese items were left to the Marine Corps, the capability to implement
the various steps are not possible due to the lack of expertise in the Marine Corps.
For instance, the Marine Corps is no longer involved in the payment and invoicing
area; DFAS is accomplishing this task. The organizational structure of DOD
prohibits the Marine Corps from executing various steps in Monczka's Model.
Therefore the elimination of the various steps is necessary and prudent.
Finally, despite the differences, the revised model is still useful in evaluating
the Marine Corps EC/EDI implementation plan. Autonomous divisions in large
corporations, similar to the USMC and DOD relationship, also use various forms of
Monczka's model. EDI planning occurs on the macro level in large corporations
which is then continued or modified at the division levels. EDI authors, industry
experts, and researchers such as Hinge, Oravec, Marrman, Goverman, and Sriram also
support this concept. Divisions within parent corporations, particularly individual
profit centers, conduct independent planning similar to Monczka's model. This is
done due to the unique needs and systems of the various divisions. Thus, once the
decision to incorporate EC/EDI within the entire corporation is made, the divisions
often develop an independent plan to conform to their corporation's desire to
implement EC/EDI. The divisions, however, must fit within the framework and
guidance of their corporation's EC/EDI plan. Fidelity Investments, for example, has
over 30 separate business units each with its own EC strategy. All of Fidelity's
business units, however, must develop plans within the capabilities of Fidelity's MIS
department. [Ref. 10:p. 3] A transaction standard may be standardized, and
respective divisions must work within this standard framework. In this respect, the
Marine Corps is no different than standard industry practices.
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For the Marine Corps, the EC/EDI implementation model is very similar to its
current war fighting philosophy. An executive decision must be made to implement
EC/EDI methods. A strategy must then be developed to achieve the goals and
objectives of EC/EDI. A campaign plan must evolve in order to meet the strategic
goals. Finally tactics must be used to support the campaign objectives. The mission
is clear, the objectives are obtainable, and everyone is marching toward the EC/EDI





1. What is EC?
EC is the paperless exchange of business information using EDI, Electronic
Mail (e-mail), Electronic Bulletin Boards (BBS), Electronic Fund Transfers (EFTS),
and other electronic processes and technologies. The Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) defines EC as "a paperless process including electronic bulletin boards,
electronic funds transfer, electronic data interchange, and similar techniques for
accomplishing business transactions. The use of terms commonly associated with
paper transactions (e.g., "copy," "document," "page," "sealed envelope" and
"stamped") shall not be interpreted to restrict the use of electronic commerce." [Ref.
11]
Thus electronic commerce is the integration of e-mail, EDI, Electronic Source
Selection (ESS), bar-coding, Computer Aided Design/Computer Aided Manufactur-
ing (CAD/CAM), FAX, Continuous Acquisition and Life-Cycle Support (CALS) and
similar techniques into a comprehensive electronic-based system encompassing all
business functions both internal and external to an organization. These functions
include purchasing, sales/order entry, production, manufacturing, transportation, and
administration. EC is being used by commercial enterprises to establish systems,
capabilities, and procedures that improve day-to-day operations. EC is growing
rapidly as firms realize gains by providing fast, accurate and low cost exchange of
information. [Ref. 12]
One interesting point concerning EC addressed by the FAR definition concerns
its relationship to EDI. EDI is a subset ofEC, not equal to EC. In the past EDI may
have been seen as the sole option ofEC methods. This certainly is not the case today,
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as technological advances have broadened the scope and breath ofEC capabilities.
EDI is not equal to EC. EDI is one tool within many EC options. A firm does not
conduct EC by merely having the capability to use or conduct EDI transactions. EC
is transforming the paper-based paradigm into an electronic paradigm. EDI is but one
tool amongst many available within the electronic framework. Changing the paper
process into an electronic process that capitalizes on EDI capabilities follows the
form, fit, function, and intent ofEC initiatives. The all-encompassing definition is not
only written into regulation in the FAR, but is supported by the statements and intent
of: 1) DUSD Report, 20 December 1993, 2) National Performance Review,
September 1993, 3) Presidential Memorandum "Streamlining Procurement through
Electronic Commerce," 26 October 1993.
2. What is EDI?
EDI, one component of EC, is the computer to computer transmission of a
business document in a standard format. EDI, relatively new to many industries, is
generally viewed in two ways: strict and relaxed. Strict interpreters view "computer
to computer" transmissions as original-application-programs to processing-
application-programs. To purists, EDI consists of business data only. Furthermore,
they view standards as formats that have only been approved by a national or
international standards organization such as the Data Interchange Standards
Association (DISA). A more relaxed interpretation ofEDI would include third party
intermediary groups, such as Value Added Networks (VANs). This view would also
allow business data as well as additional verbiage or free form messages. EDI
formats developed by industry groups or individual companies would fall within this
relaxed EDI camp. [Ref. 13:p. 77]
Standard EDI documents that businesses exchange are called templates. There
are many different industry standards, as well as independent firm standards such as
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that of Wal-Mart, each having their own unique requirements. Fortunately, there is
a general trend towards consolidation of standards to the ANSI XI2 standard from the
American National Standard Institute (ANSI). ANSI XI2 is the standard for
inter-industry electronic interchange of business transactions. This is the current
standard adopted for DOD EDI usage. Many EDI experts also predict a future global
EDI standard. The basis for the universal standard will evolve from the United
Nations EDI For Administrative, Commercial and Trade (EDIFACT) standard. The
ANSI XI 2 committee is aligning the XI 2 standards to comply with international
EDIFACT standards by 1997. [Ref. 14:pp.4-12]
B. EDI HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
EDI has grown substantially from its birth in the transportation and later
petroleum industry. In the 1950s and 60s the high cost and technical barriers of
computer to computer exchange of information limited EDI usage to large firms. EDI
was well suited for the transportation and oil industry's highly repetitive exchange of
information such as purchase orders and shipment information. As the technical and
cost barriers decreased with advances in computer capabilities, more firms were
willing to use EDI with their trading partners. As the use of EDI greatly expanded
amongst various industries, the need and desire for one cross functional, all
encompassing EDI standard began to grow. Firms desired to expand EDI usage
outside of their specific industry. One EDI standard could expand EDI usage,
decrease EDI costs, as well as reduce the technical barriers to EDI. The intent of a
single EDI standard was to eliminate the need to create special software, as well as
receive or send user-unique data formats. It was envisioned one software package




The Petroleum Industry Data Exchange, and the Transportation Data
Coordination Committee are examples of early EDI industry standards. These early
industry-unique standards, however, greatly limited EDI usage in cross-functional,
business-wide applications. ANSI tackled the EDI standardization issue due to
pressure and cooperation from various EDI industry groups. From ANSI's efforts, the
ANSI XI2 EDI standard was born. Ideally the ANSI XI2 EDI standard would allow
any firm or industry the opportunity to transmit information electronically regardless
of the hardware or software of each participating firm. Firms not only anticipated
transmitting EDI information within their specific industry, but also amongst many
other industry groups. Despite ANSI's best intentions, there still are problems
associated with EDI standardization. [Ref. 15:p. 17] Due to the necessity of
satisfying all of the various industries using EDI, the ANSI XI2 standard is very
generic. In some cases there are several options to send the same type of information.
In order to accommodate this variance, an additional layer of control called
implementation conventions were developed to define the transactions in very clear
terms. Implementation conventions refine ANSI transaction sets by defining the
standard for data segments, elements, and code values. For example, the invoice
ANSI 810 transaction set can be used for invoice, progress payment, and as a voucher
depending upon the manner in which the data is displayed. Thus, before firms begin
to use EDI, an understanding between the firms must be fully understood in order to
be a trading partner. Although EDI has created a general framework and standard for
electronic transactions, the industry association still controls the implementation
conventions. EDI variability is still present amongst firms and industries.
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D. PROBLEMS WITH STANDARDIZATION
An oil executive attending the American Petroleum Institute 1995 EDI
Conference in Dallas, 25 September, 1995, announced his company's delay in
conforming to the petroleum implementation conventions. The executive's firm, a
large U.S. oil company, delayed their action due to the substantial cost required to
migrate his old legacy system to a new system capable of accommodating the
petroleum implementation convention. Large firms typically find it expensive to
convert to EDI conventions due to the high cost of hardware and software
conversions. This results in many smaller firms, suppliers to the larger firms,
managing and paying for two or more transaction sets such as the invoice 810
transaction set. Puccio recently confirms this trend in his E-Comm article, "Standards
or Suggestions?" Even with EDI standards, firms do not have to abide by the
standards. Puccio explains how one particular company was converting and
integrating EDI into their company's applications. Of the 20 trading partners, one
EDI capable firm was a particularly large corporation. This corporation incorrectly
used the planning schedule (830 transaction set) to send shipping data and the
shipping schedule (862 transaction set) to send forecasts. Because of the desire to
integrate all 830 and 862 transactions, data were screened prior to their insertion into
the company's databases. Ifa transaction originated from the large corporation, it first
was converted prior to uploading. The conversion task "quickly became more
complicated than designing the rest of the database systems. A significant delay in
the implementation was caused by this need to accommodate one of their largest
customers and that company's non-standard use ofEDI. The extra work probably cost
an extra three months of meeting, planning, designing, and finally programming."
The additional cost required to solve the problems associated with a non-conforming
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EDI firm, in this case $30,000-$60,000, was borne solely by the small firm. [Ref.
15:p. 17]
E. VALUE ADDED NETWORKS (VANs) AND VALUE ADDED
SERVICES (VASs)
Because of the variability in standards, many VANs and VASs continue to
play a significant role within EDI activities. An "EDI Forum" survey found 32% of
all EDI users subscribe to two or more VANs. [Ref. 16:p. 26] The dual VAN/VAS
subscription, in part, stems from the willingness of firms to satisfy its large "unique
EDI" customers, as Puccio's example indicates, as well as its other conforming EDI
trading partners. Rocketdyne, for example, uses a host of VANs in order to
accommodate their company's high volume of day-to-day EDI transactions. In this
example, Rocketdyne uses several VANs as its electronic mailbox. [Ref. 17]
Unfortunately, dual VAN/VAS relationships also drive up costs for many firms.
VANs and VASs, however, are better positioned to manage the EDI configuration
issues both across and amongst industry users. Thus a firm only pays or transmits to
a VAN or VAS, who then forwards the EDI transaction to the respective firm. VANs
or VASs can also provide additional services and opportunities to both expand and
increase business and EDI usage. G.E. Information Services, a Federal Government
certified VAN, has more than 40,000 EDI trading partners which new firms can build
upon to expand their business base. [Ref. 18] However, services provided by VANs
and VASs can be costly, especially to small businesses.
F. EC/EDI HISTORY AND BACKGROUND WITHIN DOD
Within DOD, EDI is not new. Promoting EDI usage in a 1988 memorandum,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense encouraged adoption of EDI methods based upon
numerous Federal studies, extensive commercial research, and actual EDI experience
base of nearly 20 years in both public and private sectors. This memorandum called
20
for military departments and defense agencies to make maximum use of EDI
methods. In 1990, EDI methods were again promoted by the Defense Management
Review Decision (DMRD) 94. DMRD strove to provide DOD "with the capability
to initiate, conduct, and maintain its external business related transactions and internal
logistics, contracting and financial activities without requiring the use of hard copy
media." [Ref. 4:p. 201] DMRD's revalidation in December 1992 not only promoted
the elimination of the paper paradigm in favor of an electronic paradigm but also
viewed EC as economically desirable due to the current political and economic
environment. Based upon anticipated DOD savings using EC/EDI methods,
substantial cuts in both manpower and funding were preprogrammed into future DOD
budgets. [Ref. 4:p. 202]
G. PRESIDENTIAL MANDATE FOR EC/EDI
On October 26, 1993, President Clinton issued an Executive Memorandum
titled "Streamlining Procurement Through Electronic Commerce." The President
committed the Federal Government to adopt and implement EC and EDI for all
appropriate Federal purchases as quickly as possible. One stated goal in this
memorandum, to be accomplished by January 1997, is to conduct Federal
Government purchases through electronic commerce methods. Due to the 1997
deadline, EC was propelled into the forefront of acquisition reform and changes to
existing procurement processes. Additional objectives of this memorandum were:
1
.
Exchange procurement information such as solicitations, offers,
contracts, purchase orders, invoices, payments, and other
contractual documents electronically between the private sector
and the Federal Government to the maximum extent practical;
2. Provide businesses, including small, small disadvantaged and
women-owned businesses with greater access to Federal
procurement opportunities;
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3. Ensure that potential suppliers have simplified access to Federal
Government's electronic commerce system;
4. Employ nationally and internationally recognized data formats
that serve to broaden and ease the electronic interchange of data;
and
5. Use agency and industry systems and networks to enable the
Government and potential suppliers to exchange information
and to access Federal procurement data. [Ref 19]
To implement EC and to achieve his objectives for EC, the President set forth
the following four milestones:
• By March 1994, define the architecture for the government-wide EC
acquisition system and identify executive departments or agencies
responsible for developing, implementing, operating, and maintaining
the Federal electronic system.
• By September 1994, establish an initial EC capability to enable the
Federal Government and private suppliers to electronically exchange
standardized requests for quotations (RFQs), quotes, purchase orders,
and notice of awards and begin government-wide implementation.
• By July 1995, implement a full-scale Federal EC system that expands
initial capabilities to include electronic payments, document
interchange, and supporting data bases.
• By January 1 997, complete government-wide implementation ofEC for
appropriate Federal purchases, to the maximum extent possible. [Ref.
19]
Due to the President's Mandate, there has been a flood of activity within all
areas in the Federal Government, including DOD and its various agencies, to make
EC a reality. [Ref. 20 :p. 29] DOD attempted to lead, aggressively, in EC/EDI
reform. Staunchly advocated by senior DOD leadership, such as Colleen Preston,
Deputy Under Secretary ofDefense for Acquisition Reform (DASD (AR)), EC/EDI
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was viewed, in many respects, as the golden panacea to solve many of the perceived
ills and inefficiencies ofDOD procurement. EC/EDI gains, if implemented properly,
indeed have the potential to:
Reduce bureaucratic red tape
Increase access of firms in the procurement process
Reduce paperwork and procurement costs
Reduce delays in acquisition
Increase Federal work force productivity
Increase customer service
Increase cost effectiveness of Government operations and efficiencies
[Ref. 13]
H. DUSD EC/EDI PROCESS ACTION TEAM (PAT) REPORT
On July 22, 1993, Colleen Preston, DUSD(AR), directed the chairman of the
Corporate Information Management (CIM) Procurement council to establish a PAT
in order to asses EC/EDI capabilities as well as develop a comprehensive EC
implementation plan. The team also was to assess current contracting capabilities in
the DOD EC/EDI infrastructure. The objectives of the team were:
• To develop a comprehensive plan for implementing an EC approach for
procurement functions consistent with the ANSI XI 2 standards.
• To develop a planning estimate for the resources and schedule required.
• To identify relevant policy issues.
The report, "DOD EC/EDI in Contracting Report," 20 December 1993, is in
effect, the EC manifesto within DOD. Due to the report, an EC/EDI office under
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DUSD (AR) was created, which is presently headed by Ms. Delores "Dee" Smith.
Because the plan was never formally accepted or supported by Director of Defense
Procurement (DDP), Ms. Eleanor Spector, the report became the defacto plan due to
the lack of any official stated EC policy, guidance or support for EC/EDI. The lack
of policy, guidance and leadership from DOD policy makers in USD (A&T), OSD,
or Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), other than Colleen Preston, has
limited the effectiveness of EDI implementation. [Ref. 21] Thus, any policy or
guidance not issued by Ms. Spector's office, such as EC/EDI "policy" statements
emanating from Ms. Preston's office, lack the appropriate authority to implement
policy, plans, or changes (See Appendixes C and D). Hence the report has become
the unofficial defacto DOD plan. In DOD, EC policy and EC/EDI implementation
are disconnected.
The strategic goal ofthe EC/EDI PAT team was to present a "single face to the
industry." "Single face to industry " was defined in the report as:
...performance ofEC by the Government using EDI in accordance with
Federal information processing standards and a common set ofbusiness
practices and operational principles. It must be a solution which allows
the vendor to be able to process the transaction to and/or from any
DOD activity, minimally subscribe to one VAN to do business with all
DOD, and register only once to become a DOD supplier (rather than
with each DOD component/activity). [Ref. 4:p. iii]
The strategy of the DOD plan focuses on the "single face to industry" concept
and the implementation of hardware to make "single face to industry " work. In
comparison, this only addresses one small aspect of successful EDI plans in the
private sector. Successful firms have an "integrated strategic plan in place to guide
EDI development and use. If EDI is to change the way a company does business,
then managers in all functional areas need to know what to expect and what will be
expected of them as the company's EDI capabilities develop." [Ref 22:p. 541] In
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this respect, the DOD plan fails. Little or no functional guidance or vision is available
in the DOD plan and, as discovered in recent USMC interviews for this report, no one
indicated what to expect nor what will be expected from them once EDI occurs.
Another implementation issue concerns the definition of "single face to
industry." As in the commercial sector, not every DOD agency or Service must be
identical, but certain processes must be "transparent" to the vendor, that is, it looks
the same to the user. DOD's interpretation of this concept appears to mean one single
common closed-loop architectural solution. Recent articles in Government Computer
News (GCN) and Federal Computer Week (FCW) highlight the problems associated
with a narrow interpretation of EC/EDI processes. Sprehe, president of Sprehe
Information Management Associates, Stern, Vice President of Marketing, Sterling
Software Inc.'s Federal EC Division, and Termin, editor of GCN, all point to DOD's
interpretation of "single face to industry" as a major inhibitor to the implementation
of EDI in DOD. The one-to-many vice the one-to-one solution is contrary to
commercial practices. Businesses have proven the advantages ofa single generic EDI
standard and a single set of business processes with all trading partners. Businesses
do not view the single face to industry as a systems architecture issue. [Ref. 23]
Flexibility is necessary in any EDI implementation in order to make EDI possible for
the firm's vendor base. One inherent benefit ofEDI is that firms don't dictate what
type of a system is necessary, only what EDI transaction standard will be used. It is
this flexibility that Mr. Temin refers to. The technological advances in EDI using
internet technologies or messaging standards may ensure that the system being
created by DOD is outdated when it is fully functioning and operational. By defining
"single face to industry" as an architectural issue, the necessary flexibility required
to conduct and expand future EC/EDI activity may be drastically reduced.
"NetworkWorld" reported such limitations as Government EDI usage was "bogged
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down" while "commercial EDI usage is soaring." The Government has more than 21
million small purchases each year, yet only 57,536 Request for Quotations (RFQs)
and purchases were sent via EDI gateways run by DISA. Ofthe thousands ofvendors
who do business with the Government only 47 have registered with the government's
national trading partner database. [Ref. 24 :p. 43] For DOD, EC/EDI usage has fallen
well below its original expectations, such as the desire for more than 350,000
electronic trading partners by the end of FY96. [Ref. 25 :p. iv] Reflecting the slow
pace ofEC/EDI activity, most Federal Agency heads acknowledge that they will not
meet President Clinton's 1997 EC/EDI Mandate. [Ref. 26:p. 1]
The Federal Electronic Commerce Acquisition Team completed its report
titled, "Streamlining Procurement Through Electronic Commerce: Final Report."
nearly one year after the completion of the DUSD's EC/EDI Report. Although the
Federal Report hadDOD representatives participating, the report is substantially more
flexible in its interpretation of EC/EDI. The Federal EC/EDI Report is much more
accommodating to advancing technologies such as messaging and internet
technology. Jim Oravec, consultant for KPMG Peat Marwick on EC issues, stated
that the Federal EC/EDI plan is excellent. It is so good the state of California may use
or duplicate parts of the plan in its drive to convert to EC methods. The Federal plan
is practical, flexible, and much more in line with commercial EC/EDI practices.
According to Mr. Oravec, the Federal version is not looked upon favorably within
DOD. This is due to its general interpretation of "single face to the industry" versus
DOD's strict architectural interpretation of "single face to the industry." [Ref. 27]
Regrettably, there is also confusion as to which plan is the EC/EDI plan. DOD is part
of the Federal Government. DOD sent representatives to the Federal Electronic
Commerce Acquisition Team who participated in developing the Federal plan. DOD,
however, does not appear to recognize the Federal plan. Answering questions about
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DOD's progress concerning EC/EDI implementation in April, 1996, Ms Dee Smith,
Director ofDOD's EC/EDI Office, did not recognize the Federal plan, only DUSD's
EC plan. [Ref. 28] There is confusion as to which "vision" and definition of "single
face to the industry" is the correct version.
Further in-depth investigation into DUSD's implementation plan is not within
the scope of this investigation. However, several of Monczka's concepts within
DUSD's Report have not been resolved more than two years after the issuance of the
unofficial implementation plan. These issues are:
• Develop a Legal Approach
• Finalize Policy and Procedure
• Establish Audit Approach
Certainly the schism between DDP and DUSD(AR) mentioned above is an
example of the policy issue. A legal example is the U.S. Navy's suspension of
FACNET transactions due to the unresolved legal ramifications and issues such as
lack of trading partner agreements, unworkable and unenforceable central contractor
registration procedures, and DISA's inability to ensure procurement integrity within
the FACNET architecture. The inability for DOD to integrate EDI within DFAS in
order to make electronic payments also displays problems in DOD's audit approach,
planning, and lack of integration efforts.
I. MARINE CORPS EC/EDI EXPERIENCE
Marine Corps experience with EC/EDI is limited. The Marines use e-mail and
have Marine Corps wide e-mail connectivity. It is slowly expanding its e-mail
connectivity to the internet, but is very cautious in doing so. [Ref. 29] Contracting
offices are also wired into the Marine Corps Wide Area Network (WAN) and use
e-mail within the Marine Corps. Unfortunately any EC activities are presently limited
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to e-mail within the Marine Corps WAN except for one office in Kansas City which
is fully EC/EDI capable due to its use of an Army automated procurement system.
Contracting offices presently do not contact their vendor base using e-mail methods,
but do make extensive use ofFAXes if applicable. Bar coding technology is used by
military units for tracking logistic assets such as Fleet Service Support Group (FSSG)
as it offloads Maritime Pre-Positioning Ships (MPS). (Author witnessed bar code
usage during exercises at White Beach, Okinawa, Japan, March 1995). Another
office, Camp Lejeune, is working on transitioning from a paper process to an
electronic process, but relies on its own expertise, experience, and funding to move
towards a paperless paradigm. Lejeune's efforts are independent of the EC/EDI
initiatives that affect their site and their automated procurement system.
Unfortunately, the Marine Corps' automated procurement system is a large hurdle and
negative influence to overcome in the move towards EC/EDI within the Marine
Corps.
J. EC/EDI ASSOCIATION TO THE MARINE CORPS' AUTOMATED
PROCUREMENT SYSTEM
The Marine Corps' EC/EDI experience is directly related to their automated
procurement system, Base Contracting Automated System/Menu Assisted Data Entry
System (BCAS/MADES). BCAS is an on-line Air Force mini computer system based
on a Wang computer configuration. It provides abstracts, written solicitations,
purchase and delivery orders, basic agreements and contracts. MADES is an added
component which interfaces with the BCAS system in order to help prepare the
office's solicitation and contract. The EC/EDI capabilities are not integral to the
system, but stand alone as an added system that interoperates with BCAS. The buyer
utilizes a different hardware/software configuration to complete transmissions
electronically than they do for conventional purchase transactions. The MADES
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version running on the BCAS Wang platform having EC/EDI expanded capabilities
is commonly referred to as MADES II. [Ref. 4:pp. 34-51] Hence, the attitude of
EC/EDI is intrinsically associated to the BCAS/ MADES system because it is part of,
operates within and complimentary to the BCAS/MADES system. Because of this
association, a brief history of BCAS/MADES is necessary. (Author visited three
separate offices to interview personnel about EC/EDI. Without exception, statements
were only given on the basis that responses are to remain anonymous).
K. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF BCAS/MADES
The Air Force - designed BCAS/MADES program, written in COBOL, was
initially bought to temporarily fulfill the need for an automated procurement system
for Marine Corps contracting needs. Although other factors were considered, the
major factor in the selection ofBCAS/MADES was cost. BCAS/MADES would be
inexpensive for Marine Corps use. Although perceived as a low cost "temporary,
quick fix" alternative, in hindsight life-cycle costs are excessive and maintainability
is difficult. Most purchasing agents and system administrators generally indicate the
current BCAS/MADES system is difficult to use, is slowly becoming unsupportable,
and is not a user friendly system. Because of this, many contracting personnel do not
use the system and even find ways to bypass the system.
Although not within the scope of this research, the issues concerning
BCAS/MADES that pose problems for contracting offices and as well as develop a
negative attitude concerning the system are:
Hardware availability - Hardware costs are high and must be Wang specific;
Modularity - Much of the documentation and workarounds to add capabilities
to the COBOL system are not documented and the individuals who worked on the
system are no longer available. COBOL is an older, less used, and slowly a less
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supportable language. The Air Force presently trains its personnel on COBOL in
order to sustain its needs for the BCAS/MADES systems;
Sustainability - BCAS/MADES is fast becoming expensive and difficult to
maintain. Marine Corps ADP do not support the Wang equipment. Because of this,
Wang maintenance service must be contracted out. Most offices find only Wang
personnel can repair the system since no local firms use the outdated Wang system.
Wang repairmen have also made comments that even Wang may not support the
BCAS/MADES system in the future, assuming Wang continues to be a viable firm
in the computer industry. The continued supportability ofthe BCAS/MADES system
is questionable;
Non commercial based technology - Industry has progressed through several
generations of computing capabilities and have migrated towards an easier and more
user friendly Windows/ Apple/Unix point and click environment.
L. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BCAS/MADES II OFFICES
LBO believes all contracting offices are using BCAS/MADES and have the
most current updates to the system. This is not true. Of the three contracting offices
there are three distinct differences concerning the use ofBCAS/MADES. Only one
office extensively uses BCAS/MADES. Furthermore all offices have different
versions of the system at their sites. Thus the perception and belief of
BCAS/MADES at LBO sharply contradicts with the actual occurrences at the
contracting offices. LBO also indicates the contracting offices and their system
administrators are responsible to make BCAS/MADES work. Field office personnel
reverse that view and indicate that HQMC is responsible to manage "their" system,
particularly with respect to updates and EC/EDI expanded capabilities. Field offices
are reluctant to contact Air Force representatives for BCAS/MADES updates or other
information due to negative repercussions by LBO. Unfortunately, when left to LBO
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personnel, updates sent to contracting offices were incorrectly copied onto discs and
were useless to the contracting offices. Due to action, inaction and poor performance,
LBO has lost both its credibility and reputation in its management of the BCAS/
MADES configuration as well as its ability to manage computer issues for the
contracting offices. The field office "computer experts" are now the local system
administrators, not LBO personnel. Contracting officers do not trust LBO on
computer issues, particularly since LBO "forced" BCAS/MADES upon them. Thus
any comments or guidance concerning EC/EDI is unfavorably received by field office
personnel because of its "tainted" association with LBO and the BCAS/MADES
system. A closer look at the individual offices and how they work with or work
around BCAS/MADES is particularly revealing. Generally, field offices either
grudgingly accept or do not accept BCAS/MADES.
In contracting office # 1 , BCAS/MADES was used extensively. Although users
indicated it was difficult and hard to use, the office was able to fully implement the
BCAS/MADES system. During initial implementation difficulties of the system,
system administrators and contracting personnel were sent to a local Air Force Base
(AFB) in order to obtain training necessary to implement, use, and manage the
system. An LBO implementation team present at the site also went to the AFB for
training since they too were not trained on the BCAS/MADES system. The ability
to use the BCAS/MADES system was completed, but never garnered praise due to its
operational and implementation difficulties. This particular office was the only office
to obtain AFB training on BCAS/MADES. The inexperience of the LBO
BCAS/MADES installation team and the difficulties in implementing the procure-
ment system irreparably harmed LBO's reputation as "experts" on computer issues.
Word also spread to other offices concerning BCAS/MADES difficulties.
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Office #2 did not use BCAS/MADES or used it only in exceptions. This in
large part was shaped by the implementation ofBCAS/MADES. Unfortunately for
this office, the initial installation ofBCAS/MADES occurred during the absence of
their local system administrator. The LBO team installed the BCAS/MADES system
and promptly departed the area. Unbeknownst to LBO personnel, the entire
contracting computer system crashed after BCAS was brought on-line. This left the
entire office without computer capabilities for approximately one week. The local
administrator was immediately forced to bring their system back on line. The poor
start was ominous. No one wanted to shut down the entire LAN by using
BCAS/MADES. This office did not even want BCAS/MADES accessible to its
contracting personnel. Time and energy was spent on ways to circumvent the
BCAS/MADES difficulties with other applications. They also shared their
workarounds with other offices. At the present time, BCAS/MADES is only used in
extreme exceptions, if at all.
Office #3's opinion ofBCAS/MADES was split between the military and the
civilian workforce. The military personnel viewed BCAS/MADES as the only system
the Corps had and they were going to use it despite being user unfriendly. The senior
military contracting specialist was the predominant BCAS/MADES user within the
office. The civilian workforce did not share the military's willingness to use
BCAS/MADES, and preferred to use alternatives if possible. If opportunities arose
to avoid BCAS most workers generally prefer non-BCAS/MADES methods. In
essence half the workforce surmised if this was the best the Marine Corps could
provide, they would do their best to use and learn the system despite their negative
viewpoint ofthe system. The other half ofthe workforce did not share that viewpoint
and would use alternatives or workaround solutions to BCAS/MADES.
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In general BCAS/MADES is viewed as difficult to use, but can be made to
work if extensive training is provided. Due to its age, BCAS/MADES is, indeed, a
difficult system which intimidates its users. Generally BCAS/MADES is viewed as
an unnecessary burden to use. Hence, BCAS/MADES is to be avoided if possible.
M. EC/EDI AND BCAS/MADES
Because EC/EDI is an additional feature to BCAS/MADES, EC/EDI is not
viewed in a positive light. If mandated to use EC/EDI, offices would also be forced
to use BCAS/MADES. Much energy and time was spent attempting to use a
windows application workaround solution to BCAS/MADES requirements, database,
and form reports. Thus EC/EDI is not looked upon favorably because of the
requirement that EC/EDI must operate within the BCAS/MADES environment. The
schedule to install EC/EDI capabilities, delayed due to technical difficulties, only
confirmed the field offices' negative association of BCAS/MADES and LBO's
computer expertise. Offices were not informed of implementation delays concerning
the EC/EDI updates, which only compounds the field offices' opinion that LBO is
incompetent in ADP issues. There is no credibility or trust between HQMC and the
contracting offices concerning ADP, BCAS/MADES, or EC/EDI issues. The
schedule to implement EC/EDI is approximately one year behind schedule.
Transmission Control Protocol/Interent Protocol (TCP/IP) compatibility issues are at
the heart of the problem.
MADES TCP/IP requirements at Air Force bases are slightly different than at
Marine Corps bases. As mentioned earlier, BCAS/MADES is an Air Force solution.
BCAS/MADES works on Air Force Bases but did not work on Marine Bases. Since
the Marine Corps has only 27 bases with BCAS/MADES, the Marine Corps is not a
significant customer for BCAS/MADES. The priority to fix the Marine problems
within BCAS/MADES was not high. Neither LBO nor the PM viewed EC/EDI
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implementation problems as a high priority. According to the PM, no one worked
on EC/EDI related issues since January 1995. As ofFebruary 5, 1996, Marine Corps
ADP personnel in Quantico, Virginia have developed a valid workaround solution and
are awaiting approval from HQMC to proceed in implementing EC/EDI Marine
Corps wide. Thus the EC/EDI delay only fuels continued mistrust and negative
attitudes of BCAS/MADES, which also negatively influences EC/EDI within the
Marine Corps.
N. AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE: STANDARD AUTOMATED
CONTRACTING SYSTEM (SACONS)
The automated procurement system in Kansas City, unlike BCAS/MADES,
is viewed in a very positive and enthusiastic manner by its users. The Kansas City
office uses a form of CACI's Standard Army Automated Contracting System
(SAACONS). It is an IBM compatible system with three upgradeable functional
modules: contracting, small purchases, and requisition entry. SACONS is a
derivative of a Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) automated procurement system
from CACI, Inc. The problems and attitudes associated with BCAS/MADES are not
present with SACONS. The program is a point and click user friendly system.
Procurement personnel like to use the system because of its ease ofuse. It is accepted
and viewed upon favorably by all users. The installation ofEC/EDI capabilities also
sharply contrasts the BCAS/MADES experience.
In contrast to BCAS/MADES users, Kansas City's SACONS EC/EDI upgrade
was an easy and painless process to add on to their system. EC/EDI capabilities are
integrated within the operating system. SACONS "has been tested or integrated with
EDI efforts by 1 1 civilian organizations, including the Interior Department. SACONS
already supported many EDI services, but by joining with DOD's EC/EDI
infrastructure, SACONS participants gained easy access to DOD network gateways.
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They now can connect to a pair of entry points for value-added networks (VANs) at
DOD megacenters in Columbus, Ohio, and Ogden, Utah. To set up a typical EDI
transaction, a procurement official uses a specific application to generate a purchase
order, request for proposals or request for quotes. These documents go to a gateway
or, the DOD EC/EDI infrastructure. There they are translated into the XI
2
transaction set of the American National Standards Institute's Accredited Standards
Committee. The XI 2 set then is relayed to one of the megacenters for distribution to
participating certified VANs." [Ref. 30:p. 1] Furthermore CACI also trained Kansas
City personnel on the added EC/EDI feature in the contracting offices, at their
convenience. CACI also helped coordinate an EC/EDI vendors conference for
Kansas City in order to educate their vendors on EC/EDI and its impact on the local
vendor base. The conversion to EC/EDI capabilities was an easy process. With one
keystroke or click of the mouse, the EC/EDI option ofSACONS is initiated. Kansas
City's conversion to EC/EDI also did not cause any problems or burdens to their
operations. Due to the smooth and effortless transition to EC/EDI, Kansas City's
viewpoint of EC/EDI is positive. Unfortunately for the Marine Corps, Kansas City
is the only base using SACONS. Therefore, the positive attitude of EC/EDI is the
exception at Kansas City, not the rule, for Marine Corps activities.
In summary, the viewpoints ofEC/EDI within the contracting community are
intrinsically associated with the negative BCAS/MADES opinion. As such, EC/EDI
is viewed negatively. Since individuals are not being informed of the problems
encountered with EC/EDI implementation, the implementation delay only confirms
their negative bias towards EC/EDI, BCAS/MADES, and LBO computer expertise.
DOD's EC/EDI implementation problems, delays, slow acceptance of EC/EDI
reaffirms the opinion that EC/EDI is presently not a good idea for Marine Corps
contracting offices or its vendors. Furthermore, the de-emphasis and low priority
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given to the implementation ofEC/EDI within the Marine Corps, as exhibited in little
or no EC/EDI activity since January, 1995, leads to inaction at the contracting offices.
Illustrating the unwillingness to move forward with EC/EDI implementation at the
local level, a Marine Corps contracting officer stated, "let me know when you get it
[EC/EDI] fixed." [Ref. 31]
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IV. INDUSTRY SUCCESS IN EC/EDI IMPLEMENTATION
A. STRATEGIC VISION AND PLAN
Two critical factors necessary for management support are vision for EC/EDI
methods and a strategic plan to reach that vision. As indicated by EDI authors
Oravec, Monczka, Hinge, and others, successful EC/EDI implementation originates
from a sound strategic plan. The implementation ofEC/EDI then follows the goals
and plans of the strategy. In this respect, R.J. Reynolds (RJR) is an excellent
commercial example. The corporate/subsidiary relationship of RJR is parallel to the
DOD/USMC relationship.
RJR, a firm in excess of $88 million dollars in total assets, is divided into two
subsidiaries: RJR Tobacco (RJRT), and RJR Nabisco (RJRN). In its December 1995
10-K report to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), RJRT reported $7.8
billion dollars in U.S. and international sales. RJRT represents 48% of total net sales
for the parent corporation RJR. [Ref. 32] Senior management at RJR decided to
move towards an EC/EDI process for their corporation in 1987. [Ref. 4:pp. 110-111]
This greatly affected RJRT, particularly in their purchasing and payment systems.
EDI activities originating in the procurement and purchasing departments, such as
Just in Time (JIT) features that EDI promotes, were increasing and approaching
critical mass. This had a corollary effect in the payment system. The payment
processing workload dramatically increased due to more frequent and smaller orders
that JIT creates. Because of this, RJRT believed EDI was not only the cause of the
increased workload, but was also viewed as the solution to their problem. Thus in
March of 1 99 1 , RJRT developed a strategy not to just automate the old paper payment
process, "but to obliterate the old process." [Ref. 33:pp. 10-19] The intent of the
change was to dramatically improve the ability to pay their bills accurately and on
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time. The various goals and objectives that emanated from this strategy were as
follows:
Make payments timely and accurately with an emphasis on simplicity,
speed, and enhanced levels of service;
Rebuild an efficient payment process from the ground up;
Streamline work flows;
Capture data at the source with minimal of handling;
Eliminate non-critical tasks that did not add value to the payment
function;
Empower and encourage employees to contribute and suggest changes;
Re-evaluate the core functions of accounts payable and focus on the 80
to 90% that were routine tasks. [Ref. 33:pp. 10-19]
As a consequence to RJR's planning efforts, the basic strategy, plan, goals, and
objectives were in place. Prior to implementation everyone in RJRT knew the
strategy was to "obliterate" the paper process and could collectively work towards that
goal in the implementation process. A clear, focused strategy laid the groundwork
for support of purchasing personnel, support of management, and cross-functional
commitment to EDI. RJRT and all of its employees could move forward and make
EDI a reality.
B. OBTAIN MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
In RJR's example, four major critical success factors stand out in their
approach to obtain management support:
1 . Their belief and desire for fundamental and radical change, achieved
through business process re-engineering, as evidenced in their
"obliterate" the paper process strategy;
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2. Their vision that all transactions be electronic;
3. Their development of a strategic plan, goals, and objectives to move
from the current process to an electronic vision and process;
4. Their suppliers desire to cooperate with RJR in order to move forward
in implementing EC/EDI. [Ref. 33:pp. 10-19]
Within RJRT, EC/EDI also gained immediate management support and
commitment required for the project's success. Senior leadership at RJR supported
EC/EDI methods. The corporation's upper level management support and
commitment led RJR's subsidiaries towards early acceptance and use of EC/EDI
methods. EC/EDI was essential in order for RJRT to switch to an electronic
purchasing and payment process. [Ref. 33:pp. 10-19]
Another firm, Priester Supply Company, an electronic and telephone supply
company, credits its implementation's success to top management's unconditional
support ofEC/EDI implementation. [Ref. 34:p. 29]. EDI World Institute emphasizes
commitment and involvement of management as one of four critical factors in EDI
implementation success. Everest Frozen Foods also credits senior management
support and direction as essential to successful EDI implementation. [Ref. 34:p. 32]
In addition to management support, EDI implementation must also have the support
and backing of purchasing personnel.
C. ESTABLISH PURCHASING SUPPORT
Purchasing support is "absolutely necessary to develop the commitment
required for EDI success." [Ref. l:p. 15] "Purchasers are the primary users ofEDI
and will be the communicators to outside suppliers about the necessity, importance,
and benefits ofEDI." [Ref. l:p. 15] RJR chose to implement EDI first in purchasing
which laid the foundation for early support and commitment from purchasing
managers and personnel. Furthermore, RJR purchasing personnel did not just
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communicate benefits ofEDI to its supplier base, they followed verbal support with
action. RJR paid for all EDI transition costs in order to make EDI occur with the last
5% oftheir suppliers. By paying for suppliers to switch to EDI methods, RJR quickly
garnered the support of purchasing management and personnel. Without such
support, implementation would be "very difficult to complete." [Ref. l:p. 15]
Purchasing support and use ofEDI also affected operations in other subsidiaries and
organizations.
As workloads in other areas increased, such as more frequent payments and
purchase orders, other managers also began to view EDI as a way to make their
operations more efficient. Purchasing personnel were in favor of increased EDI use
as any improvements in the electronic process greatly complimented their electronic
process. Moves to improve the accuracy and service to its customers and suppliers
through EDI, such as more timely and accurately payments or enhanced levels of
service, were looked upon favorably by purchasing personnel; such benefits could be
communicated to their suppliers, therefore reinforcing the benefits and investment in
EDI. [Ref. 33:pp. 10-19] Another example of purchasing support comes from a
similar large U.S. firm, 3M. 3M also began EDI within the purchasing departments
in 1987 and expanded to the financial departments in 1991. A senior executive
management meeting was held at 3M to discuss how EDI greatly benefited the
accounts payable department. This meeting led to increased support and commitment
from executives and managers in both the purchasing and finance departments. [Ref.
35:p. 50] Purchasing support is important, however a commitment to EDI must also
permeate the organization.
D. DEVELOP CROSS FUNCTIONAL COMMITMENT TO EDI
RJR's commitment to an electronic process was firm and unquestionable.
RJR's pursuit of an entire electronic paradigm lasted six years. Senior management
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supported EDI in 1987, and in 1993 all transactions were completely electronic within
RJR. [Ref. 4:pp. 110-111] Hence RJR's commitment weathered a six year duration
which, ultimately, led to a 100% electronic process. This transition involved 1,800
trading partners with over 6,000 purchase orders annually. In this conversion, the last
5% of RJR's suppliers did not desire to switch to EC/EDI methods. RJR invested
$40,000 of their own money in order to transition the last 5% of their suppliers into
electronic trading partners. [Ref. 4:pp. 110-111] RJR was extremely committed to
make their processes electronic, to include paying for the last remaining suppliers
who could not afford EC/EDI, or did not have the expertise, time, or desire to make
EC/EDI occur. RJR made EC/EDI a reality. In a similar fashion, Mobile also
subsidized its 540 lubricant product distributors nationwide when it forced them to
use EDI methods. Mobile helped cover the costs for personal computers, software,
and training necessary to conduct electronic transactions with the company.
Interestingly, 20% of that group now use EDI with other electronic trading partners.
[Ref. 24:p. 43]
RJR's commitment and message to the subsidiaries of RJR was clear: EDI
usage would be a company wide initiative. RJRT, sensing the change EDI was
bringing to their organization, began to look at other functional areas EDI could be
applied to within their subsidiary. Hence the initial EDI purchasing methods began
to drive other functional areas towards EDI. Soon EDI was viewed by finance
managers within the organization as an answer to increase responsiveness and account
billing. RJRT immediately received management's commitment, in both people and
money, to ensure EDI was successful. [Ref. 34:pp. 10-19] Another example of cross
functional commitment and company wide support is Dannon.
Dannon Company, famous for yogurt, rapidly received support for EDI from
three important stakeholders within Dannon. Dannon's triumvirate billet holders, all
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acting and sharing the chief of information officer title, were excited about the
opportunities EDI would bring to their company. The positions and responsibilities
of the triumvirate cover very different functional areas: Mark Nelsen, Director of
Sales and Marketing, Crystal Kennedy, Director of Information services, and Richard
Kravchuk, Director of Manufacturing Systems. "Our sales force is solidly behind
EDI. Many customers have demanded it and our salespeople want to provide it as an
additional sales tool. There's a strong perceived need for it," says Nelsen. Thus the
widespread support from the different functional company areas, in Dannon's case
sales, information systems, and manufacturing, are clear examples ofthe commitment
EC/EDI requires from all personnel within the organization. Cross functional support
is necessary and essential to successful EC/EDI implementation. [Ref. 36:p. 64]
E. ORGANIZE FOR EDI
Organizing for EDI can happen in many forms. Jim Oravec mentions two
forms: centralized and decentralized. Large firms who centralize EDI functions and
leadership tend to be more successful in implementing EDI. GE, DuPont, and Texas
Instruments, are examples of successful centralization of EDI implementation
programs. "Others without central EDI direction have struggled." [Ref. 37:p. 1]
Centralization, a contributing factor in successful EDI implementation, can be
conducted by one full-time person even in large Fortune 500 firms. [Ref. 37:p. 1]
Centralization also reinforces one of the model's successful traits; EC/EDI leadership
is firmly established.
EDI leadership is also accompanied by or manifested through either an EDI
team, steering committee, or a combination ofthe two. Cross functional participation
and involvement is both necessary and essential in organizing for EDI. "User
ownership of design and implementation is crucial because users will be managing
the automated work flow." [Ref. 38:pp. 90-93] In this respect, 3M established an
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EDI procurement team. 3M contributes much of its EDI success to the single highly
coordinated unit which works closely on EDI efforts. If problems occur at any level
in any organization, internally, externally, or in other functional areas, all parties
know they can turn to the team for help and quick resolution. Current and future EDI
plans and procedures are also managed by the EDI team. 3M has designed a "one
stop" shopping concept for all its EDI needs. Rocketdyne also has set up a similar
concept in its use of Rockwell's Information Systems Center EDI Team.
Additionally, Rocketdyne can turn to its EC Council/Rockwell EDI User Group for
further assistance. RJRT also founded a 10 member team composed of managers,
supervisors, and information resource personnel. This team quickly expanded to
other functional areas with the addition of personnel from purchasing, controllers,
traffic and auditing. Once functional participation and organization occurs, a pilot
program can begin to form.
F. ESTABLISH A PILOT PROGRAM
Monczka and Hinge indicate the need to test the pilot product prior to full EDI
implementation. There are several clear examples relating to EDI pilot tests. NASA,
for example, is currently testing pilot projects to make all purchases below $500,000
available electronically through EDI methods, based on the internet. Premenos, an
EDI services company, also is testing several internet-based EDI pilot projects. Most
firms who participate in Premenos' s Templar project are now running independent
pilot programs at their respective companies. [Ref. 39:p. 18] Premenos also is
actively scouting for firms interested in a pilot project that would offer secure
encrypted and authenticated EDI transactions. [Ref. 40 :p. 54]
CargoNet, a private EDI service supported by many transportation firms within
Hong Kong, conducted four months of testing at selected pilot installations. The
integrated approach of CargoNet reaped praise and support from Hong Kong's
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business community. The pilot project was quickly supported by development
partners representing all segments of the trade and transport community in Hong
Kong. [Ref. 41:p. 3] CargoNet's EDI was specifically tailored to allow freight for-
warders, consolidators, shipping lines, airlines and terminals meet the needs of cargo
shippers and consignees. CargoNet's pilot project achieved successful EDI
transactions in its initial four month test that its governmental counterpart, Tradelink,
was unable to do in almost a decade. [Ref. 42 :p. 22]
Dannon also ran a test pilot prior to full implementation. Dannon initiated a
four month long testing period with several of its customer grocery chains. The sole
purpose of the pilot was to learn, understand and become educated on EDI methods.
Crystal Kennedy, Dannon's director of information services states one of Dannon's
biggest lessons in the pilot program "was the need to link our finished goods
inventory with the EDI network." [Ref. 36:p. 64] Pierre Belvedere Inc. of Montreal
spent approximately $15,000 in research, testing, and software consultant work to
build its pilot system. [Ref. 43 :p. 48] In successful EDI organizations the precedent
is not only clear to have a pilot project as part of the implementation process, but also
to have an evaluation method for the pilot project.
G. REVIEW PILOT RESULTS AND MODIFY
Croner-Tyco Toys, an Australian toy distributor and subsidiary of U.S.
Tyco-Toys, "handles 12,000 to 15,000 order lines per month, 6,500 ofwhich typically
involve a value of less than $1.50 and an order quantity of one." [Ref. 34:p. 50] The
frequent low dollar, low quantity orders was inefficient. According to Croner-Tyco
Toys national operations manager Paul Carter, EDI is the answer to efficiently solve
the company's numerous low dollar and low quantity purchase orders. Although
Croner now plans to integrate EDI into their accounting, inventory and order
processing systems, their first try at EDI was unsuccessful.
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Croner began its EDI association in 1988. During a briefEDI pilot project with
K-Mart, Croner was unsatisfied with the results of its EDI pilot. Croner and their
customers were unwilling to use and commit to EDI methods. This led to the pilot's
poor demonstration, lackluster performance, and initial demise ofEDI within Croner.
Croner's pilot project was unsuccessful and unacceptable to the firm as well as its
customers. During the 1991-1992 time frame, both Croner and its customer base
developed a new interest in EC/EDI. Croner, bought and renamed Croner-Tyco Toys
by U.S. based Tyco-Toys, was pressured to increase the efficiency of its distribution
system. For their new EDI pilot project, Croner-Tyco Toys would look at an
integrated EDI process. In their second try at EDI both Croner-Tyco Toys and their
customer/vendor base were committed to EC/EDI. Accordingly the technology,
comfort level, efficiencies, and savings of an integrated EC/EDI solution were now
acceptable to all parties. As in Croner's example, pilot projects may not all be
successful for each and every EDI pilot project. However, a willingness for leaving
options open, re-evaluating results and methods of the pilot, and modifying the
project are qualities of successful EDI programs. Just as pilot projects change to fit
various implementation plans, changes in policies and procedures must also be
considered in the implementation of EDI.
H. CHANGE POLICY AND PROCEDURE
In a September 1995 EDI World article, Rocketdyne was featured for its
successful implementation ofEDI. One strong aspect of Rocketdyne's plan lies in its
development of EDI policies and procedures. Rocketdyne approached its supplier
base to move towards EDI. An EDI process flow was conducted to iron out
information for EDI, protocol, personnel and points of contact. Rocketdyne, for
example, would help shepherd its small business suppliers through the EDI process.
Within a few weeks hardware, software, and transaction sets were quickly established
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by the participating firms. A trading partner agreement followed and a comprehen-
sive understanding of the policies and procedures were in place. Rocketdyne also
educated their suppliers thereby enhancing their EDI knowledge and increasing the
probability that EDI implementation would be successful. Based upon their EDI
experience, Rocketdyne now has the following policies concerning EDI:
• Maximize the use ofEDI for procurement
• Require suppliers to be EDI capable (with some exceptions extending
to small businesses)
• Achieve 90% of all suppliers via EDI
• Integrate EDI to balance of purchase ordering systems




Identify systems and procedures affected by EDI implementation and
the policies and procedures to support EDI;
2. Develop EDI suppliers and define what those suppliers will be expected
to do;
3. Establish a contractual agreement to do business electronically;
4. Establish the internal policy, procedures and personnel mechanisms
required to support electronic activity. [Ref. 17]
As indicted above, education was an integral procedure within Rocketdyne's
process. Education is vital in the implementation ofEDI.
I. DEVELOP KNOWLEDGE, EXPERIENCE, AND EDUCATION
As part of the education process 3M continually conducted EDI Seminars for
its suppliers. In 1995 at least six seminars were held for 3M's suppliers to attend.
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According to Vince Schoon, a portion of 3M's seminars are "dedicated to explaining
and communicating the advantages of EDI in general and the added benefits gained
for integration." [Ref. 35 :p. 5 1 ] 3M also included financial EDI education taught by
its accounting EDI team members. The purpose of this was to explain the benefits of
financial EDI transactions. 3M also educates suppliers on the hurdles suppliers must
overcome in order to receive funds and remittance advice electronically. [Ref. 35 :p.
50] Pratt and Whitney learned it needed to better educate both its EDI software/
network vendors as well as its suppliers in order to successfully implement an
electronic supplier relationship. [Ref. 44 :p. 11] Once basic fundamentals are
established, such as education, broad based implementation can begin.
J. BROAD BASED IMPLEMENTATION
In the broad based implementation a trend emerges in using the purchase order
850 and Functional Acknowledgment 997 transaction sets. These two sets are
generally part of the initial pilot tests. Shortly thereafter, the use of other transaction
sets, greatly effects and broadens the scope and breadth of implementation. Once the
use and acceptance of EDI purchase orders grows, EDI spreads across the
organization to include cross functional areas, as well as between companies. 3M's,
RJR's, Priester Supply Company's, Teradyne Connection Systems's, Dannon's, and
Rocketdyne's supplier bases all initiated EDI broad based implementation with the
purchase order. Once successful, newly EDI trained personnel began to infect other
functional areas and press for continued integration of EDI, particularly in finance
departments. In the twelve case studies conducted by EDI World Institute [Ref.
34:pp. 22-23], all twelve broadly implemented the 850 purchase or the 810 invoice
transaction set. All twelve also indicate a desire to expand the use of EDI or to
integrate EDI capabilities internally and cross functionally. For RJR and 3M, the 850
EDI purchase order complemented JIT's process, frequent orders, and increased
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billings. To compensate and adjust for increased billing, 810 EDI invoices were
quickly brought on line. Once broad implementation occurs, a procedure to review
and measure benefits in addition to costs is necessary.
K. REVIEW RESULTS AND COSTS/BENEFITS ANALYSIS
A method to review the EDI process is necessary, particularly as more
suppliers and vendors conduct transactions electronically. In many firms this is
handled by a committee or by the designated EDI expert. As indicated above, 3M
consolidated this function to its EDI procurement team. 3M contributes much of its
EDI success to the single highly coordinated unit which works closely with its EDI
participants. In a review of its EDI implementation, 3M discovered EDI suppliers are
more likely to receive timely payments. 3M also discovered "invoices received via
EDI have an additional 7% chance ofbeing paid on time due to the completeness and
accuracy ofthe invoices." [Ref. 35 :p. 51] Because 3M receives 1 .2 million purchases
orders annually, increased EDI accuracy has had a positive affect on its operations.
Catnic, a British manufacturing firm, discovered two valuable lessons in its review
of EDI: 1) customers value EDI links and 2) the expenditure of funds to implement
EDI is not cost prohibitive and is decreasing with technological advances in hardware
and software. [Ref. 45:pp. 14-16] In Nissan's review of EDI, it found an immediate
reduction in labor required for mailings, reduction in errors, and a shortening of
lead-time for delivery information to their supplier base. [Ref. 45:pp. 14-16]
EDI implementation cost/benefit analysis is also very important to private
firms. If EDI benefits are not justified, financial commitment as well as senior
management commitment, may not survive. This is clearly displayed in Croner-
Tyco-Toys first pilot test mentioned earlier. Reviews to ensure error-free EDI
operation allows firms to evaluate ifEDI is meeting the various objectives and goals
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of the implementation plan. Although the benefits to EDI are well documented and
numerous, the following examples are a few of the successes stories of EDI:
McGavin Foods LTD- saved $50,000 annually on couriers, mail, and
telecommunication costs [Ref. 46:pp. 43-44].
Mercantile Stores - reduced lead time of orders by 41% [Ref. 44:p. 11].
Dannon Company - reduced labor and fax-based communications by
$300,000-500,000 and increased accurate and timely orders from customers [Ref.
36:p. 64].
U.S. Air Force - saved $1.3 million over two years through lower prices as a
result of increased electronic competitive bids [Ref. 47:p. 65].
Detroit Edison - reduced cost ofprocessing paper invoice from $10 to less than
$1 for an electronic invoice [Ref. 24 :p. 43].
Mobile - reduced payments from 30 days to 2 days, reduced banking costs by
5-10% and reduced clearing house payment costs from $.50-$2.00 to $.12 [Ref. 24 :p.
43] and [Ref. 44 :p. 11].
British Petroleum - saved $1.7 million by eliminating paper invoices [Ref.
48:p. 49].
BC Liquor Distribution - saved $ 1 million in reduced annual labor, material,
and inventory [Ref. 49 :p. 43].
Pierre Belvedere Inc.- increased accuracy in transactions, reduced costs
resulting from incorrect orders, decreased order-to-shipment time from days to same
- day shipment, and increased company's organization and material management [Ref.
43:p. 48].
U.S. Army - saved $50,000 in its initial Hawaiian electronic bid [Ref. 50].
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Rocketdyne - eliminated paperwork, mailing costs, purchase order typing
costs, labor handling costs, purchasing errors, warehouse inventory, provided a clear
audit trail and 24 hour service [Ref. 17].
RJRN - reduced paper purchase order costs from $70.00 to $.93 [Ref. 5 1 :p. 1 ].
Tallent - created a competitive advantage, reduced lead times, reduced demand
updates from days to hours, increased savings on data input [Ref. 52:pp. 16-17].
3M - increased data accuracy cost savings, gained a competitive advantage,
reduced or allowed staff reallocation, reduced cycle time, increased timely invoicing,
received more timely payments, increased accuracy and completeness of invoices,
increased on-time payments by 7% [Ref. 35 :p. 50].
IBM - reduced processing costs by 25% [Ref. 53 :p. 2].
Although there are measurable aspects to EDI benefits, not all benefits are
measurable. Some benefits to EDI may be more aptly viewed as cost avoidance. For
instance, a study by the Gartner Group indicates incorrect orders cost ten to fifteen
times as much as processing an accurate order. [Ref. 54:pp. 44-49] Thus, the
increased accuracy and reduction of inaccurate orders resulting from EDI transactions
is not an obvious and easily quantifiable savings. Unfortunately such savings are not
immediately seen on the company's bottom line and may be hard to justify in a
cost/benefit analysis. 3M advises not to rely solely on the cost reduction firms hope
to get with EDI methods. According to 3M, firms should first focus on achieving
critical mass, total integration, and process changes. Once critical mass and
integration occurs, the costs of processing transactions can be significantly reduced.
3M's long term strategic view, however, appears to be an exception to the norm.
Despite overwhelming quantitative and qualitative support for EDI, there is
another perspective to EDI cost/benefit analysis. There are questions concerning the
costs for EDI systems, particularly from large firms. This may be caused, in part, of
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the difficulty to quantify EDI's benefits. There is a "perceived high cost of
implementation with no immediate quantifiable return on investment", even though
a PC based EDI system costs approximately $5,000. A senior analyst for Brinker
International, a restaurant chain in Dallas, indicates EDI may be justified in the long
run, but more than likely is not justified in the short term. According to the Brinker
analyst, initial EDI setup costs must provide comparable market rates of return before
EDI can be viewed as a good business decision. [Ref. 55 :p. 91] Computerworld
published industry's concerns about EDI cost in its article, "EDI's move to prime time
stalled by cost perception." "In some cases," the article states, "there is little
compelling evidence of a return on investment" for an EDI project. [Ref. 55 :p. 91]
Despite the cost perception, EDI use and growth is soaring. Frost and Sullivan
predicts the EDI market will quadruple from $699 million to $3.2 billion in 2001.
[Ref. 56:p. 8]
L. CONTINUOUS MONITORING, IMPROVEMENT, EDUCATION,
AND COMMITMENT
One aspect unique to successful EDI firms is the continuous monitoring,
improvement, education, and commitment necessary for EDI implementation. As
indicated above many firms have teams, committees, or one central unit to help
monitor, improve, and educate in order to foster continued support and long term
commitment needed for EDI success. General Public Utilities (GPU) is testing EDI
electronic time sheets for contracted services covering their plant sites. Detroit
Edison is also accepting EDI time sheets for services such as security or tree pruning.
[Ref. 24 :p. 43] RJRT used Ford Motor Company's electronic receipts settlement
(ERS) concept and expanded it to include EDI transactions from transportation
requirements and recurring non-industry items. ERS essentially pays vendors or
suppliers upon receipt of a shipping status or at a preset date. Thus these firms are
51
innovative in that they may pay a vendor for supplies or services before actually
obtaining the products or services. [Ref 33:pp. 10-19] 3M's team, for instance,
continues to review and seek for innovative use ofEDI technology similar to RJRT's
ERS concept. [Ref. 35:p. 50] Contracted services such as janitorial equipment,
maintenance, rent, and software license agreements are now electronic. [Ref. 33:pp.
10-19] Priester also is an excellent example to learn from their EDI activities.
Priester was forced to re-think and improve their EDI process due to a
customer's desire to invoice electronically. After initially installing EDI capabilities,
Priester decided to switch to an integrated EDI process that completes an entire
purchasing cycle, purchases, payments, invoices, and payment advice, in an electronic
EDI fashion. Customer pressure and a willingness to change motivated Priester to
continually improve, monitor, and initiate new methods of EDI activity. Priester
Continuously monitored EDI activity, ensuring EDI traffic is both accurate and
successful. Priester's diligence has led to increased business and decreased operating
costs: 50% of all receivables are now conducted electronically through EDI. [Ref.
34:pp. 27-29] 3M also has shown exemplary behavior in its ability to continuously
monitor and improve its EDI process.
3M as mentioned earlier, has a procurement team to help manage its
monitoring and improvement process. The control and accuracy of their EDI activity
is increased with their use of the functional acknowledgment transaction set (997).
3M also asks its EDI capable firms to monitor their EDI process in order to catch any
errors from 3M. 3M also continually strives to educate their vendors on the benefits
of EDI and EDI integration. EDI integration is important as the success and
commitment of EDI directly correlates to greater EDI integration. Substantial
integration ofEDI within the company's operating systems, leads to successful EDI
implementation, increased use, higher satisfaction, and substantial company-wide
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benefits. [Ref. 57:p. 3] Through various education and EDI recruitment platforms,
such as seminars, 3M anticipates adding an additional 350 firms willing to use
electronic purchase orders and 400 new firms willing to conduct financial EDI
transactions. In this manner, 3M continually educates their vendor base and attempts
to expand EDI use with their suppliers and vendors. In order to keep the EDI
momentum and high motivation among EDI participants, 3M also conducts studies
to identify alternatives for those suppliers who do not plan to move to a true EDI/EFT
cycle. 3M creates interest for their non-integrated, non electronic trading partners by
providing current topical information for potential electronic options that arise from
new electronic methods and technological advances. In summary, 3M has an
excellent program that monitors EDI accuracy, improves electronic procedures,
educates, and continually seeks alternatives to improve and generate commitment for
EC/EDI methods. Because oftheir efforts, 3M is rewarded with a very successful and
robust EDI program.
The inherent qualities ofthe EC/EDI model, ifimplemented correctly, can lead
to successful EC/EDI implementation. These essential, EC/EDI successful traits








• Cross functional input and support
• Measurement of results [Ref. 1 :p. 3]
If any ofthe traits listed above are lacking in an EC/EDI implementation plan,
EC/EDI will fail, produce poor results, or fall well below EC/EDI expectations.
Organizations must have these traits to succeed in EC/EDI implementation. In this
respect the model creates a Go/No-Go criteria. If an organization does not wish to
expend the resources for such efforts, EC/EDI should not be initiated. Private
industry's examples of EC/EDI implementation provides a frame of reference,
yardstick and Go/No Go evaluation in which to measure the Marine Corps'
implementation ofEC/EDI. Chapter V uses these commercial examples to measure
current Marine Corps EC/EDI implementation efforts.
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V. USMC EC/EDI IMPLEMENTATION EFFORTS
As indicated by numerous commercial EDI examples, firms can and do
vigorously implement EC/EDI. Due to the Presidential EC/EDI Mandate and DOD's
EC/EDI initiatives, LBO is also attempting to implement EC/EDI throughout the
Marine Corps. The next step in this analysis compares U.S. Marine Corps
implementation efforts to the EC/EDI model as described in Chapter IV.
A. STRATEGIC VISION AND PLAN
Two critical factors necessary for management support are vision for EC/EDI
methods and a strategic plan to reach that vision. A strategic plan focuses and
directs EC/EDI implementation efforts. RJR's vision was to "obliterate" the paper
process into an electronic process. [Ref. 33:pp. 10-19] Chart 1 reveals more than
half of Marine personnel questioned, 53%, indicate an EC/EDI implementation
plan does not exist for the Marine Corps. The 40% of respondents who
answered "yes" in Chart 1 were unable to express facets of the plan.
Does HQMC LBO have an implementation plan for EC/EDI?
(40.0%)





Essentially, 93% do not know an LBO Marine Corps wide EC/EDI plan exists, or do
not know what the plan is. Furthermore in Chart 2, only one person answered that the
plan's goals were clear and concise. One third, of respondents did not know what
Are the plan's goals clear and concise?
(20.0%)





the goals were, and another 20% did not understand the plan's goals. Thus, 53%, do
not know or do not understand EC/EDI goals. In essence, LBO lacks a Marine Corps
wide EC/EDI vision, EC/EDI implementation plan as well as EC/EDI implementation
goals.
Since LBO is perceived as lacking an EC/EDI implementation plan, personnel
were asked if local offices have EC/EDI implementation plan or EC/EDI goals. As
Chart 3 indicates below, 40% believe their local offices have their own EC/EDI plan.
Once again, "yes" respondents were asked to specify aspects of their plan. Again as
before, most could not list specific aspects or attributes of their local EC/EDI plan.
The following were the only items listed as specific attributes of the local EC/EDI
plan:
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• Implement as soon as possible;
• Implement EC/EDI;
• FACNET certification.
Thus 40% believe that a local plan exists, but are unsure what it is. Chart 3
also reveals personnel are 13% less likely to admit that their local office does not have
an EC/EDI implementation plan. Also in Comparison to Chart 1, a substantial
increase in blank responses are present. Individuals are generally unsure about the
EC/EDI situation at the local level but are clear on LBO's EC/EDI efforts or lack of
efforts. Respondents have a strong opinion whether LBO does have or does not have
an Marine Corps wide EC/EDI implementation plan as exhibited in Chart 1.
However, over a quarter of the response, 27%, did not feel their office had it's own
plan to implement EC/EDI.











Comparing Chart 3's "no" response to Chart l's "no" response, personnel are twice as
likely to say LBO does not have an EC/EDI implementation plan than their own
office. In this respect personnel clearly say that LBO has no plan, but are twice as
less likely to admit that their office also does not have a plan. Essentially, 67% do not
know a local EC/EDI plan exists, or do not know what the local EC/EDI plan is.
Attempting to discover any local EC/EDI goals, more than a quarter of those
surveyed, 27%, do not have any goals or do not know of any local EC/EDI
implementation goals. Those who felt there were local goals were asked to list
specific elements of the plan. Over half of the 73% who stated there were local goals
could not state one goal of the implementation plan. Again, contracting personnel
believe that there are EC/EDI goals, but do not know what the goals are. All specific
responses for local goals are listed below:
Increase by 5% per year;
Implement and expand as soon as possible;
25%-50% in 1 year;
Use as much as possible;
Implement as soon as possible;
Get FACNET certified;
100 EDI buyers per year.
Over a quarter of responses, 27%, do not feel their local office has its own
goals for EC/EDI implementation. Essentially, 57% do not know local EC/EDI goals
exists, or do not know what the local EC/EDI goals are. Uncertainty in the definition
or perception of an implementation plan is also present.
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Chart 4 indicates an attempt to define the term "implementation plan" as
perceived by the survey group. A majority, 59%, feel the installation schedule to
install the hardware and software required for EC/EDI transactions is the
implementation plan. Furthermore, no documentation was provided to the author
concerning a plan other than an installation schedule. Leadership at LBO verbally
confirmed the installation schedule as the implementation plan. Individuals believe
installation ofEC/EDI equipment automatically makes them EC/EDI capable. This
contradicts fundamental successful traits highlighted in Chapter IV. EC/EDI is not
solely hardware/software/computer issue as most view EC/EDI in the Marine Corps.
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Chart 4
Summarizing the Marine Corps's strategic plan 97% do not know or do not
understand LBO's Marine Corps wide EC/EDI implementation plan, 53%, do not
know or do not understand LBO Marine Corps wide EC/EDI goals, 67%, do not know
or do not understand local level EC/EDI implementation plans, approximately 57%
do not know ofany local EC/EDI goals, and 59% view EC/ED implementation solely
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as a hardware/software issue. Unfortunately, there are no single characteristics,
themes, traits, plans, or goals enunciated by any of those surveyed. Most of the
Corps' workforce does not understand EC/EDI strategy and implementation concepts
as discussed in Chapter IV. Most view EC/EDI solely as a hardware/computer issue.
It is evident the Marine Corps has neither EC/EDI vision, plan, or goals as discussed
in Chapter IV, nor do they understand the broader conceptual EC/EDI fundamentals
of an implementation strategy or plan. Because EC/EDI vision, plans, and goals are
the basic foundations for EC/EDI success, the ability to successfully implement
EC/EDI within the Marine Corps is in jeopardy. The Marine Corps' EC/EDI
implementation efforts are rudderless. The Corps' EC/EDI process lacks vision,
direction, purpose, and goals. Based upon the model and industry examples, lack of
EC/EDI implementation vision and plans often leads to poor management support.
B. OBTAIN MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
The support for EC/EDI from senior leadership within the Marine Corps and
its contracting community is virtually non-existent. In stark comparison, as indicated
in Appendix E, the Army's senior procurement and policy executive, Mr. Gilbert
Decker, Assistant Secretary of the Army, Research, Development and Acquisition
(SARDA) supports DOD and Army EC/EDI initiatives. In a formal EC/EDI
directive, Mr. Decker states EC/EDI initiatives will be implemented and used within
the Army. Furthermore, he formally establishes policy and procedures to incorporate
EC/EDI processes as a standard Army business practice. Thus the Army initiates
EC/EDI support from the top senior leadership flowing down to contracting sites. In
essence, the Army supports and expects EC/EDI implementation will be
accomplished. Written documentation from senior leadership within the Marine
Corps specifically supporting EC/EDI initiatives is absent. True, DOD has Ms.
Preston and Ms. Smith to help promote EC/EDI, but they are again out of the domain
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of USMC contracting authority and policy. It is difficult to garner support for
EC/EDI when an implementation vision and plan does not exist. Leaders and
managers may support EC/EDI, but they need to understand what is EC/EDI, what
is the EC/EDI implementation plan, and how will EC/EDI benefit the Corps prior to
granting such support. Another sign of inadequate management support reveals itself
in EC/EDFs "champion" within the Marine Corps.
In the Marine Corps, 57% feel there is an EC/EDI "champion." The individual
most often viewed as the EC/EDI "champion" within the Marine Corps is Ms. Gail
Adams. Both LBO and field contracting offices most often indicate Ms. Adams as
the vocal EC/EDI supporter. Unfortunately, the Corps' EC/EDI "champion," Ms.
Gail Adams, is not in the contracting authority or reporting chain of command. As
indicated in Appendix C, Ms. Adams is a special assistant to Mr. Ledford, Deputy
Director ofLBO. The contracting chain ofcommand flows from LtGen Brabham, to
Mr. Zanfagna, directly to the local contracting officer. Any action, support, or
EC/EDI policy from Ms. Adams, as with DOD's Ms. Preston, lacks the respective
authority required for Marine Corps contracting offices. Thus there is no impetus or
authority to motivate individuals to implement EC/EDI, particularly purchasing
personnel and the field contracting offices. Additionally, Ms. Adams is currently
attending the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and has been absent from her
"champion" position at LBO for nearly 18 months. Her EC/EDI responsibilities have
been assigned to Mr. Jim Lee, who is part of the Field Contracting Support Branch.
The decreased level and importance of EC/EDI is reflected in the "hand off
of EC/EDI responsibilities to a lower level of importance and rating. As with Ms.
Adams, Mr. Lee also lacks the respective authority for Marine Corps contracting
offices as he too is not in the respective chain of command. There is no doubt that
Ms. Adams and Mr. Lee are diligent and conscientious workers. However, because
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the EC/EDI responsibilities were delegated to Mr. Lee in addition to his other duties,
the time spent on EC/EDI issues has decreased within LBO. For all practical
purposes, EC/EDI has been demoted to a collateral duty, to be worked on only when
absolutely necessary. In this regard, Marine Corps leadership and management does
not support EC/EDI efforts as their successful commercial EC/EDI counterparts do.
The low priority ofEC/EDI issues within LBO, not unique to LBO, is reflected in the
LP functional organization. Whereas LBO's EC/EDI leader is presently four levels
below the functional manager/leader, Mr. Zanfagna, LP's EC/EDI Program Manager
Officer (PMO) is three levels below the Functional manager/leader, BGen
McKissock. The PMO billet, however, is discussed later in this chapter.
C. ESTABLISH PURCHASING SUPPORT
One key indicator for EC/EDI purchasing support is current EC/EDI
transactions. Only one office presently uses EC/EDI methods. This EC/EDI capable
office, as indicated in Chapter III, uses a version of CACI's SAACONS system.
Although the poor results can be due, in part, to BCAS/MADES technical problems
associated with the installation ofEC/EDI, there is not any pro-active action on behalf
of EC/EDI. Lacking guidance, Marine Corps implementation lacks a sense of
urgency, or focus that successful plans develop at the purchasing level to make
EC/EDI occur. Pressures of profitability, cost savings, and time are also not present
as compared to commercial EC/EDI examples, despite the approaching Presidential
Mandate in 1997. Without any pressure to move forward, implementation is at a
standstill. Only one site is able to conduct EC/EDI since the EC/EDI initiative began
in 1993. In contrast, the Army has 127 sites as of January, 1996. [Ref. 58] The
impression and implied behavior within the Marine Corps is quite simple; EC/EDI is
not a priority within the Marine Corps. If the Commander in Chiefs EC/EDI
Mandate does not motivate Marine Corps personnel to implement EC/EDI, what will?
Another aspect of purchasing support lies in the BCAS/MADES equipment.
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The survey ofpurchasing personnel loudly and clearly reveals its doubts ofthe
MADES EC/EDI capabilities. These doubts strongly inhibit any support for EC/EDI
at the user level. Chart 5 reveals nearly half of those surveyed, 46%, indicate
MADES will not meet their needs for EC/EDI activity. Another 23% do not know
ifEC/EDI will work in their office. Combining these two groups together, 69% of
the purchasing community either do not feel MADES will meet their EC/EDI needs,
or do not have confidence MADES will meet their EC/EDI needs, or are not being
informed that MADES can meet their EC/EDI needs. In essence, 69% do not feel the
present EC/EDI tools will be able to meet their EC/EDI needs. This is not surprising
as Chapter III reveals a general dislike for BCAS/MADES. Low expectation of
BCAS/MADES leads to low expectations ofEC/EDI due to its inherent association
with BCA/MADES. How EC/EDI initiatives are viewed, in a negative or positive
fashion, is yet another aspect to purchasing support.
Does MADES il meet your needs for EC/EDI? If not, what else do you feel you need?
(46.2%)
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Chart 6 reveals the majority of personnel, 61%, view EC/EDI positively.
Slightly more than one quarter, 28%, however, view EC/EDI negatively. Although
viewed very positively, LBO has only one functioning EC/EDI capable site in the










entire Marine Corps. Strong verbal support expressed for EC/EDI but very little, if
any, action supporting that positive view may be indicative of what author and Duke
Professor Fish labeled as "professional correctness." [Ref. 58] Originating from
debates of "political correctness," "professional correctness" espouses one
"authorized" viewpoint associated within the workplace, such as DOD's and Ms.
Colleen Preston's avid and positive support of EC/EDI and FACNET. Any
disagreement or negative view of EC/EDI would be considered "professionally
incorrect." Many interviews for this research, for example, were agreed upon only
on conditions of anonymity due to concerns that their comments would cause them
harm within their office. Yes, there is strong verbal support for EC/EDI, but
successful EC/EDI implementation requires more than just verbal support. Successful
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EC/EDI requires positive action by the entire organization. Another aspect of
concerning EC/EDI is its perception as a threat within the contracting community.
As Chart 7 indicates, nearly 58% of respondents view EC/EDI as a threat to
their profession, whatever that threat may be. IfEC/EDI is viewed in such a positive
manner how does one account for the strong perception ofEC/EDI as a threat within
the contracting community? The view of EC/EDI as a threat contrasts the positive
verbal support indicated in the last question. The view of EC/EDI as a threat also
bolsters Fish's "professional correctness" arguments. A better representative
sentiment ofEC/EDI within the Marine Corps may view EC/EDI as a threat. Given
Chapter IFs Cats-Baril and Thompson example as well as other authors such as
Schein, cultural issues are indeed obstacles which must be overcome in EC/EDI
implementation. Recent articles point to fear as a significant barrier to EC/EDI
implementation. "EC/EDI barriers may be more sociological than technological.
Organizations may choose to ignore benefits and advantages to EDI. Technophilia
(sic), lack of support from senior management, resistance from within an organization
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and a piecemeal mentality" prohibit acceptance of EDI. [Ref. 59] Fear and the
perception ofEDI as a threat within the contracting community is real. To counter
and overcome such views, pro-actively managing change from day-to-day, constant
communication, and distribution of information is necessary. Purchasing support is
always very important for EC/EDI success because oftheir front line relationship with
vendors. Ifpurchasing does not view EC/EDI as an important aspect in procurement,
their vendors may also reflect a similar view.
D. VENDOR SUPPORT
Vendor support ofEC/EDI reflects an unwillingness to use EC/EDI methods
as Chart 8 indicates. EC/EDI is not a priority or a concern among vendors. More
than half ofthe vendor base, 53%, has not implemented EC/EDI. Furthermore, more
than a quarter of those surveyed, 27%, do not know if their vendor base is moving
towards electronic trading partner relationships. Only 20% of responses, represented
by the sum of the three small slices, indicate vendors have made any effort to move
toward EC/EDI capabilities. EC/EDI is not a priority for purchasing personnel and













is not a priority for vendors. Additionally, 27% of the survey group simply do not
know what their vendors are doing in the area of EC/EDI. The trading partnership
concept, one of close affiliation and cooperation necessary in EC/EDI, may not be
present in the Government-vendor relationship or may be difficult to develop given
this response. Close buyer/supplier relationships characteristic of EC/EDI and JIT
processes is quite different than Government's "arms length" supplier/vendor
relationship. A lack of interest, concern, or knowledge of supplier EC/EDI
capabilities also indicates problems of measurement, control and management issues
which are discussed later in this research.
The perception ofEC/EDI amongst vendors is illustrated in Chart 9. Contrary
to the overwhelming positive support expressed by personnel in Chart 6, vendor
EC/EDI support is weak. Vendor's positive views ofEC/EDI are nearly 40% lower
than their Government counterparts. Only 25% of those surveyed believe vendors
view EC/EDI positively compared to a positive response of61% in Chart 6. Over a












third, 38%, think vendors view EC/EDI negatively. Whereas more Marine personnel
view EC/EDI positively than negatively, vendor negative views outnumber vendor
positive responses. A wide disparity exists between government's positive view and
the vendor's negative view towards EC/EDI. This trend continues when asked if
vendors accept EC/EDI.
Vendor EC/EDI acceptance also is not strong. The belief that more vendors
do not accept EC/EDI as compared to those that do accept EC/EDI, closely parallels
the negative viewpoint ofEC/EDI. 38% of vendors have not accepted EC/EDI. The





3. Will only accept EC/EDI when local office switches to EC/EDI.
Interestingly one of the factors prohibiting EC/EDI growth among vendors is
the non-use of EC/EDI by Marine Corps purchasing personnel. Vendors are
forestalling investments in EC/EDI until forced to move in that direction. IfEC/EDI
is viewed positively by Marine Corps personnel, clearly that viewpoint is not being
communicated to the vendor base. Vendors also appear to view EC/EDI for use only
with local bases. EC/EDI expands local vendors into national vendors, greatly
expanding the opportunities for increased business transactions. A strong and
persuasive case for EC/EDI benefits targeted at the vendor community must be
conducted by all Marine Corps personnel.
E. DEVELOP CROSS FUNCTIONAL COMMITMENT TO EDI
Survey results indicate superiors overwhelmingly support EC/EDI. 87% of
respondents indicate their superiors support EC/EDI. With such overwhelming
support one would think EC/EDI activity would be would be visibly noticed and
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conducted within the Marine Corps. Unfortunately, only one office currently
conducts EC/EDI. The USMC I&L Organizational Chart in Appendix C, provides
a graphical view where senior cross functional support must begin. Senior level
support starts at the top of each cross functional organization. However, neither
LtGen Brabham nor his functional subordinate counterparts affected by EC/EDI,
BGen McKissock, BGen Bratten, Col Hansen, or especially Mr. Zanfagna, head of
LBO, have issued any written support or directives for EC/EDI. Whereas the Army
defined EC/EDI support and the expectations ofEC/EDI implementation in writing,
the Marine Corps has neglected EC/EDI.
Lack of cross functional support also revealed itself in other areas of the
survey. Chart 1 1 reveals what LBO could do to help support local offices in their
conversion to EC/EDI. The response was fairly consistent and equally spread among
the choices. Three choices often selected, representing 57.1%, are inherently cross
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functional issues. These cross functional issues are: more guidance, funding, and
management of EC/EDI. Funding of EC/EDI initiatives are resource allocation
questions that all I&L cross functional leaders, particularly the EC/EDI PMO, LP and
LB branches must coordinate. Due to declining defense budgets and an unwillingness
by senior EC/EDI DOD officials to fund Marine Corps EC/EDI efforts, any future
EC/EDI funding must begin within I&L. [Ref. 61 ] Therefore, discussions and actual
funding ofEC/EDI initiatives will become difficult cross functional efforts. Funding
EC/EDI efforts may cause a reduction in the budgets of LF, LP, and an LC divisions.
It is fair to assume such efforts may also be resisted by the various cross functional
leaders. Managing EC/EDI is also an inherently cross functional endeavor since
actions necessary to properly manage EC/EDI implemen-tation on a daily basis
affects LB, LF, an LP personnel. More guidance of course refers to the policy and
procedures EC/EDI requires for success, which has inherent cross functional Marine
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Corps wide effects. Interestingly most "other" responses, 29%, indicated LBO was
"in the way" or "blocked" offices from progressing and converting to EC/EDI
methods. This viewpoint is particularly alarming as LBO is perceived as the inhibitor
of EC/EDI implementation not the promoter of EC/EDI. Due to the numerous
responses, LBO's prevention of EC/EDI initiatives is not an isolated view. One
concrete example given in support of such a viewpoint relates to a local initiative for
an electronic bulletin board system. LBO would not allow a local office to operate
a BBS system, despite specific FAR language supporting electronic use as well as a
recent DISC GAO protest, won by DISC, which specifically supports electronic
dissemination and use of an electronic bulletin board for its vendor base. Local
offices may support EC/EDI but this does not help implement EC/EDI unless the
entire organization, particularly leaders in cross functional organizations within the
Marine Corps, support EC/EDI implementation in words, deeds, and commitment of
resources to accomplish implementation.
Lack of support, dedication, and commitment by LBO is clearly stated in the
survey's response. 60% do not feel LBO is responsive to EC/EDI needs or requests.
Only one person answered "yes" to this question. This is a loud and clear signal that
appropriate personnel are not committed to the necessary steps to make EC/EDI
successful. Interviews within I&L's cross functional areas point out difficulties in
obtaining information, coordinating and cooperating with LBO. LBO is not viewed
favorably amongst its cross functional peer organizations. Other cross functional
personnel do not view EC/EDI as a priority due to LBO's poor response or lack of
effort concerning EC/EDI issues. IfLBO is not committed to EC/EDI within their
own organization, why should other cross functional areas commit to EC/EDI? LBO
must lead by example, commit to EC/EDI, and conduct themselves as ifEC/EDI is
a priority in order for other cross functional organizations within I&L to share that
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commitment. Another example of cross functional issues concerns the ability to
invoice and make electronic payments using EDI transactions.










Industry achieves the greatest success and efficiencies created through EC/EDI
integration. The Marine Corps, however, is isolating EDI within the procurement
arena. In many respects EC/EDI efforts are carried forth in the traditional stovepipe
military procurement tradition. For example, personnel involved with future Marine
Corps FEDI issues are unaware of any LBO EC/EDI efforts, particularly with respect
to SPS. Information concerning successful EC/EDI implementation through EC/EDI
integration is also not provided to field personnel.
The lack of EC/EDI integration comprehension and importance is alarming.
Most personnel, 93% of respondents, are unaware of any EC/EDI integration efforts.
The importance ofEC/EDI integration is neither emphasized, pursued, nor managed
within the Marine Corps. The Marine's DFAS office in Kansas City, for example, is
presently a test site for an electronic document management system. DFAS's efforts
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includes an integrated EC/EDI process. [Ref. 62] DFAS views FEDI as the standard
business process of the future. DFAS has staked its strategic vision on FEDI usage
and has committed substantial resources towards FEDI capabilities. Unfortunately
DFAS Kansas City does not know what LBO is doing in the implementation of
EC/EDI or SPS which facilitates FEDI procedures. DFAS representatives did not
know what SPS was, what it would do, or that it will be tested by LBO at a Marine
Corps site within the year. Since SPS will be mandatory for every purchasing office
in the Marine Corps, it is vital to develop cross functional support and input, such as
the Marine's DFAS EC/EDI expert, into the process. SPS includes substantial
EC/EDI capabilities inherent to the system, which integrates the purchasing-payment
capabilities within the Marine Corps. Therefore Marine DFAS participation in an
SPS tests is a crucial towards EC/EDI integration efforts. Integration is a vital
EC/EDI trait that Marine personnel do not know is part of the EC/EDI
implementation process. The lack of integration efforts may also be a byproduct of
poor EC/EDI education. An integrated commitment and effort for EC/EDI is
commonly associated with a firm EC/EDI educational base. Therefore, the next topic
of discussion is education.
F. DEVELOP EDI KNOWLEDGE, EXPERIENCE, AND EDUCATION
The core aspects of developing EC/EDI knowledge and experience is through
education efforts. Due to problems associated with the MADES EC/EDI capabilities,
a true indicator of Marine Corps EC/EDI implementation efforts manifests itself in
the Corps' education efforts. Technical problems encountered in EC/EDI implemen-
tation are not associated with education efforts, and certainly technical issues can not
be blamed for lack of an EC/EDI education process. Technical difficulties are
independent ofEC/EDI education efforts. Hence, the Corps' development ofEC/EDI
knowledge and experience can be viewed as the manifestation of the Marine Corps'
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lack of EC/EDI efforts, management, leadership, support, and commitment to
EC/EDI.
Because EC/EDI is relatively new to Marine Corps personnel, one aspect vital
for USMC activities is education of the workforce. Education also focuses on two
distinct groups; Marine Corps personnel and the vendor base. Any education efforts
must address these two groups. Unfortunately there isn't a Marine Corps wide
EC/EDI education/training program for these two groups. Because there is a lack of
an education program, there is a lack of both knowledge as well as experience
necessary for EC/EDI implementation.
As discovered earlier in this chapter, incomprehension of an implementation
strategy is an indicator of an EC/EDI knowledge deficiency. The survey reveals 47%
of respondents did not have any documentation concerning the benefits of EC/EDI.
Those that answered "yes" in this question were asked to list the documents available.
The only response listed "brochures" as the material on hand for EC/EDI
documentation. Most replies did not or could not specifically list what EC/EDI
documentation was available at the local level. Brochures are not EC/EDI
documentation. All personnel currently surveyed lack any documentation concerning
the benefits of EC/EDI. Documentation of EC/EDI benefits typically contain
successful examples of EC/EDI or case studies of EC/EDI implementation. An
excellent example of documentation is EDI World Institute's, The Why EDI Guide
for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises . This particular documentation contains
twelve case studies on EDI implementation and is particularly applicable given
EC/EDI initiatives are focused on benefiting small businesses. Thus any desire or
attempt to increase EC/EDI knowledge, experience, or provide documentation to the
vendor base concerning the benefits of EC/EDI is thwarted by the lack of EC/EDI
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documentation. Lack ofeducation efforts are also revealed in many other areas ofthe
survey.
A sizable portion of respondents, 40%, lacked EC/EDI training material.
Furthermore, during visits to three contracting, only one office had DOD's Your
Introduction to Electronic Commerce: A Handbook for Businesses , of which only
one copy was available for the entire office. DOD's Your Introduction to Electronic
Commerce: A Handbook for Procurement Personnel published by DOD's EC/EDI
office was not present at any of the visited sites. The author personally gave his
copies of these books and an EC/EDI tape developed for DOD use to Marine
contracting personnel. At present LBO has not developed any standard EC/EDI
education/training guides for contracting personnel or vendor use. They also have not
facilitated distribution ofpresent DOD EC/EDI education material. Local offices are
also not developing any EC/EDI education/training guides. From the viewpoint of
local offices, such EC/EDI education/training guides should be developed by LBO at
HQMC in order to create a standard knowledge base for all offices to use. The
general consensus indicated LBO is implementing EC/EDI, and therefore also needs
to develop necessary training and education material in support of their implement-
ation efforts. Development ofLBO EC/EDI material would also create a standard
reference base to begin EC/EDI education efforts at little or no cost to the local
offices. Respondents of the survey were very adamant on receiving education and
training materials.
As indicated in the frequency Chart 13, nearly every respondent wanted more
than one of the following items:
• Books about EC/EDI
• Tutorials
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• Current EC/EDI articles
• Vendor material to help sell EC/EDI to local businesses
• Comprehensive training packages
The chart also reveals the most requested types of material are EC/EDI
tutorials and a comprehensive training package for EC/EDI. Thus, offices
What type of training material do you want?
ET3 Books about EC/EDI
1—3 Tutorials
Q Current EC/EDI articles
CD Vendor material to help "self EC/EDI to local businesses




recognize the need for EC/EDI education materials, but do not have the funds,
expertise, or time to obtain appropriate EC/EDI material. Another option to EC/EDI
education is EC/EDI conferences.
The opportunity for an EC/EDI conference to educate vendors as well as
purchasing personnel also reveals lack of Marine Corps commitment to EC/EDI
education efforts. Nearly half, 47% of the offices have not had a conference in their
area. The only conference held by Marine Corps activities occurred in the test pilot
site, Quantico. Many of the 53% positive responses indicated they used a local Navy
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contracting office's EC/EDI conference as their conference opportunity. Many offices
did not know the status ofLBO directed Marine Corps EC/EDI conferences and chose
to use the Navy's conference as an opportunity for their vendors. Local offices also
did not have to fund any of the Navy's EC/EDI conferences.
As indicated in Chart 14, 47% do not know when an LBO conference would
occur. Only one person indicated knowledge ofa conference. Initially, Marine Corps
procurement personnel and offices were told EC/EDI conferences and experts would
be contracted out and provided by LBO. LBO would manage all EC/EDI confer-
ences. Local offices need only advertise the conference to their vendor base. Local
offices also would not fund any ofthe conferences. Over time and several iterations,
the conference framework changed to its current status. Local offices are responsible
for their own conferences. LBO will not plan, participate or fund conferences. Local
offices are left up to their own devices to manage their EC/EDI conferences, educate
their personnel and their vendors without any help or funding. Because of this
dilemma, offices are not educating or promoting EC/EDI.
















Chart 15 reveals 73% of respondents are not actively pursuing EC/EDI
education efforts with their vendors. Contracting Officers find themselves in a
frustrating and untenable position. They must educate their personnel and their
vendors without EC/EDI material, EC/EDI knowledge, EC/EDI experience, EC/EDI
resident expertise, or EC/EDI funding. In this respect, the Marine Corps's education
efforts exhibits little or no support, dedication or commitment to EC/EDI. Education
is necessary to gain experience. However EC/EDI education material is necessary to
obtain an EC/EDI education. Material required for EC/EDI education and experience
is presently not available to Marine Corps personnel. Thus vendor education of
EC/EDI at the local level is not possible. Efforts are neither focused in obtaining or
developing education materials, nor is the Marine Corps willing to outsource the
expertise necessary to educate those who must have the EC/EDI education such as
purchasing personnel and vendors.









G. CHANGE POLICY AND PROCEDURE
One elusive aspect of EC/EDI within DOD as well as the Marine Corps
concerns EC/EDI policy. Other than EC/EDI references located in the FAR, no
EC/EDI policy letter or statement currently exists. When asked if a Marine Corps
Order (MCO) or policy letter (DOD, Navy or USMC policy letter) exists concerning
implementation or use of EC/EDI methods, 47% responded no such policy exists.
Only 27% mentioned that a policy exists. "Yes" respondents were again asked to
specify the policy letter. In a similar fashion, the only statement concerning policies
were "general" policy letters. No one could specifically refer to a policy reference or
order that addresses EC/EDI. No policy letters were obtained or forwarded in the
investigation of this research. A formal policy letter for EC/EDI does not exist. One
particular issue which entered into this question concerned the Navy's moratorium on
all EC/EDI activity.









As seen in Appendix D, the Marine Corps does fall under Navy procurement
policy. The Navy issued a temporary moratorium on EC/EDI activities for several
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reasons, of which some are unresolved legal ramifications and issues such as lack of
trading partner agreements, unworkable and unenforceable central contractor
registration procedures, and DISA's inability to ensure procurement integrity within
the FACNET architecture. Because of this, several Marine activities have halted all
EC/EDI activity citing the Navy position as policy to halt EC/EDI activity. LBO, on
the other hand, states the Navy moratorium has no effect on any Marine Corps
activities. The Marine Corps uses the Air Force's BCAS/MADES system and as such
are not part of the moratorium. The Navy uses other systems which are not integral
to the Marine Corps EC/EDI MADES process. Unfortunately this was not
communicated to the offices and Marine Corps personnel. In one office, the
moratorium "policy" was stated as the reason for halting any efforts for EC/EDI
activity. It was the only "policy" letter referred to during this research on EC/EDI
within the Marine Corps. Again, lack of ownership in the EC/EDI implementation,
lack of established clear leadership for EC/EDI implementation, as well as
coordination and focus of effort that policy and procedures bring to implementation
are inhibiting the implementation ofEC/EDI within the Marine Corps. Lacking any
policy or guidance on EC/EDI, the Navy moratorium is interpreted as policy or as an
excuse to stop all EC/EDI activity in the field. Lacking clear EC/EDI policy and
guidance, offices interpret EC/EDI action, as they are allowed to do, in the manner
they determine is appropriate. Field offices typically make decisions based upon the
given current level of material, education, and knowledge ofEC/EDI. Unfortunately,
these items are the very items that many ofthe offices lack. Just as there is policy and
guidance to topics such as small business set asides or disadvantaged businesses, there
is a need for corresponding EC/EDI policy to aid contracting officers in their decision
process. The Marine Corps currently lacks such EC/EDI policy or guidance.
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H. ORGANIZE FOR EDI
Two essential principles for EDI organization are clear leadership and efforts
that are organized and coordinated in a cross functional manner. Presently Marine
Corps efforts violate these principles. More than half of the survey group, 53%, did
not know the PM for EC/EDI within the Marine Corps. Nearly all of those who said
they knew the PM, stated Ms. Adams, or Mr. Lee as the EC/EDI PM. No one, 0%,
knew the correct EC/EDI PM within the Marine Corps. The billet of EC/EDI PMO,
recently re-assigned in February 1996, is Mr. Ron Tyler of the LPS branch. The
EC/EDI PM billet and responsibilities, as with Mr. Lee, is in addition to his other
duties and responsibilities. Thus, the PMO within the Marine Corps has been
delegated to a collateral duty status, to be worked on only when absolutely necessary.
The original PMO, Mr. Heasley, confirmed little or no work occurred on EC/EDI
issues since January, 1995. In discussions with Mr. Taylor shortly after assuming his
EC/EDI PMO billet and responsibilities, the author quickly discovered. Lee had no
previous experience with EC/EDI efforts. Mr. Taylor was not aware of the EC/EDI
Presidential Mandate approaching in 1997. Not only is there little management
support, as evidenced by the lack of any full time dedicated EC/EDI personnel, but
no one knows who to turn to or who is in charge ofthe EC/EDI implementation. The
rapid change-over in leadership billets, as Cats-Baril and Thompson indicated, is a
factor contributing to the poor efforts ofUSMC EC/EDI implementation.
Another aspect promoting confusion concerns LBO's EC/EDIs' point of
contact (POC). As indicated at 3M, an EDI procurement team was organized and
firmly established as the sole EC/EDI POC for all issues related for EC/EDI. 3M
created a one stop shop for all EC/EDI needs. All efforts, problems and questions
funneled through the procurement team. The Marine Corps, however, has difficulties
concerning who is the EC/EDI POC. Lack of clear leadership and ownership
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confuses contracting offices as to who is really in charge of EC/EDI within the
Marine Corps. Is the PM shop responsible for EC/EDI implementation or LBO? This
question was never satisfactorily answered by LBO or the PMO. The Army has a
LtCol in charge of EC/EDI who reports directly to Mr. Decker in SARDA. The
Marine Corps lacks such organizational support structures. Furthermore, one third
of all respondents, 33%, do not know who the POC for EC/EDI is at LBO. Surveyed
individuals who indicated a POC generally listed one of the following individuals:
Ms. Adams, Mr. Lee, and Ms. Cordle. All three can be seen in the I&L Chart in
Appendix C. The frequency of the names was equally spread amongst the three
individuals. Some respondents may have confused the POC as the "champion," Ms.
Adams. If surveyed personnel were not confused with the selection ofMs. Adams as
the POC, field offices have not done any EC/EDI related work over the past 18
months since Ms. Adams has been absent from her duties during this time period.
Respondents would have known the POC changed had they attempted to contact her
on EC/EDI issues. The Marine Corps also is not developing its own EC/EDI resident
experts, which means the POC is not current on EC/EDI issues or problems. All three
ofthe listed individuals are not dedicated solely to managing EC/EDI issues. EC/EDI
is a collateral duty, not a full time management position. As indicated earlier, 93%
do not know of any cross functional efforts with EC/EDI. This certainly reveals lack
of leadership, coordination, cross functional support, weak EC/EDI implementation
traits, and poor EC/EDI implementation management. Most of these issues are a
result of the Marine Corps' current organization for EC/EDI. The present EC/EDI
organizational structure weakens implementation, inhibits cross functional support,
and is a significant factor of the Corps' poor EC/EDI implementation results.
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In many respects, EC/EDI is looked upon as just another way of continuing the
Corps's present process, albeit electronic. This violates the basic premise of business
process re-engineering of EC/EDI. This is made clear in the survey as 47% of
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respondents indicate EC/EDI will not change the process within their office. Only a
small portion, 27%, anticipate changing the way they operate. As indicated by
industry, this is a fundamental flaw that will not lead to successful implementation or
use of EC/EDI within the Marine Corps. The paper process will not be improved,
merely transformed to an electronic process. As in RJR's example, a 17 page payment
process was reduced to a two page electronic payment process. Interestingly, the
perception of what EC/EDI will do for manning levels is not indicated by industry.
Industry has reduced staffing or more frequently reallocated personnel to other tasks
within the department. Chart 1 8 reveals 40% of respondents believe EC/EDI will
either have no effect or increase the staffing/manning levels. Additionally, 14% do
not know how EC/EDI will affect their organization. Clearly the lessons of EC/EDI
and the effects ofEC/EDI implementation are not reaching those affected by EC/EDI.
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J. ESTABLISH A PILOT PROGRAM
The Marine Corps, according to DUSD's report, did not plan to run a pilot test
for the implementation ofEC/EDI. The following schedule in Table 1 was issued in
DUSD's report indicating that the installation of EC/EDI capabilities would
immediately jump to broad based implementation. An immediate conflict rises in the
deployment of the system because of the rush to install the EC/EDI capabilities. The
DASD report states:
The EC/EDI capability ofMADES has not yet been completed on the
WANG platform for the establishment of EC/EDI capability in
MADES II/BCAS. An estimated 6 man-months must be invested in
completing MADES II EC/EDI on the Wang platform. Testing the
delivery of data to and from MADES II/BCAS will be via an Air Force
Gateway to a DISA Distribution Point, and testing will begin in
November 93. Availability of a Gateway/DP is required by second
quarter FY94.
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DOD EC/EDI Report in Contracting
Report MADES II Deployment
Schedule (p. 48)
Site Date
CampLejeune, NC May 94
Parris Island, SC May 94
Albany, GA July 94
New Orleans, LA July 94
Quantico, LA July 94
Arlington, VA July 94
29 Palms, CA Nov 94
Barstow, CA Nov 94
Camp Pendleton,CA Nov 94
Table 1
In other words, MADES EC/EDI capabilities would not be ready or tested prior to the
broad based hardware/software installation schedule above. Furthermore, the test site
ofthe project would be conducted at an Air Force installation and not a Marine Corps
installation. The schedule left little room should any problem arise in the MADES
II/BCAS EC/EDI tests. Due to this method and DOD's rush to implement EC/EDI
capabilities, no one should be surprised at the technical problems developed due to
the differences or incompatibilities between the Air Force systems and the Marine
Corps systems.
The schedule listed above was not implemented in the Marine Corps.
Quantico was an initial site for the installation of EC/EDI capabilities despite its
position in Table 1 . Implementation stalled at Quantico due to TCP/IP problems
associated with differences between the Air Force systems and Marine Corps systems.
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MADES generated EC traffic was unable to reach designated FACNET gateways.
Through intent or luck, as the table above indicates, Quantico became the pilot site
once technical difficulties prohibited further installation. Because of this action, the
Marine Corps complies with the EC/EDI model for a test site. Once problems were
encountered, broad based installation of EC/EDI capabilities halted. Unfortunately
the halting of the installation ofEC/EDI capabilities and the reasons for delays were
not passed on to the various Marine Corps offices or personnel. Personnel often
voiced no knowledge of an installation schedule for EC/EDI MADES equipment.
Once difficulties and suspension of the installation halted, offices were not kept
abreast of the changes, status, or reasons for the installation delay. Field personnel
generally knew there were problems with EC/EDI, but did not know specifics. "LBO
knows," was one common recurring theme expressed by an individual, "but they're
not telling us." (Author visited three separate offices to interview personnel about
EC/EDI. Without exception, statements were only given on the basis that responses
are to remain anonymous). Thus, the entire EC/EDI implementation and installation
program is perceived in the field as "broken." [Ref. 31] Many individual opinion's
hold LBO in low regard due to past unpleasant experiences with LBO, particularly
over BCAS/MADES issues. In the eyes of field personnel, problems with EC/EDI
only confirms LBO's incompetence and poor management skills.
K. REVIEW PILOT RESULTS AND MODIFY
One important aspect of the pilot program is the feedback, review, and
modification of the pilot program. In industry, if problems arise out of a pilot
program there are two options to choose; 1 ) apply the resources, expertise and people
necessary to overcome the problem or 2) eliminate the program and avoid wasting
time effort and resources. Priester learned this process in its first EC/EDI pilot. The
Marine Corps chose to do neither. In this respect the pilot program is the
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manifestation of lack of Marine Corps support, commitment and dedication to
EC/EDI implementation.
There were three main parties in the pilot test; contracting/purchasing
personnel, ITM personnel, and BCAS/MADES personnel. The three parties
contradicted each other or indicated problems encountered were not in their area of
responsibility. Rather than attempt to focus on who is correct or to blame for
difficulties in the test pilot process, this research will point out significant issues
within the overall management of the pilot test. The most significant issues in the
Corps' test pilot were organizational. Mechanisms and methods of industry were not
used or were not functional.
One of the most important issues of the pilot test is a group or steering
committee focused solely on the pilot program. A single clear EC/EDI leader was not
firmly established. A POC for the three main groups was identified, but locating a
single person who admitted they were in charge ofthe entire test pilot process was not
possible. No one appeared to take ownership of the process, but some were quick to
voice blame. Marine Corps personnel also had other tasks in addition to test pilot
issues. Many involved in the project were from Quantico and had Quantico
operational issues competing for their attention. The test pilot, for the most part,
involved parties from Quantico, and did not include others with expertise or interest
in the pilot's success. Cross functional support and maximum participation are
demanded from all major stakeholders within industry. The Marine Corps also did
not draw on the best expertise available within the Marine Corps as industry does.
This does not mean or imply Quantico personnel did not have the skills to accomplish
the task at hand. Rather, it points out industry views its allocation and exploitation
of resources and skills from the entire organization while Marine Corps efforts only
considered those in the Quantico area. Once problems occurred, field offices were
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not solicited for help. Budget and time constraints were not an issue as compared to
industry. More than one year after attempting to initiate EC/EDI capabilities,
personnel are still working BCAS/ MADES issues at Quantico. Contrary to industry,
additional assets and expertise were not added to overwhelm and overcome
difficulties encountered in the pilot. Additionally, there was no mention or discussion
of options such as terminating the EC/EDI pilot, await the award of SPS, and
accelerate fielding of SPS. Where industry has a tolerance point that once achieved
will force them to stop the pilot test to avoid wasting time and resources, the Marine
Corps has no point of termination. Specific objectives, goals, supplier participation,
or go/no go criteria, common industry evaluations, were absent, not enforced, or not
tracked. Reliance on resident experts is also limited in the BCAS/MADES program.
Due to the age and technology associated with BCAS/MADES, only Air Force and
Wang, personnel have resident expertise on the MADES/BCAS system. Most Marine
Corps systems personnel would prefer to see BCAS/MADES system terminated since
they have difficulties supporting its use. While industry attempts to migrate to a more
modern platform, the Marine Corps is upgrading an outdated system. If industry can-
not migrate from their legacy system, they attempt to insert new technology to
interface with their legacy system. On example may use current client-server
applications to provide the interface for EC/EDI capabilities. The Marine Corps is
updating and adding on to outdated, Wang specific proprietary equipment. In
hindsight, SACONS has proven itself superior to the BCAS/ MADES system. The
Marine Corps, unfortunately, has BCAS/MADES and must struggle with the system
until SPS appears.
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L. BROAD BASED IMPLEMENTATION AND THE REMAINING
EC/EDI MODEL
In all aspects compared to the commercial examples, the Marine Corps has
essentially halted efforts in implementing EC/EDI even though verbally support
continues to be strong. Because ofEC/EDI inactivity, unresolved technical problems,
lack of clear leadership and management of the EC/EDI implementation process, it
is not necessary to cover the broad based implementation and the rest of the EC/EDI
model. The Marine Corps has not progressed beyond the pilot test phase. Despite
this, some of the mechanisms to make EC/EDI work in the remaining steps, are
discussed.
Most successful EC/EDI examples consistently use committees, teams,
individuals, or offices that only focus on managing the EC/EDI implementation
process. An organization, such as 3M's EC/EDI procurement team is fully supported
and firmly established by successful companies. Often these committees report
directly to a president, vice president or senior management. Senior Management
commits and dedicates resources to ensure the team has the tools and resources to
successfully implement EC/EDI. Successful EC/EDI firms dedicated individuals full
time to EC/EDI management both during as well as after EC/EDI implementation.
EC/EDI requires continuous management and measurement in order to ensure
EC/EDI remains in use. In this respect, the Marine Corps does not have the
mechanisms that industry uses to promote, manage, shepherd, improve, and innovate
in order to maximize the use of EC/EDI within the Corps.
In summary, successful EC/EDI has the following traits:
• An implementation plan






Cross functional input and support
Measurement of results [Ref. l:p. 3]
Presently, the Marine Corps has very few, ifany, ofthese successful indicators.
The chart below graphically displays the results of current EC/EDI implementation
efforts compared to the EC/EDI model. This does not necessarily mean the Marine
Corps will fail in the implementation of EC/EDI. As Priester's example revealed,
recognition ofEC/EDI implementation problems, reevaluation and readjustment of
Marine EC/EDI efforts can still turn EC/EDI implementation into a successful Marine
Corps EC/EDI program. It is not too late for the Marine Corps to change. Chapter
VI will focus on a strategy and plan to help EC/EDI implementation within the
Marine Corps.
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USMC EDI IMPLEMENTATION CHECKLIST
Yes No
Has management support been obtained? •
Has purchasing department support been obtained? •
Has commitment to EDI been obtained from cross functional
organization personnel?
•
Has an appropriate organization structure for the EDI effort
been established?
•
Has a pilot been established? •
Has a method for reviewing the results, as well as modifying
results, of the pilot program been developed?
•
Have policies and procedures for both purchases and
suppliers been finalized?
•
Has road-based implementation been established? •
Have plans been developed to review and measure benefits
and costs?
•





VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USMC STRATEGIC EC/EDI
CAMPAIGN PLAN
A. INTRODUCTION
The intent of this chapter is to develop both a strategy and plan in order to
implement initial electronic capabilities in both USMC purchasing offices as well as
their vendor base. The goal is to migrate both parties towards increasing levels of
EC/EDI activity, striving for an integrated EC/EDI paradigm. Industry examples
indicate not every firm can or will integrate EDI within their company's systems.
Successful EDI firms do, however, continue to foster and encourage an integrated
solution for their vendors. Before the specifics of a plan can be discussed, there are
limitations which the Marine Corps must operate within. These items are the intent
of EC/EDI initiatives, time and scope of the implementation, existing structure and
EC/EDI framework, and the support of the Marine Corps vendor/supplier base.
Although some of the items listed may limit the ability to implement EC/EDI, there
is substantial room to maneuver within this box given today's wide technology
choices. The first topic to be covered will discuss the intent ofthe EC/EDI initiatives.
B. INTENT OF EC/EDI INITIATIVES
President Clinton's Presidential Memorandum dated 26 October 1993,
"Streamlining Procurement Through Electronic Commerce," states several desired
EC/EDI objectives:
(a) Exchange procurement information such as solicitations, offers,
contracts, purchase orders, invoices, payments, and other
contractual documents electronically between the private sector
and the Federal Government to the maximum extent practical;
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(b) Provide businesses, including small, small disadvantaged, and
women-owned businesses, with greater access to Federal
procurement opportunities.
(c) Ensure that potential suppliers are provided simplified access to
the Federal Government's electronic commerce system;
(d) Employ nationally and internationally recognized data formats
that serve to broaden and ease the electronic interchange of data;
and
(e) Use agency and industry standards and networks to enable the
Government and potential suppliers to exchange information
and access Federal procurement data.
The FAR response and intent of EC initiatives are found in FAR Section 4,
Subpart 4.5 pertaining to this discussion are:
"Electronic commerce (EC)" means a paperless process including
electronic mail, electronic bulletin boards, electronic funds transfer,
electronic data interchange, and similar techniques for accomplishing
business transactions. The use of terms commonly associated with
paper transactions (e.g., "copy," "document," "page," "printed," "sealed
envelope" and "stamped") shall not be interpreted to restrict the use of
electronic commerce.
"Electronic data interchange (EDI)" means a technique for elec-
tronically transferring and storing formatted information between
computers utilizing established and published formats and codes, as
authorized by the applicable Federal Information Processing Standards.
"Federal Acquisition Computer Network (FACNET)" means the
Government wide Electronic Commerce/Electronic Data Interchange
(EC/EDI) systems architecture for the acquisition of supplies and
services that provides for electronic data interchange of acquisition
information between the Government and the private sector, employs
nationally and internationally recognized data formats, and provides
universal user access.
94
(a) FACNET functions are listed as follows:
(1) Provide widespread public notice of contracting oppor-
tunities, and issue solicitations;
(2) Receive responses to solicitations and associated requests
for information;
(3) Provide widespread public notice of contract awards and
issuance of orders (including price);
(4) Receive questions regarding solicitations, if practicable;
(5) Issue contracts and orders, if practicable;
(6) Initiate payments to contractors, if practicable; and
(7) Archive data relating to each procurement action.
(b) FACNET will permit the private sector to do the following
electronically:
(1) Access notices of solicitations;
(2) Access and review solicitations;
(3) Respond to solicitations;
(4) Receive contracts and orders, if practicable;
(5) Access information on contract awards and issuance of
orders; and
(6) Receive payment by purchase card, electronic funds
transfer, or other automated means, if practicable.
EC/EDI is mandated by the President and codified in the FAR as the preferred
method of soliciting and receiving quotes for purchases between $2,500 and
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$100,000, but certainly not the only method. A recent GAO ruling allowed
non-FACNET electronic bulletin board solicitations by DISC because they provided
competition to the maximum extent practical as required for small purchase
acquisitions and were consistent with FACNET requirements. [Ref. 63] This aspect
is particularly important since the Marine Corps has difficulties in its EC/EDI
implementation. A temporary electronic alternative is necessary until sites are
FACNET capable or SPS is fielded. This plan is not designed to bypass the present
FACNET structure or requirement, but as an alternative and complimentary method
to jump start the electronic process in order to abide with the intent of the 1997
EC/EDI mandate.
Equally important is the support of the past and present Commandant of
Marine Corps, General Mundy and General Krulak. EC/EDI concepts are supported
in three Marine Corps Commandant Policy White Letters, White Letter No. 8-92,
White Letter of No. 9-93, White Letter No. 14-94 and the present Commandant's
Warfighting Laboratory precepts.
White Letter 8-92 states the Marine Corps should make "payments of
reasonable prices" for necessary goods and services. Furthermore the Marine Corps
should "buy only what we need and ensure the price we pay is fair and reasonable."
As the IBM survey indicates in Chapter IV, a 26% average savings is possible with
electronic on-line processes that EC/EDI promotes. Electronic methods make any
firm a local vendor for the Marine Corps. Electronic methods increase competition
and lower prices as the IBM survey indicates. 3M, RJR, Priester, and others, also
obtain better service in addition to better prices in their electronic process. Savings
in electronic transaction and processing costs are passed on to the customer.
Therefore to save scarce Marine Corps resources and obtain a true "fair and
reasonable" price for goods and services as well as better service, Marine Corps
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purchases must be done electronically. Current prices received for goods and services
are higher than the prices received through electronic processes, and does not comply
with the Commandant's policy. [Ref. 50]
White Letter 9-93 states "reinventing Government initiatives," which EC/ EDI
is part of, "are critical to improving the current state of the Government. The Marine
Corps can benefit from these initiatives." This White Letter specifically targets the
leadership within the Marine Corps. The Commandant points out that each and every
officer within the Marine Corps has a responsibility, duty, and obligation to carry out
and support reinventing initiatives, such as EC/EDI:
The entire senior leadership of the Marine Corps is responsible for
setting the tempo at which our officers, enlisted, and civilians follow.
Change is necessary ifwe expect our "Quality Corps" of 218 years to
move into the 21st century as the force of choice.... "Ready, Relevant,
and Capable."
This is our opportunity to set the pace again by proving we have a
Marine Corps that is both effective and efficient at mission
accomplishment. I am secure in the knowledge that your full support
will maintain the momentum of this vitally important initiative.
White Letter, 14-94, addresses the Marine Corps continuing problem ofinvalid
unliquidated obligations. One of the positive inherent traits of EC/EDI is that it will
help reduce the problem of invalid unliquidated obligation because of increased
accuracy ofEC/EDI transmitted information. DFAS's long term strategy to reduce
and eliminate invalid unliquidated obligations and become more efficient and
responsive depends upon the use of EDI and Financial EDI (FEDI). The
Commandant further states:
As commanders we are fiscally accountable and responsible to correct
this problem.... We must assign adequate personnel to do the job,
give them proper training, be certain we have effective internal
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controls, and provide appropriate command emphasis and support.
The magnitude of invalid obligations reported by the auditors indicates
clearly to me that our resources have not been used effectively. I
strongly urge you to take an active role in guarding against the
inefficient use of our scarce resources. We must insure that every
dollar is spent prudently and accounted for properly. (Authors
emphasis)
Finally, the current Commandant's guidance concerning the Warfighting
Laboratory (CWL) is pertinent to the intent and inherent traits of EC/EDI. General
Krulak states, "a major goal of the CWL is the leveraging and adaptation of ongoing
R&D and technology opportunities within the R&D community, especially those that
can be of immediate potential exploitation and operational experimentation.
Technology and R&D sources include DOD, ARPA, Government laboratories,
academia, industry, and non-DOD sources." [Ref. 64] The importance and specific
use of ARPA referenced by the Commandant cannot be overstated in this plan.
EC/EDI is inherently a technology exploration and exploitation plan that the
Commandant advocates. Furthermore, EC/EDI capabilities have the potential to be
applied in a sea-based support and logistics environment that the CWL desires. "The
objective is to minimize needed equipment ashore and provide on-demand logistics
support from the sea. The entire logistical chain essentially from supply to
distribution will be highly responsive to the needs of the forces ashore. By reducing
the traditional buildup ashore, equipment and forces will be more survivable, tailored
to the specific need and cost-effective. Key technologies include: automated
tracking/supply/routing of logistics (total asset management), advanced transport and
container techniques, low consumption/long endurance equipment and resources, and
alternative fuels/propulsion/personnel supplies." Note the EC/EDI characteristics of
the plan: on demand logistics, supply to distribution, highly responsive, tailored to the
specific need, cost-effective, total asset management. EC/EDI industry examples
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often refer to these qualities as Just In Time (JIT) management principles. EC/EDI
enables JIT through EC/EDI applications by providing faster and more accurate
information, integrating "total asset management" EC/EDI processes by linking users,
purchasers, payments, suppliers and shippers. In summary, the intent of the EC/EDI
Presidential Mandate, as well as the intent of past and present Commandant is clear;
EC/EDI implementation is required and expected to be carried out. The Marine Corps
can no longer ignore EC/EDI.
C. TIME AND SCOPE
Although RJR is a large company, it does not compare in size to DOD in terms
oftransactions. DOD executes between one and two billion procurement transactions
annually with thousands of vendors. DOD's plan states its desire to convert 350,000
vendors into electronic trading partners and make millions of small purchases a year
all within a 3 year time fame. This is an aggressive and daunting task given only
40,000 U.S. firms use EDI methods. [Ref. 25 :p. iv] RJR's EC/EDI implementation
outlook may shed some light on this subject.
RJR has 1,800 electronic trading partners and executes 6,000 purchasing
transactions annually. RJR required six years of dedication, support, and commitment
to transition to an all electronic integrated process. Furthermore, RJR paid for all EDI
transition costs in order to make EDI occur with the last 5% of their suppliers. RJR
invested $40,000 of their own money in order to transition all of their suppliers into
electronic trading partners. [Ref. 4:pp. 110-111] In light of this, the President's
Mandate to switch the entire Government to EC/EDI methods in approximately 3
years appears unrealistic. Additionally, no one in DOD has voiced their desire to pay
for suppliers' EC/EDI conversion costs as RJR. Using RJR's method and DOD's
350,000 trading partner goal, the last 5% ofthe electronic vendor base will cost DOD
$777,777 in 1993 dollars. Adjusted for inflation, this figure approaches $1 million
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dollars. Is DOD committed to spend $1 million or more above the $26 million
already expended on EC/EDI implementation? Given the trend of declining defense
budgets, this is highly unlikely as is the notion that the Marine Corps will pay for
EC/EDI conversion costs. Given firms such as 3M and RJR are private companies,
they do not have the bureaucratic hurdles and resistance to change that DOD and
Government agencies face transforming to EC/EDI. As mentioned, such firms also
pay for EC/EDI conversion costs. Therefore, a period greater than six years may be
more appropriate for DOD's and the Marine Corps' conversion to EC/EDI.
A long range Marine Corps outlook is necessary as is the dedication of assets
and daily management of EC/EDI implementation. Daily EC/EDI management is
necessary until SPS is fully fielded and operational in all Marine Corps purchasing
offices. SPS scheduled fielding falls in line with the six year outlook as full fielding
is not anticipated till the 2002-2007 time frame. Given the problems and poor view
ofBCAS/MADES, the Marine Corps may consider initiating permission to accelerate
SPS fielding immediately upon selection of the SPS product. With only 28 sites to
field SPS, the small number of offices shouldn't significantly impact any present
fielding plans. The time and scope of the project must be adjusted to fit the realities
of the scope necessary in implementing the Corps' EC/EDI capabilities. As the time
and scope adjusts, so must the strategy and plan adjust within the existing EC/EDI
structure and framework.
D. STRUCTURE AND FRAMEWORK: FAR, FACNET, AND SPS
According to the FAR, FACNET purchases are geared toward a specific
market; purchases above the $2,500 micro-purchase threshold and below the
simplified acquisition threshold of $100,000. This does not mean purchases cannot
be made through FACNET in purchases less than $2,500 or more than $100,000.
Rather, it creates a preference toward the Government credit card for purchases less
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than $2,500. Thus, EC/EDI works hand-in-hand with the Government credit card.
For purposes of this study, credit card purchases are viewed as an electronic method;
authorizations and purchase payments occur electronically. Therefore, to abide with
the intent ofEC/EDI initiatives and the FAR, this plan suggests that all purchases in
the Marine Corps under $100,000 only be conducted through the use of a credit card,
FACNET, or FACNET similar techniques. Again FACNET similar techniques are
only temporary options to bridge the gap of current Marine Corps EC/EDI
implementation failure and the requirement to abide with the Presidential Mandate.
Furthermore a requirement exists to work within the current FACNET structure
despite problems associated with FACNET. This does not mean that FACNET is the
only method to use, but rather the preferred method and ultimate long range Marine
Corps EC/EDI objective.
Lastly any suggestions must consider SPS. SPS will replace the BCAS/
MADES automated procurement system. This will provide an open windows based
solution with EC/EDI features integral to the system. SPS provides a quantum leap
in technology and usability for Marine Corps purchasing personnel. Lastly, DFAS
must be considered since they will be required by law to make all Federal payments,
except IRS tax returns, electronic payments by January, 1999. DFAS's long term
strategy for future payments as well as to reduce invalid unliquidated obligations is
based upon Financial EDI (FEDI). Hence, the immediate ability to transmit EDI
transaction and integrate the procurement-payment cycle is real within the Marine
Corps.
E. SUPPORT OF MARINE CORPS PURCHASING PERSONNEL
AND VENDORS
A significant hurdle present in the current EC/EDI implementation process is
the support ofboth purchasing personnel and vendors. A key aspect ofsupport hinges
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on educating both the Government as well as vendors on the concepts and benefits of
EC/EDI. Attention must be focused to develop an understanding ofEC/EDI. EC/EDI
simply makes good business sense, and will be an expected business process in future
business relationships. The plan for EC/EDI must help migrate firms at the lowest
spectrum of electronic capability, to the highest advanced integrated EC/EDI
approach without placing a burden upon vendors or purchasing personnel. The
program must provide vendors an "opt out" solution as the levels of sophistication
increase from fax, e-mail, to EDI. In other words the plan must be flexible enough
to accommodate a wide range of options as commercial industry provides its vendors.
F. STRATEGY
Conceptually, EDI is nothing more than managing information, transforming
the information into knowledge, and using the knowledge to accomplish a service or
mission objective within an electronic paradigm. Electronic methods capture added
value ofworkers wherever they may be in the customer/supplier relationship. Thus
re-keying or duplicated efforts are eliminated. The speed, efficiency, and accuracy
of electronic knowledge and processes provides intrinsic value to both the customer
as well as the supplier. Thus, in many respects, EDI, is viewed as a "competitive
advantage" vehicle. The desire to gain a competitive or strategic advantage through
price, quality, or service, real or imagined, is a major driving force for the enduring
and continued growth of EDI.
The Marine Corps' interest in EC/EDI focuses on reducing costs, as industry
is, but also in developing new suppliers as well as helping current suppliers remain
competitive and robust suppliers of the future. Firms can gain a competitive
advantage, today, compared to their Government competitors, by implementing
EC/EDI prior to DFAS's electronic payment requirements and fielding of SPS.
Learning and experimenting with EC/EDI today, means they gain a competitive
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cost/service advantage, which can be immediately exploited, as well as future
advantages as their remaining competitors maddeningly dash to obtain EC/EDI
capabilities to comply with DFAS and SPS deadlines. As businesses and Government
expand EC/EDI/FEDI, the EC/EDI mandate will be a common business and
Government mandate for all purchase/payment processes.
Based upon the intent of EC/EDI, the following is the strategy for the
implementation of EC/EDI within the Marine Corp; eliminate the paper
purchasing/payment cycle and all paper communication between industry and USMC
activities by transforming it into a 100% electronic process. This will be
accomplished using the Government Credit Card, EDI/FACNET structure, and where
appropriate other EC technology such as e-mail and internet World Wide WEB
(WWW) technology. The plan and goals to accomplish EC/EDI implementation will
also focus on the following:
• Make the entire process, from purchase to payments, electronic using
EC methods such as such as e-mail, internet, as well as EDI;
• Facilitate and conduct 100% of all Marine Corps obligations and
payments through EDI/FEDI processes;
• Establish an EC/EDI Office and EC/EDI Support Team to: manage
implementation of EC/EDI on a daily basis, provide EC/EDI support
for Marine Corps personnel and their vendor's, track measure and
report EC/EDI implementation progress to the Commandant through
Deputy Chief of Staff, I&L;
• Establish measurement metrics and evaluate all leaders/managers, such
as the LBO Director and contracting officers, on their improvement of
EC/EDI implementation in their fitness reports and civilian evaluations;
• Re-engineer the paper process at the local level in order to eliminate
non-critical tasks that do not add value;
103
• Capture data at the source and find methods for users to begin the
electronic process;
• Develop, gather and deliver training and education material for
procurement personnel and their vendors;
• Train and educate Marine Corps personnel on EC/EDI implementation
and the benefits to EC/EDI;
• Keep people informed ofEC/EDI implementation progress and accom-
plishments;
• Empower and encourage employees to contribute and suggest changes
to the EC/EDI process and provide incentives and bonuses to
individuals and offices that make such suggestions;
• Eliminate LBO control and management of ADP and automated
procurement systems and empower local levels to manage their
processes;
• Focus on industry's purchase order success instead ofRFQ DOD focus;
use internet for RFQs;
• Request a waiver or obtain re-invention lab status in order to waive the
Government's 30 day Prompt Payment Act requirement. USMC's
suppliers will receive immediate electronic payment upon receipt of
correct EDI/FEDI transactions.
The plan to address the strategy is initially a low tech e-mail plan based over
a six year basis or until SPS is fielded. There will be hurdles at three distinct phases
that raise the use and sophistication ofEC/EDI usage. Ultimately once SPS is fielded,
the vendor base will be electronic. No business will transpire with firms who do not
accept the Government credit card or do not use EC/EDI methods. Until this high
level of sophistication occurs, e-mail will help bridge the technical gap and hook users
on to the concept and use of computers in a purchasing environment.
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G. EC/EDI IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
1. E-mail Phase
The initial phase of the plan is the e-mail phase. E-mail is a low tech and easy
method to begin transmitting communications to and from Marine Corps contracting
offices and vendors. This phase will be a 12 month hurdle for vendors to overcome.
Ifvendors do not become e-mail capable, they will be dropped from the vendor list.
E-mail is a simple tool that even Marine Corps personnel religiously use on a daily
basis. E-mail is also prevalent in the business community. Business cards routinely
include e-mail addresses. Thus, e-mail is an easy acceptable low tech solution to
develop purchasing support and vendor support. Those who do not wish to make the
e-mail jump will be referred to the FAST Electronic Brokerage system. FAST will
be discussed in detail later in this chapter. E-mail is also cheap- $10 a month buys
an e-mail account at the various on-line services such as America Online (AOL). The
USMC-wide e-mail system is expected to have internet connectivity and will be able
to communicate with any commercial e-mail address. If offices do not have that
connectivity, they will be allowed to obtain a commercial account just as their
vendors. Internet service providers charge between $10-$20 a month for unlimited
internet access which includes an e-mail account. The precedent for e-mail
connectivity and usage is well established in the business world as a common
business practice. The Marine Corps, however, is not using this commercial example
in its relationship and communication with its vendor base. This is not only unwise,
but inefficient. One e-mail message can be sent to the entire vendor base with one
click of the mouse instead of:
• Printing a letter to each vendor;
• Folding each letter;
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• Enclosing each letter in an envelope;
• Sealing each envelope;
• Addressing each envelope;
• Mailing the letters.
This also frees up individuals to conduct more important tasks within the
offices. Additionally, the speed at which e-mail travels is extremely quicker than the
current postal system. Firms could begin or bid on items the same day the office
distributed the solicitation. E-mail activity is also easy to record; copy and paste e-
mail activity into an electronic file/folder. Another aspect to e-mail is cost.
As indicated above, e-mail is a cheap alternative. Many Government
contractors subscribe to the CBD, commercial FAR resellers such as CCH, as well as
updates to the Federal Register. These are costly options. An e-mail account with
internet access will provide the opportunity to get these materials free on-line. In this
manner the account could also save vendors money by reducing current cost and
increasing the ability to access other information electronically. Electronic
submissions of bids and electronic bulletin boards also were upheld in a recent GAO
protest. Although security issues were not part of the issues at DISC, security issues
are not an issue due to public shareware, Pretty Good Privacy (PGP).
The issue of security is a moot point for several reasons. First and foremost
there is a shareware program written by Phillip Zimmerman ofMIT that is a public
key encryption system. This program is widely available on the internet and is free
to individuals. A reasonably priced commercial version is also available for vendors
through Viacrypt. PGP works on windows, UNIX, Macintosh, and OS/2 operating
systems. Essentially, PGP provides a sealed envelop for electronic mail. Iftampering
occurs in the deliver of the e-mail message, the receiver will be aware of such
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problems. Because this product encrypts so well, the U.S. Government has banned
distribution ofPGP to foreign countries in fear of misuse by criminal elements. Not
only does PGP support encryption, but it also supports electronic signatures.
Electronic signatures, are even more difficult to forge than written signatures. In this
manner the vendor will absolutely know the message was not tampered with and also
have positive confirmation that the message is from a contracting officer.
In France an enterprising person decrypted one encrypted message that used
an algorithm 40 bit key. This encrypted message required 8 days of work, 120
workstations, and two parallel super computers to break the code. This was a single
encrypted message. To repeat that task, even from the same client to the same server
seconds later would require another 8 days
,
129 workstations, and 2 parallel super
computers. PGP can use a 128 bit key which is 288 times harder to decrypt than the
40 bit key. The computing power to decrypt such a message would be more than 1
trillion times greater than the capability to decrypt the 40 bit key. [Ref. 65] With
PGP, the ability to electronically sign, safely encrypt and transmit e-mail is available
today as a cheap and easy alternative to security issues. Furthermore, the speed at
which Marine Corps can award a contract using electronic means now becomes a
security tool also. The contract can already be awarded before anyone ever
successfully decrypts a message, if it can be decrypted at all. Thus any information
gathered from such a costly and highly technical endeavor is useless. In this manner,
the speed of award, and the high technical and cost barriers required to decrypt the
message eliminates any security related issues with little cost to Marine Corps
activities and vendors. PGP is also easy to install and presently has five windows
applications that facilitate use ofPGP in a windows friendly environment. PGP is a
simple, low cost solution to any security concerns. [Ref. 66]
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Another option using public key encryption technology for electronic
authentication is the U.S. Postal Electronic Commerce Services. By July 1996, the
U.S. Postal Service (USPS) will "begin operating a 'postmarking server' that will time
stamp electronic documents with the USPS digital seal. Each USPS electronic
postmark will cost ten cents and online billing will be available. This postmark will
show the document existed at a certain point in time and has not been modified."
[Ref. 67 :p. 1 ] This is particularly welcome to the contracting community because the
electronic transmission is covered under the USPS fraud statute. Postal inspectors
will investigate ifUSPS electronic methods are used to perpetuate fraud. Thus, any
legal or security concerns are eliminated for only ten cents per transmission. [Ref.
67:p. 1]
DISC faced a GAO protest when an RFQ, solicited on an EBB, required an
electronic response. The protester argued that the electronic process limited
competition. DISC won the protest because the electronic medium 1) improved
efficiency on PALT, 2) increased competition, and 3) electronic responses did not
overly burden the vendor community. DISC'S electronic methods, including
electronic submission of bids, were consistent with the mandate to provide
competition to the maximum extent practical for small purchase acquisitions. GAO
also ruled that "while DISC procurement were not conducted through FACNET, they
were consistent with FACNET requirements." [Ref. 63] E-mail is not only a simple
way to communicate with vendors, it also is now a recognized method to submit bids.
E-mail is now the norm and should also be a norm within the Marine Corps and its
vendor base.
This plan suggests all future solicitations, blanket purchase agreements, etc.,
contain e-mail addresses as a requirement for bidders. To encourage e-mail use,
communication with vendors will be through e-mail unless time sensitive responses
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demand otherwise. E-mail and voice mail will greatly reduce the day-to day
interruptions of the purchasing workforce. The FAR also supports this position as e-
mail is specifically listed as an EC process. Thus, e-mail supports the intent, upholds
the regulations, and is a cheap alternative to begin EC/EDI implementation. E-mail
also saves businesses shipping costs which can be up to $ 1 5 for overnight delivery.
Bill Eagler, vice president of Online Systems Services, estimates businesses can save
$1,200 per employee using e-mail for project files distributed as e-mail attachments.
[Ref. 68 :p. 23] Additionally e-mail technology is quickly approaching the EDI world.
There are current EDI options based upon e-mail activity that could be used by the
vendor community. EDI transactions are being "wrapped" in an e-mail message
standard as an option for trading partners. The e-mail option also still allows firms
to continue up the ladder ofEDI complexity by integrating new e-mail messaging
technology with EDI capabilities. In this fashion e-mail very effectively leverages a
$10 per month cost and keeps open a wide option for vendors to choose their
respective levels ofEC/EDI activity. This flexibility should not only make vendors
happy, but purchasing personnel also. Vendors have a foot in the door for EC activity
while becoming accustomed to electronic commerce and electronic business
transactions. E-mail also provides a wide selection of future EC/EDI opportunities.
Those that do not wish to overcome the e-mail step will be referred to FAST. Once
the 12 month e-mail phase ends, the FAST phase will begin.
2. FAST Phase: A Government Agency Project
The FAST phase is named after a Government sponsored project titled FAST
Electronic Broker. FAST is a temporary tool to overcome the difficulties the Marine
Corps presently faces with BCAS/MADES EC/EDI capabilities as well as to migrate
and convince the vendor base to switch to an electronic process. FAST is not
intended to replace or bypass FACNET or EDI methods, but merely is a method to
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help jump-start the EC/EDI implementation process. FAST is a project initiated by
the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in cooperation with the Information
Sciences Institute of the University of Southern California. FAST is a rapid and
reliable purchasing tool based upon electronic mail, EDI, FAX, phone and computers.
FAST has a wide base of suppliers, distributors and manufacturers to tap into,
including Government databases, for a robust purchasing mechanism. FAST's
strength is in the small purchase arena as well as unique item purchases. Essentially,
the Marine Corps can use FAST to purchase items via e-mail, giving the Marine
Corps EC capabilities despite the BCAS/MADES problems, in order to fulfill the
President's EC/EDI Mandate with no additional equipment costs incurred by the
Marine Corps. Government sponsorship is vital since the backing of the Government
is an essential element of this phase. Notice FAST is an ARPA project which is also
in line with the Commandant's CWL concepts and support.
In using FAST, the Marine Corps would not be implementing or instigating
any new project, initiative, or unusual procurement methods. The Corps would be
using a Government sponsored and authorized project. The Government sponsorship
also allows FAST to receive Government prices for goods and services. Appendix
F also highlights FAST's praise and support from the Joint Chiefs for its vital role in
fielding an anti-fratricide device during the Gulf War. OFPP conducted a post review
of the GulfWar procurement and found it to be fully compliant with applicable law
and regulations. Additional legal and regulatory issue addressed by Richard Dunn,
ARPA's General Counsel, also promotes Marine Corps use ofFAST because FAST:
1
.
Does not conflict with any inherent Government functions
2. Does not conflict with any Walsh-Healy Public Contract's Act
3. Does not conflict with the Competition in Contracting Act
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4. Does not conflict with the Small Business Act
5. Does not conflict with Small Business Set Asides (SBSA) (See
Appendix F)
Because FAST does not conflict with the above items, and even helps
contracting offices manage the various aspects of the above regulations, such as
SBSA, Dunn states any concerns or objections concerning FAST'S electronic system,
as indicated above, "are not valid as a matter of fact and law." (See Appendix F)
Therefore the Marine Corps should use FAST because it is; sponsored by a
Government agency, in line with the Commandant's CWL intent, approved by the
Joint Chiefs, reviewed and approved by OFPP and does not conflict with any existing
laws or procurement regulations. DLA, U.S. Army, and the Air Force all currently
take advantage of FAST's unique capabilities. This plan requires Marine Corps use
of FAST because it makes good business sense, fulfills the intent of the EC/EDI
Mandate, and supports the Commandant's CWL technology exploitation initiatives.
a. Fast-Goodfor Government and Vendors
The essential step in the FAST phase is migrating the vendor base to
participate in FAST. The important capability of FAST is the flexibility in its
communication capabilities. Because BCAS/MADES EC/EDI capabilities are stalled,
the Marine Corps can communicate with FAST via e-mail, today, if it desires to do
so. Once BCAS/MADES EC/EDI capabilities are installed or ifSPS is fielded, FAST
can also accept EDI transactions. Thus, if the Marine Corps moves from e-mail
traffic to EDI traffic, the transition will be transparent to the vendor base. Vendors
will not notice any changes in their traffic or business process. Thus, an EDI
transaction can be sent through FACNET and without any further work, other than
changing the e-mail address, be forwarded to FAST.
Ill












The other strength ofFAST is its ability to communicate to the Marine
Corps vendor base in whatever fashion they use: phone, FAX, e-mail, or EDI.
Essentially FAST contacts the entire vendor base in addition to any other FAST
participant that can respond to the solicitation. The FAST/FACNET team enhances
competition, promoting CICA, as well as supporting the contracting officer's
requirement in FAR 13.106 (a)(3) to solicit new sources. FAST not only has
thousands of sources, but also continually seeks new vendors to add to its database.
In this fashion, a Government sponsored project is fulfilling the FAR regulation to
solicit new sources without effort expended by the contracting office. FAST does not
create any barriers because it is FREE to become a FAST participant. As the picture
above indicates, if vendors choose to opt out of the transition towards electronic
commerce they could still join FAST and use their FAX to conduct business
electronically with the Marine Corps. This aspect would be transparent to the
contracting offices. FAST's response would remain e-mail or EDI. In effect, vendors
get a taste of electronic commerce at little or no cost. By joining FAST, each firm
now has gained the ability to access and conduct business with thousands of other
firms within FAST. Local vendors would no longer be local, but national vendors for
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their $120 per year e-mail account. Through FAST, the Government and the Marine
Corps is inviting the vendor base to test electronic commerce methods without
incurring any substantial cost risk. The Marine Corps wins in that they are moving
the vendor base towards an EC process, step by step, with little or no cost to the
vendor base. Because FAST is free, FAST certainly will generate vendor support and
participation. Secondly, the Marine Corps can use e-mail to initiate FAST which
would be welcomed and supported by purchasing personnel. They do not have to
relearn any complicated process or wait for the BCAS/MADES installation to occur.
Even if the BCAS/MADES installation overcomes its problems, FAST will still
accept EDI transactions. Therefore, a FACNET/FAST RFQ could occur without
additional work or re-keying effort necessary. Furthermore, the FAST/FACNET
option will provide greater competition resulting in a lower price for Marine Corps
activities. The FAST option does not commit offices to exercise a FAST quote if it
is not competitive.
The FAST strategy has several win-win aspects. First vendors get a taste
of EC/EDI at little or no cost. Secondly vendors increase opportunities to expand
their sales on a national level, again in a very cost effective manner. Thirdly, local
vendors solely dependent on local Government business may expand their business
base and be less dependent upon Government contracts. Finally, and most
importantly, e-mail and FAST "hooks" the vendor base into an electronic process and
may encourage them to expand upward in the EDI process because it is a good
bushiness decision to do so.
One of the most beneficial aspects of e-mail and FAST is that the
process and experience may lead to a more sophisticated electronic process such as
EDI. A recent Rand study on the electronic environment states the e-mail is a catalyst
for further electronic activities and participation. "Electronic mail is the critical first
113
entry point to participation in electronic communities for the majority of individuals.
Also, because e-mail is immediately popular with network users, it plays a crucial role
in stimulating them to experiment with other features of an electronic environment.
The value of e-mail's role as a catalyst to other, more advanced network use is
significant. Return on investments made by commercial businesses and other
enterprises in network services also are likely to rely on use of more advanced,
value-added features." [Ref. 69] Nordstrom, the retailer, also confirms e-mail is the
lowest common denominator of technical choices. Nearly everyone can use e-mail.
Nordstrom's business process, many unique one-time buys and no centralized buying
offices, lead Nordstrom to use e-mail instead of EDI. In Nordstrom's case, Randy
Rehn, project manager for Nordstrom, states, "our goal is to study and implement EDI
where it makes sense for us, but it won't always make sense." [Ref. 70:p. 72]
Unfortunately for the Marine Corps, one aspect of DOD's EC/EDI operational
concepts, RFQs, does not make sense.
b. Follow Commercial Examples: Use Purchase Orders
As indicated in Chapter IV, industry gravitates to the purchase order
transactions and then generally moves into EDI invoicing, payments, and shipping.
Contrary to industry, DOD has chosen to initiate the 840 RFQ transaction first.
Industry's rational for this is simple; the purchase order tends to draw other areas and
functions into the electronic paradigm. [Ref. 71:p. 78] Other areas race to keep up
to speed as the process moves toward an electronic integrated paradigm. Turner
thoroughly document the six most commonly used EDI transaction sets, which are:
• 810 -invoice
• 820 - Payment Order/Remittance Advice
• 850 - Purchase Order
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• 855 - Purchase Order Acknowledgment
• 997 - Functional Acknowledgment
Notice the 840 RFQ transaction is absent. In addition to DOD's
interpretation of a single architectural solution to EC/EDI, they also have chosen one
of the most difficult hurdles and expensive transaction sets to implement EC/EDI:
840 RFQ transaction. [Ref. 71 :p. 78] In Turner's study, only 7 of 95 firms sent 840
transactions, and only 9 of 95 received 840 transactions. As DOD continues to have
problems in its FACNET and EC/EDI implementation, DOD's process must be
re-evaluated. Marine Corps EC/EDI activity should focus and prioritize its
implementation efforts on the six common commercial transaction sets listed above.
Once EDI activity and participation matures, the Marine Corps could move toward
RFQ transaction sets. RFQs in commercial example are typically only used in mature
EC/EDI environments. DOD and the Marine Corps are not in a mature EC/EDI
environment. Therefore, focus on the 850 Purchase Order is a better alternative for
current EC/EDI activity. 840 transactions often are very large. This translates to
higher vendor cost as many VANs charge customers a fee per character. Cost must
be considered through the Corps' eyes as well as the vendor's eyes. Costs, or the
perception of high costs is limiting EC/EDI activity and participation. Although
FAST will be used, FAST does not prohibit sending RFQs through FACNET. As
mentioned before, the tandem use of FAST/FACNET is desired and reinforces
FACNET use. However an alternate method to access RFQs besides FACNET is
necessary. To help shoulder some of the burden, the plan uses FAST, as mentioned
before, as well as internet World Wide Web (WWW) pages.
c. Internet Web Pages: Inexpensive Universal Access
DOD has institutionalized a single architectural EC solution. This may
not be in the best interest of vendors, or the Government. Such a design may,
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unintentionally, violate the objectives and intent of EC/EDI initiatives. There is not
only an effective, cheap, and simple manner to fully live up the EC/EDI objectives
and regulatory intent, particularly FACNET requirements, but also to share the
burden, expense and ease of EC/EDI transition, including small businesses. This
alternative is internet web pages. No other means presently fulfills the expansive
overarching intent ofEC as well as internet web pages. Web pages address all of the
president EC objectives, abide by the definitions of EC, and address 10 of 13
functions associated with FACNET.
In both the Presidential Mandate and the FAR an underlying and
common intent is to distribute Government information, such as contracting
information, as broadly as possible. There is no indication, whatsoever, to limit the
distribution of information only to private companies such as the current DOD
EC/EDI distribution to certified VAN/VAS organizations. As much as the
Government desires to uphold the sanctity of full and open competition in
procurements, there should be a parallel full and open access to information. Such a
conduit to information not only promotes full and open competition but also abides
by the full intent and objectives of EC/EDI. Presently there is an architectural
limitation of information, which creates an information barrier to entry, limiting
competition.
Present FACNET initiatives do not promote the FAR's FACNET
objectives concerning widespread public notices of contracting opportunities to
Government solicitations, questions regarding solicitations, or access to archived data
relating to each procurement action. Present FACNET operations neither promote
widespread public electronic access to notices or reviews ofGovernment solicitations,
nor does FACNET allow access to contract awards and issuance of orders. Such
access is presently only given to the VAN/VAS organizations, not the public. Public
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access, by definition, does not equate to the private commercial VAN/VAS
distribution structure DOD presently uses. Private firms pay the VAN/VAS for
Government contracting information. Allowing only designated firms access to such
information and forcing businesses to pay for free Government information is
contrary to the widespread public notice concept as well as contrary to recent
legislation on Government information. House Resolution 830 Requires each Federal
agency to ensure that the public has timely, equal, and equitable access to information
products and services. The resolution also prohibits agencies, except where
specifically authorized by statute, from:
( 1
)
Establishing exclusive, restricted, or other distribution arrange-
ments that interfere with timely and equitable public avail-
ability;
(2) Restricting or regulating the use, resale, or re-dissemination of
public information by the public;
(3) Charging fees or royalties for resale or re-dissemination of
public information; or
(4) Establishing user fees that exceed the cost of dissemination.
[Ref. 72:p. 1]
Interestingly, how would DOD and EC/EDI Government executives
respond to Congressional inquiries concerning why a Government/DOD funded
center, ECRC, must pay a commercial DOD certified VAN provider for Government
FACNET information DOD has located at the NEPs in Ogden, Utah or Columbus,
Ohio? Furthermore, no documentation was discovered or provided by DOD
personnel concerning any specifically authorized statutes allowing the current
VAN/VAS reselling of Government FACNET information. A simple cost effective
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alternative, which industry is racing to implement, internet web pages, can satisfy the
objectives and intent ofEC initiatives.
One solution to the information dissemination is to rip out the role of
information dissemination from the architectural paradigm and provide access to such
information on a searchable web page. The San Antonio ECRC is already
experimenting with such a concept, but must pay a commercial DOD certified VAN
for Government FACNET information. San Antonio's web page allows key word and
FSC code searches on FACNET solicitations. The San Antonio ECRC web search
is an impressive, quick and easy method to search for business opportunities within
DOD. If the Government provided access to DLA, Veteran's Administration, and
NASA electronic procurement activity in the same fashion as the current search data
base is presently configured, nearly all Government electronic procurement would be
searchable. Note this is only access to and not control and management of such
information. This also reduces the need for any one agency to control or be in charge
of one control or system. Each organization could hold on to their own unique
processes, if necessary, as long as the search tool was allowed to access the
information. A one face, one searchable point would be available to any vendor. The
ability to display "one face" through the use ofweb pages, despite being located and
managed at many different locations, is an internet feature that should be capitalized
through the EC initiatives. Using web pages also means using a current global
commercial standard with global access that is inexpensive to view. Businesses and
Government agencies are racing to get on the internet. The standards and precedents
for disseminating information on web pages is already well established. The Marine
Corps needs to take advantage of this technology and exploit it in its EC/EDI
implementation. Solicitation, procurements, and other contracting information can
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be globally publicized on web pages, making them easily and cheaply retrievable by
vendors.
Many commercial EC/EDI implementation efforts develop close vendor
partnerships in order to make a successful transition to EC/EDI. This involves both
sharing of risks as well as costs. BP Oil and RJR are two examples where firms paid
EC/EDI transition expenses for their small business vendor base. "Sender pays" in
EDI is also a common commercial method. [Ref. 71 :p. 78] In many industries, 840
RFQ transactions are not used because they are hard and expensive for firms. In line
with the "sender pays" concept, the Marine Corps could post procurement information
on web pages as its share in the EC/EDI process. This is not an extremely difficult
task to accomplish. Each installation has the ability to provide an internet
procurement site. If a base is unable to provide such services, an office can purchase
a site from a local internet provider. Also, one base could potentially list several
separate sites on their account if offices desired to keep such activity in Marine
control. Currently there are over twenty sites listed by the Marine Corps internet
home page as Marine sites. Web pages are not new to the Corps, and should become
an integral part of the EC/EDI implementation plan.
Through web pages, the Marine Corps can both live up to the objectives
and intent of EC initiatives, but also to help move closer to a partnership that
commercial industry often uses in EC/EDI implementation. Web pages are a simple,
cheap, and easy alternative to develop EC/EDI partnerships with our vendor base.
Industry is rapidly creating critical mass in its use of internet technology. The Marine
Corps should also exploit internet technology and its ability to easily and cheaply
distribute information 24 hours a day, thereby fulfilling EC/EDI objectives.
Due to considerations, among them security, the current FACNET
architecture is still necessary. Web pages in no way distract, diminish, or threaten the
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current EC/EDI architecture. Web pages merely complement the current FACNET
structure. This EC/EDI Plan does not advocate scrapping the current FACNET plan,
but suggest current technology can be used in different ways to make EC work for
both the Government and vendors. An internet based solution in an information
dissemination role capitalizes on internet strengths. This EC/EDI plan does not
advocate a Government wide transition to internet procurement methods such as
NASA is currently experimenting with. Internet methods are not for everyone. There
is no single solution or golden EC panacea. However, the Marine Corps must
provide flexible tools and electronic options that can be used on a broad basis that
reinforces EC/EDI objectives. Internet connectivity and web searches can provide
both parties greater flexibility and options needed for EC/EDI implementation, and
still comply in full with EC/EDI objectives and intent.
d. Virtual Vendors, Virtual Competition
One aspect DOD is not considering in its EC/EDI implementing
concerns sharing ofEC/EDI costs with suppliers. This plan does not intend to pay for
vendor EC/EDI costs with suppliers. Rather this plan intends to use a common
commercial EDI concept, sender pays, and modify the concept via FAST. The great
aspect ofFAST is it is FREE to all USMC vendors. Message traffic emanating from
the contracting office and received by the vendor base via FAST is free. Sending a
response to Governments' solicitation is also free. Vendors need oniy pay for a
monthly e-mail account. The Marine Corps pays a slight transaction fee when they
purchase the item through FAST. Thus for a short time the Marine Corps "shoulders"
the transition to an electronic process as industry does. This is also why the plan is
a temporary solution for the Marine Corps. Due to the intense electronic competition
from the virtual vendor base ofFAST, and eventual FACNET, competition is very
keen. Prices obtained through FAST are very competitive and in many areas,
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particularly isolated installations, are less than the local vendor base. One of the first
electronic bids in Hawaii saved the Army over $50,000 compared to a previous
locally procured item. [Ref. 50] Two ideal areas for Marine Corps use are Hawaii
installations, and two California desert stations. Yes, the Corps is "shouldering" the
EC/EDI transition costs, but they can do it cheaply through virtual competition.
FAST activity also does not prohibit procurement personnel from using common
sense. IfFAST is not competitive with the local vendor base, purchase items locally.
FAST is not the golden panacea to good business judgment, but it is a method to
create, develop, and increase vendor demand for EC/EDI.
3. SPS Phase
Because fielding of SPS is not yet solidified, the SPS phase is a moving target
and will be confirmed as the selection of SPS is completed. Once SPS selection and
fielding dates are received, purchasing offices can notify their vendor base as to the
date that the Marine Corps will shift to the SPS phase. The FAST phase in essence
provides benefits similar to current VAN/VAS operations. In this regard the vendor
and purchasing community receive EC/EDI benefits at a pace and cost that is
acceptable to both vendors and purchasing personnel. Once SPS is fielded the Marine
Corps will shift entirely to the FACNET structure. In this regard the next hurdle for
vendors will be to switch to an electronic process that will accommodate the
FACNET structure. More than likely, this will be a VAN/VAS option. In this
respect, FAST grooms the vendor base for the VAN/VAS transition. Once firms
become accustomed to FAST services, the transition to VAN/VAS will not only be
easy, but will be a wise business choice. VAN/VAS operations have many more
opportunities to develop business trading partnerships compared to FAST. In this
respect, FAST prepares the vendor base for the SPS phase. Another aspect in the
concerns the uncertainty of SPS phase and FACNET.
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Because SPS is not yet selected, SPS capabilities are not yet fully known.
There is vendor hesitancy to commit to EC/EDI if such a commitment is quickly out
dated. Furthermore, due to FACNET's problems, there is considerable debate on
FACNET's future capabilities. OFPP and industry experts predict FACNET will have
to include EDI transactions as well as Web pages and electronic mail. [Ref. 73 :p. 11]
EDI internet based systems may transform FACNET in the future, and SPS will be
part of that process. In this light FAST also protects the vendors from switching to
an expensive EDI system that may be abandoned or neglected in the SPS phase.
Technology has bypassed the current FACNET architecture. Thus when SPS is
fielded the Marine Corps and their vendor base will have the tools to be 100%
electronic and begin an integrated EDI solution. Once this occurs, the Marine Corps
can fully commit to an electronic paradigm because the tools necessary to accomplish
an integrated electronic paradigm will be available to the Marine Corps. Once the
Marine Corps is fully able to commit to an electronic process, the vendor base must
also choose at this time to clear the next hurdle and leap to a more sophisticated
EC/EDI process. Thus EC/EDI capabilities will become a normal cost and technical
barrier necessary for business with the Government as well as the Marine Corps.
The EC/EDI Plan permits Marine Corps personnel to learn educate, and
experience various electronic commerce methods over a period of time. The plan
grows its own experts and provides a flexible option at each and every phase. It
views its vendors and suppliers as partners in the transformation process, as industry
does. In this respect the Marine Corps is helping their vendor base migrate to EDI,
particularly small vendors, while simultaneously fulfilling the intent and objectives
of the EC/EDI Presidential Mandate and the Commandant's intent. The plan and its
three phases fulfills all six of the President's EC/EDI objectives, while allowing the
Marine Corps to abide to the 1997 EC/EDI Mandate. This truly is a win-win solution.
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H. OBTAIN SUPPORT AND COMMITMENT FROM SENIOR
LEADERSHIP/MANAGEMENT, PURCHASING, AND CROSS
FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Prior to implementing the plan, support from senior leadership, management,
purchasing personnel, and commitment from cross functional units is necessary. This
can only occur from one person within the present organizational structure. Support
for EC/EDI implementation must begin at the very top. The Commandant of Marine
Corps must issue a White Policy Letter directing the various leaders and offices to
abide with the EC/EDI Presidential Mandate and implement EC/EDI as soon as
possible. As in industry, the "Champion" ofEC/EDI, the one to shepherd and sponsor
EC/EDI through the implementation phase, must be in the reporting and contracting
chain of command. The best selection for the EC/EDI "Champion" is the Deputy
Chief of Staff, I&L, LtGen Brabham. A statement of support for EC/EDI
implementation and usage by the Champion, General Brabham, similar to the Army
example is necessary. In this fashion, all personnel will know the importance of
EC/EDI and its vital role in future Marine Corps operations and efficiencies.
Furthermore, it should direct, not suggest, that subordinates put forth their best effort
to abide with their Commander in Chiefs desire for an EC/EDI process. The letter
will also contain support and signatures of all the various functional leaders of LP,
LF, LC, and LB. The General's direction and support of EC/EDI will wed the
purchasing personnel, hardware/ITM personnel, finance, installations and policy
makers ofthe various organizations into one team effort, linking implementation with
policy. Up to the present, this has not been accomplished between DOD policy and
implementation personnel. [Ref. 21] DOD leaders may be able to afford the
mismatch between EC/EDI implementation and procurement policy, but the Marine
Corps no longer can afford such divisiveness. If such critical support and
commitment does not occur, the Marine Corps should not ignore the EC/EDI Mandate
123
and FAR regulations, or only voice support for EC/EDI efforts, but pursue an
exemption for EC/EDI capabilities from the Secretary of Defense as indicated in the
FAR. An exemption is risky as DFAS and the other services rapidly approach
advanced stages of EC/EDI. Such an exemption carries substantial risk,
technologically, and is not recommended.
An EC/EDI exemption will lock out any future savings and efficiencies
EC/EDI processes have. An exemption would also lock out any Marine Corps input
in future technology options related to EC/EDI. The Marine Corps would find itself
technologically isolated as businesses and Government increasingly use EC/EDI
methods. If senior leadership ultimately supports EC/EDI implementation, the first
step is to elevate and establish an EC/EDI Office that reports directly to LtGen
Brabham.
I. EC/EDI OFFICE
The EC/EDI PM responsibilities will be reassigned to the EC/EDI Office. This
office will be assigned to report directly to LtGen Brabham as seen in the organization
chart below. This structure supports not only the General's role as the EC/EDI
"champion," but also continues to bind the operational and implementation aspects
ofEC/EDI with policy. Day to day operations will be assigned to a full time EC/EDI
Director/PM. The director will aid the "champion" in directing the EC/EDI vision
and strategy toward a paperless process by running the day to day operations of
EC/EDI implementation. The office is similar to 3M's EC/EDI Procurement office
or industry's EDI steering committees. The EC/EDI Office will follow the FedEx
example and conduct weekly meetings with the functional organizations directly
under General Brabham. Once a month an EC/EDI meeting will be chaired by
General Brabham and all of his subordinates to keep abreast ofEC/EDI progress as
well as keep momentum and high level interest. Although the founder and CEO of
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FedEx, Fred Smith, attends monthly EC/EDI meetings, the demands and travels
placed upon the Commandant may prohibit his regular attendance at monthly EC/EDI
meetings. The Commandant may wish to visit EC/EDI monthly meetings, when
possible, to exercise his personal support and priority of EC/EDI as well as to
emphasize command support for EC/EDI implementation. EC/EDI progress reports,
however, will ensure the Commandant is informed ofMarine Corps EC/EDI progress.
The structural change, high attention, increased presence, senior "champion" and top
level priority will greatly aid implementation at all levels. The EC/EDI Office will
also be staffed and funded beyond the fielding of SPS. There are many EC/EDI
issues lacking in present Marine Corps implementation efforts that must be addressed
by the EC/EDI Office. One of these issues is EC/EDI education efforts.
The Marine Corps EC/EDI Office will establish an EC/EDI Support Team to
improve the quality and accessibility of EC/EDI training, education and business
related information to all Marine Corps personnel as well as its vendor base. In this
manner, the corporate knowledge of EC/EDI within the Marine Corps will begin to
grow and expand. The center will include a conference room for conducting EC/EDI
training, several computer workstations that can be used to access electronically
available EC/EDI Government and business information, and a wide array ofEC/EDI
information, periodicals and journals and video teleconferencing equipment. The
establishment ofthe Corps' EC/EDI Support Team is a significant element in General
Brabham's "champion" role to solidify andjoin cross functional support, commitment,
and dedication to EC/EDI initiatives.
The focus of the EC/EDI Support Team is to use state-of-the-art electronic
media, including the internet, to effectively place the resources ofthe EC/EDI Support
Team on the desk of any Marine, GS employee, or USMC vendor. The center will
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also distribute topical commercial EC/EDI information to personnel and offices
affected by EC/EDI implementation. The Support Team also provides immediate,
on-line feedback to questions and problems related to EC/EDI implementation. One
major task of this team will be to aid the contracting officer's search in sole source
scenarios where firms do not wish to convert to EC/EDI methods. In this respect the
office can be a tool to help convince USMC vendors to switch to EC/EDI or find an
alternative EC/EDI firm to replace the non EC/EDI firm.
Key features of the EC/EDI Support Team include:
• Communication links and shared USMC wide vendor database to
USMC contracting offices;
• Immediate on-line internet access to all USMC solicitations;
• Immediate on-line internet availability of information related to the
status of on-going acquisitions and current USMC contracts;
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• EC/EDI outreach program, including the sponsorship of EC/EDI
seminars;
• A centralized library of information resources, both in hard-copy and
electronic form;
• On-line internet access to EC/EDI procurement policy and regulations;
• EC/EDI best practices and benchmarking information throughout
USMC, DOD, Government, and industry available via internet;
• USMC personnel/vendor E-mail list for EC/EDI updates;
• 1-800 telephone number and fax capabilities for Marine personnel and
USMC vendors;
• Develop and maintain a core group ofEDI experts to provide direction
and management of EC/EDI within the Marine Corps, interface and
integrate internal and external organization EC/EDI efforts and policy,
and participate in commercial EC/EDI professional organizations;
• Continually monitor, improve, innovate, and educate EC/EDI users.
Through the EC/EDI Support Team, the Corps will increase both USMC
personnel and vendor knowledge ofEC/EDI, its policies and practices. Additionally,
the EC/EDI Support Team will facilitate increased EC/EDI participation, feedback,
ownership and acceptance ofEC/EDI within the Marine Corps as well as their vendor
base.
Borrowing a FedEx phrase, "you cannot manage what you can't measure", the
following measurements are part of the EC/EDI plan:
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Total Contracting Offices 100% 100%
Total Paper Based
Transactions











Total Vendors 100% 100%
EDI returned "No
Quotes"-RFQ Returned





















All functional leaders, purchasing personnel, financial personnel, contracting
officers will be evaluated on how they improved their EC/EDI capabilities during the
evaluation period. Each and every contracting personnel will be evaluated on how
much electronic activity they transacted or what improvements were made to further
enhance the Marine Corps' electronic strategy. In this manner, promotion, increased
pay or any pay incentives will be directly related to EC/EDI activity.
Summarizing, the EC/EDI Office will have firm support from the Corps'
EC/EDI "champion," the staffing and funding necessary to manage the EC/EDI
implementation process on a daily basis, provide a strong leader and single POC for
EC/EDI within the Marine Corps, provide the material and tools necessary to make
EC/EDI successful within the purchasing office as well as their vendor base, and
provide a measurement capability to monitor the progress of EC/EDI implemen-
tation. Three distinct phases guide the Marine Corps' EC/EDI plan to fulfill the
strategic objective: eliminate the current paper purchasing/payment cycle and
transform it into a 100% electronic process.
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USMC EDI Implementation Checklist
Yes No
Has management support been obtained?
•
Has purchasing department support been obtained?
•
Has commitment to EDI been obtained from cross functional
organization personnel?
•
Has an appropriate organization structure for the EDI effort
been established? •
Has a pilot been established? •
Has a method for reviewing the results, as well as
modifying results, of the pilot program been developed?
•
Have policies and procedures for both purchases and
suppliers been finalized?
•
Has broad-based implementation been established?
•
Have plans been developed to review and measure benefits
and costs?
•






The purpose of this research was to examine the Marine Corps' EC/EDI
implementation plans. Through analysis of successful commercial implementation
practices, a model was developed to evaluate current Marine Corps EC/EDI efforts.
As businesses and other Government agencies continue to move toward an EC/EDI
paradigm, it is vital that the Marine Corps also sheds its paper processes. The
potential advantages and savings in EC/EDI processes are necessary as Marine Corps
budgets continue to decline. In essence the Marine Corps must do more with less;
EC/EDI is but one tool to help in that endeavor. The principal conclusions from
previous chapters will now be presented.
1. EC/EDI Can No Longer Be Ignored
EC/EDI is not only mandated by the Commander in Chief, President Clinton,
but also is part of the Commandant's desires of a more efficient and effective Marine
Corps. Furthermore, EC takes many forms such as e-mail and internet web pages in
addition to EDI. EC does not equal EDI. EDI is just one option within EC. Kelman
of OFPP also promotes use of web technology in procurement. Wheeler predicts
"FACNET architecture will have to include not only EDI transaction sets but also web
pages and electronic mail." [Ref. 73 :p. 10] The Marine Corps must capitalize on the
wide choice of EC options available to accomplish EC/EDI initiatives. Negative
consequences of EC/EDI implementation failure, such as Marine Corps
incompatibility with DFAS FEDI systems or mandatory workforce reductions,
threaten future Marine Corps operations.
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2. Applicability of Commercial EC/EDI Models in Marine Corps
EC/EDI Implementation Efforts
Commercial EC/EDI implementation models, successful indicators and traits
are very germane to the implementation of EC/EDI within Government, particularly
the Marine Corps. Firms much larger as well as much smaller than the Marine have
successfully implemented EC/EDI. Although obstacles, such as communication and
cross functional support are much harder to coordinate and manage within the Marine
Corps, EC/EDI can be implemented successfully if proper implementation methods
are followed. Based upon a modified commercial EC/EDI model, the following items







Cross functional input and support
Measurement of results
Education
Integration [Ref. l:p. 3]
3. Poor Results ofUSMC EC/EDI Implementation Efforts
Because ofpoor implementation efforts, EC/EDI implementation is injeopardy
of failure. Only one trait is present in current USMC EC/EDI implementation efforts.
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The Marine Corps' EC/EDI implementation efforts are rudderless; the Corps' EC/EDI
process lacks vision, direction, purpose, and goals. Critical failure points in Marine
implementation are: lack of support, commitment, education and integration.
Immediate action, intervention, interest and commitment of resources from senior
Marine Corps leadership must occur in order to successfully implement EC/EDI
Marine Corps wide. Marine Corps EC/EDI implementation can meet and exceed the
Presidential EC/EDI Mandate in 1997, despite technical difficulties, only ifimmediate
action occurs.
4. U.S. Marine Corps Must Implement an EC/EDI Strategy
Because Marine EC/EDI implementation lacks any vision, plan, or goals, an
EC/EDI Implementation Strategy must be initiated to focus EC/EDI efforts within the
Marine Corps. The following strategy is suggested: eliminate the paper purchasing/
payment cycle and all paper communication between industry and USMC activities
by transforming it into a 100% electronic process.
5. U.S. Marine Corps Must Develop an EC/EDI Implementation Plan
In order to attain the vision ofEC/EDI within the Marine Corps, a three phase
plan that raises the use and sophistication of EC/EDI usage is suggested:
a. E-mail Phase
The initial phase of the plan is an e-mail phase. E-mail is a low tech
and easy method to begin transmitting communications to and from Marine Corps
contracting offices and vendors. This phase will be a 12 month hurdle for vendors to
overcome. If vendors do not become e-mail capable, they will be dropped from the
vendor list. E-mail is a simple tool that Marine Corps personnel religiously use on
a daily basis. E-mail is also commonly used in businesses today. Thus e-mail is an
easy, acceptable, low tech solution to develop purchasing support and vendor support.
Those who do not wish to make the e-mail jump will be referred to the FAST
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Electronic Broker system. E-mail helps bridge the technical gap and hooks users on
to the concept and use of computers in a purchasing environment. E-mail is also a
cheap and user friendly alternative.
b. FAST Phase
The FAST phase is named after a Government sponsored project titled
FAST Electronic Broker. FAST is a temporary tool to overcome difficulties the
Marine Corps presently faces with BCAS/MADES EC/EDI capabilities as well as to
migrate the vendor base to an electronic process. FAST is not intended to replace or
bypass FACNET or EDI methods, but merely a method to help jump-start the EC/EDI
implementation process. FAST is a project initiated by the Advanced Research
Projects Agency (ARPA) in cooperation with the Information Sciences Institute ofthe
University of Southern California. FAST is a rapid and reliable purchasing tool based
upon electronic mail, EDI, FAX, phone and computers. FAST has a wide base of
suppliers, distributors and manufacturers to tap into, including Government databases,
for a robust purchasing mechanism. FAST's strength is in the small purchase arena
as well as unique item purchases. Essentially, the Marine Corps can use FAST to
purchase items via e-mail, giving the Marine Corps EC capabilities, despite the
BCAS/MADES problems, in order to fulfill the President's EC/EDI Mandate without
additional equipment costs incurred by the Marine Corps. FAST is an ARPA project,
which supports the Commandant's CWL guidance. FAST is a low-tech, easy option
for both purchasing personnel as well as vendors that has been approved by OFPP as
abiding with all procurement legislation and regulations.
c. SPS Phase
Once SPS is fielded, the Marine Corps will shift entirely to the
FACNET structure. When SPS is fielded the Marine Corps will have the tools for
a 100% electronic process as well as an integrated EDI/FEDI procurement/payment
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cycle. Once this occurs, the Marine Corps can fully commit to an electronic paradigm
because the tools necessary to accomplish an integrated electronic paradigm will be
available on a Marine Corps wide basis. Once the entire Marine Corps is fully able
to commit to an electronic process, the vendor base must also leap with the Marine
Corps to a more sophisticated EC/EDI process which must be FACNET capable. In
this regard the next hurdle for vendors will be to switch to an electronic process that
will accommodate FACNET capabilities. Thus in the SPS phase, EC/EDI capabilities
will become a normal cost and technical barrier all firms must overcome in order to
conduct business with the Government as well as the Marine Corps.
6. U.S. Marine Corps Must Develop EC/EDI Implementation Goals
In order to successfully complete the plan and its three phases, the following
goals are recommended:
• Obtain support and commitment for EC/EDI on a Marine Corps wide
basis, through a White Policy Letter statements by formally expressing
the Commandant's support for EC/EDI implementation and;
• Obtain high level support within I&L, by way of formal, written
support and commitment by Deputy Chief of Staff I&L, LtGen
Brabham, and his subordinate cross functional leaders through a
directive and policy statement demanding immediate EC/EDI
implementation efforts. This letter will contain signatures of all
subordinates to LtGen Brabham as well as the funding necessary to
make EC/EDI implementation possible;
• Establish measurement metrics and include mandatory comments on all
I&L personnel fitness reports or civilian evaluations, to include I&L
directors, contracting officers, and system managers, on their
improvement of EC/EDI implementation within their office or
organization. Directly link fitness reports, evaluations, promotions,
pay, bonuses, and incentives directly to improvement of EC/EDI
implementation and processes;
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• Make the entire process, from purchase to payments, electronic using
EC methods such as such as e-mail, internet, as well as EDI;
• Facilitate and conduct 100% of all Marine Corps obligations and
payments through EDI/FEDI processes;
• Establish an EC/EDI Office and EC/EDI Support Team in order to
manage EC/EDI implementation on a daily basis, establish an SPS
program manager within the EC/EDI Office, provide EC/EDI support
for Marine Corps personnel and their vendor's, track measure and
report EC/EDI implementation metrics and progress to the
Commandant through Deputy Chief of Staff, I&L;
• Re-engineer the paper process at the local level in order to eliminate
non-critical tasks that do not add value;
• Capture data at the source and find methods for users to begin the
electronic process;
• Develop, gather and deliver training and education material for
procurement personnel and their vendors;
• Train and educate Marine Corps personnel on EC/EDI implementation
and the benefits to EC/EDI;
• Keep people informed of EC/EDI implementation process and
accomplishments;
• Empower and encourage employees to contribute and suggest changes
to enhance EC/EDI implementation or processes and award suggestions
with incentives and bonuses;
• Eliminate LBO control and management of ADP and automated
procurement systems and empower local levels to manage their
processes;
• Focus on industry's purchase order success instead of DOD's RFQ
focus; use internet to distribute RFQs;
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7. U.S. Marine Corps Must Organize and Commit to an EC/EDI
Office and EC/EDI Support Team
The EC/EDI office will be the sole POC for entire the Marine Corps in all
aspects ofEC/EDI. The office, among other things, will establish an EC/EDI Support
Team and provide the following:
Communication links and shared USMC wide vendor database to
USMC contracting offices;
Immediate on-line internet access to all USMC solicitations;
Immediate on-line internet availability of information related to the
status of on-going acquisitions and current USMC contracts;
EC/EDI outreach program, including the sponsorship of EC/EDI
seminars;
A centralized library of information resources, both in hard-copy and
electronic form;
On-line internet access to EC/EDI procurement policy and regulations;
EC/EDI best practices and benchmarking information throughout
USMC, DOD, Government, and industry available via internet;
USMC personnel/vendor e-mail list for EC/EDI updates;
1-800 telephone number and fax capabilities for Marine personnel and
USMC vendors;
Develop and maintain a core group ofEDI experts to provide direction
and management of EC/EDI within the Marine Corps, interface and
integrate internal and external organization EC/EDI efforts and policy,
and participate in commercial EC/EDI professional organizations in
order to expand the EC/EDI vendor base.
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B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The following related subjects should be targeted for further research:
• Investigate and develop an electronic automated reconciliation process
for Government credit card reconciliation within the SPS framework or
other potential Marine Corps use of SPS capabilities;
• Investigate and develop a business case to outsource necessary EC/EDI
expertise for EC/EDI Office functions;
• Investigate and develop a business case to outsource necessary skills to
manage the Marine Corps' vendor base in their transition to EC/EDI
capabilities as industry does;
• Develop a case study on BCAS/MADES and SACONS selection
process in order to ascertain any lessons learned for future ADP
acquisitions;
• Investigate commercial internet search sites in order to develop a
partnership for USMC wide procurement search functions and USMC
internet capabilities at each contracting office;
• Examine ECRC capabilities and investigate whether a partnership can
be established in order to closely integrate ECRC within the EC/EDI
implementation plan.
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APPENDIX A. EC/EDI CONCEPTUAL MODEL
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Analyze EDI's Opportunity
The first task associated with the EDI implementation process
is determining whether there is an EDI opportunity in the
organization. Identification of the opportunity and/or perceived
benefits may be driven by executives, purchasing and/or mar-
keting and sales personnel. Some of the factors driving the
firm toward EDI in purchasing include:
• High volume of paperwork transaction documents.
• Numerous suppliers.
• Length of the internal administration lead-time associated
with the purchasing cycle,
• Need to develop headcount reductions or new hire
advoidance, or both.
• Need to increase professionalization of purchasing
personnel.
• Customers may require EDI.
Determining the EDI opportunity is a go/no go situation and
could be very abbreviated. If the opportunity is perceived to be
low, then the effort would stop. If the perceived benefits appear
to outweigh the associated costs, the work effort would continue.
This task should be able to be accomplished within a thirty day
time frame by two individuals. Two people are appropriate to
foster an interchange of ideas. Likely candidates would be from
purchasing and systems. These individuals should spearhead
the definition of EDI within the firm and conduct interviews
with a variety of key people to discuss EDI and determine the
perceived value of an EDI effort. Those interviewed should in-
clude personnel from top management, accounting and finance,
receiving, auditing, legal, purchasing and other materials
functions.
Obtain Management Support
If the company perceives positive EDI opportunity, it becomes
necessary for purchasing and materials management to obtain
higher management support. This next level of management
support is not necessarily from the most senior executive
management, but primarily from key leaders and other high
level functional managers throughout the firm. EDI can be
implemented without the same magnitude of effort as would be
required in a Just-In-Time implementation process in purchas-
ing or manufacturing.
Major critical success factors to developing management
support include:
• Creating the belief that the fundamental mechanism of
doing buisness between buyers and sellers needs to change
from a historically paperwork dominated transaction system
to an electronically oriented approach.
• Identifying and describing the "future world" with high
level benefits or competitive advantages that would accrue
to the buying firm from EDI. Examples of this include
increased product responsiveness, headcount reduction,
manufacturing and purchasing leadtime reduction, paper-
less operations, inventory reduction, and greater cost
reduction opportunity within purchasing, and so forth.
The EDI drivers will vary from company to company and
their importance will depend upon the anticipated degree
of funding required to support the EDI effort.
• A general developmental plan of how to get to the "future
world" of electronic transmission of transaction documents.
It would be useful to have a broad-based plan of the
general requirements for the firm to move from the current
to the future situation.
• Obtaining preliminary support from suppliers who would
be willing to participate in the EDI effort. This support
would indicate to top management that there is a willing
group of firms whom, on a joint basis, would like to reduce
transaction costs and enhance the way in which buyer and
seller communicate.
Develop Purchasing Support
It is extremely important to obtain support for EDI from
middle management and operating level personnel in purchasing.
These are the people that will have to ensure the implementation
success of EDI. They are the primary users of EDI and will
be the communicators to outside suppliers about the necessity,
importance, and benefits of EDI.
A number of specific actions can be taken by those charged
with EDI implementation responsibilities to obtain broad-based
purchasing support. These include:
• Develop an awareness by purchasing management and
operating personnel about the benefits of EDI to be gained
within purchasing. This should include direct face-to-face
meetings with appropriate personnel.
• Review the EDI plan and an implementation schedule with
systems personnel. Be able to provide this implementation
plan as scheduled to effected purchasing personnel.
• Have key purchasing personnel on the EDI implementa-
tion team. Leaders need to participate in the design and
development of the EDI system and be able to communicate
and respond to questions regarding how EDI will effect
others within the purchasing department.
The development of complete management and purchasing
(management and operations) support is absolutely necessary to
develop the commitment required for EDI success. Without com-
mitment of these key parties, it could be very difficult to complete
all the tasks necessary to achieve the most successful EDI system.
Develop Cost/Benefit Analysis
Another important task in implementing EDI is developing a
specific cost-benefit analysis. Even though the respondents in
the survey research indicated that a detailed cos^enefit analysis
was not generally done, it will be increasingly important to do
so as more firms begin to develop EDI applications so as to
justify application of resources to the effort. A detailed discussion
of cost/benefit analysis is included in Chapter 4.
Develop Commitment to EDI
By Appropriate Organization Personnel
The organizations that participated in this study believed it
was important to establish company wide support for EDI by
developing an EDI presentation. This presentation was designed
to develop awareness on the part of key functional personnel
in departments such as legal, auditing, accounting and other
materials functions. Furthermore, the role of these non-pur-
chasing functions had to be established based upon what their
anticipated contribution to the EDI development and imple-
mentation effort could be.
Organization for the EDI Effort
Numerous alternatives exist regarding how a firm might
organize for the EDI effort. These arc discussed in Chapter 4.
Two principles that should be followed in organizing for the
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EDI effort are: (1) clear leadership of the effort must be estab-
lished and (2) the effort be multi-functional in scope. An em-
phasis on coordinating the appropriate functional inputs and
considerations is also important.
Develop Legal Consideration, Policies and Practices
Since a signed contract will not accompany an EDI trans-
mission, a separate contract governing the terms and conditions
associated with doing business using EDI needs to be established.
Key content areas in this contract include the following, which
are based on a review of samples from the firms participating
in the research study.
• Purchase orders are to be transmitted electronically
between buyer/seller.
• Buyer/seller authorizes the Third-Party Network to
interchange data.
• Shipment location of scheduled delivery needs to be
identified.
• To avoid errors resulting from network malfunctions,
trading partners are required to return functional
acknowledgements of transmitted documents or
received transactions.
• Company standard terms of condition, set forth in the
attachment, shall be applicable to all purchase orders placed
electronically.
• Length of the contract needs to be established.
• Designation of who pays for the Third-Party Network and
other services must be established.
• Support needs to be established with the supplier for the
document transaction standards (ANSI X12).
Further detailed examples are shown in Chapter 7, Legal
Issues.
Establish Support for Transaction Document Standards
(ANSI XI2)
It is becoming apparent that firms should further efforts to
develop support for the ANSI X12 standard and provide basic
information to all concerned about why a document transaction
standard is necessary. In addition information aboutwhy the ANSI
X12 should be the appropriate standard needs to be provided.
Special actions that should be taken include:
• Obtain the ANSI X12 standards.
• Begin to work with appropriate industry groups.
• Join X12 subcommittee.
• Develop systems personnel knowledge about the ANSI X12
standards and have current transaction documents mapped
to X12 standards.
Develop Auditing Considerations, Policy and Practices
Although auditing problems do not appear to be a problem
based upon the survey interviews, it is important that purchasing
and EDI implementation teams work closely with the auditing
department to establish guidelines for auditing within the EDI
system. Since Electronic Data Interchange maintains data elec-
tronically, specific practices and techniques that will have to be
used in the audit process will be somewhat different than manual
practices. How the audit will take place should be clearly estab-
lished and an auditor should participate in the design and
development of EDI applications. Furthermore, the audit should
promote productivity improvement in procurement rather than
fostering an electronic mirror of the current situation.
Develop System Application Capability
It is important that a prototype EDI application be devel-
oped. Included must be a mapping from the current system
to ANSI X12, with translation protocol established. First, an
interface with the existing system must be done through a
file extraction. Second, software must be established for the
translation. «
This will enable purchasing and the supplier to understand
what and how the EDI system would operate. The prototype
would be a much smaller application than a full pilot test and
would involve parties from both the buying and the selling firm.
Establish a Pilot Program
Establishment of a pilot program is a key ingredient to the
overall success of the EDI effort. Failure to manage this pilot
program in an effective manner can result in failure of the
overall EDI effort. Key pilot program tasks which are further
discussed in Chapter 4 include:
• Establishing the specific documents to be transmitted
by EDI.
• Selecting the hardware and software for the EDI effort.
• Selecting a Third-Party Network when appropriate. In all
likelihood, the use of Third-Party Networks will dramatically
increase in the future.
• Developing awareness and support on the part of key
suppliers for the EDI effort and selecting specific suppliers
to participate in the EDI pilot program.
• Providing suppliers with the necessary education and
training about the EDI system.
• Training appropriate internal purchasing personnel.
• Developing the test data for a pilot.
• Conducting the pilot program.
Review Results of the Pilot Program and Modify
The pilot should provide information regarding the EDI im-
plementation effort so that an operational EDI system can be
implemented with a minimum degree of difficulty. There are a
number of key questions that need to be answered during the
pilot program review. These questions are:
1
.
Is the system adequate and relevant to perform the
necessary EDI functions?
2. What is the operational response time for working with
the EDI system?
3. Does the hardware and software actually work under trial
conditions?
4. Are there any problems with the Third-Party Network,
and what are they?
5. What kind of error rates are there?
6. How effective is the system control, security and
adaptability for audit?
7. What is the storage and operation capacity of the system?
8. How easy or difficult does it appear the system would be
to implement with training on a broad basis?
9. How easy is the system to work with from a user
perspective?
10. What will be the apparent cost effectiveness of the system
as it relates to personnel utilization and work reduction
efforts in purchasing and other areas?
Each of these questions must be carefully studied. Answers of
both a quantitative and qualitative nature should be established.
Robert M. Monczka and Joseph R. Carter, Electronic Data Interchange:
Managing Implementation in a purchasing Environment , Michigan State
University, East Lansing, Michigan, 1987
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Stabilize Systems Design and Approach
Prior to the broad based implementation of EDI, all system
design decisions should be stabilized including hardware, soft-
ware, third party networks, payment and cost responsibilities,
standards (ANSI X12) and system and communication protocols
including transmission structures. The key to a stable system
design will certainly be the applications software and business
practices. Generally, hardware aspects will be more consistent.
It is necessary that the user has full confidence in the applica-
tion software and achieves consistent results from that software.
Finalize Policy and Procedure for Purchasing,
Suppliers and EDI
Policies and procedures to guide the use of EDI between the
buying and selling organizations needs to be established and
clearly understood. Both buyer and seller must know what to
expect under an EDI effort. Considerations include:
1. Identify all of the systems and procedures affected by EDI
implementation and then establish needed changes in
these policies and procedures to support EDI.
2. Develop EDI suppliers and, through policy and procedure,
define what those suppliers will be expected to do.
3. Estahlish a contractual agreement to do business
electronically.
4. Contact appropriate supplier internal personnel with
regard to policy and procedure changes.
Establish Broad-Based Implementation
To fully establish a broad based implementation of EDI re-
quires that both buying and selling firms now act as facilitators
of change with a significant number of personnel involved.
It is important that people who were involved in the pilot be
an active part of the broad based implementation.
The firm initiating the EDI effort will have to ensure that
clear-cut responsibilities and a plan have been established for
EDI implementation. The plan should include the transactions
to be implemented, maintenance of data integrity, supplier
responsibilities, the providing of necessary education and train-
ing, and scheduling. Furthermore, parallel runs by application
would generally be appropriate, unless a very quick implemen-
tation was required.
Conduct Review and Measure Benefits and Costs
A means to review and evaluate the success of EDI is needed
as more suppliers and transactions are established. The EDI
effort should be monitored to review progress and improve the
use of EDI. Problems need to be quickly identified so that
solutions can be developed to minimize any negative reactions.
The EDI director and an implementatien committee should
have centralized responsibility to make changes in the EDI system
when necessary.
This committee should be charged with measuring error rates
from the system and promoting acceptance of the system, both
internally and at the suppliers. In the end, the critical question
is whether the data that was to be transmitted between buyer
and seller was actually received. Data transmission and receipt
anomalies should be identified and causality determined.
The committee should also be concerned with an audit
function. They should document the apparent financial and
nonfinancial costs and benefits associated with EDI.
Continually Monitor and Improve
the Application ofEDI
For EDI to successfully operate over time, with hundreds of
suppliers, numerous transaction documents, and thousands of
transactions, it is critical that a person be charged with the
responsibility to continually monitor and improve the EDI sys-
tem. The overall improvement effort should be a responsibility
of purchasing, systems, and suppliers.
There also needs to be an emphasis on controlling the EDI
process. This includes measurement of the number of trans-
actions between buyer and supplier and functional acknowledge-
ment of receipts to ensure that transactions are received.
Emphasis needs to be placed on measuring and controlling the
EDI process to ensure accuracy.
Successful EDI Implementation
All of the above activities are necessary to ensure the success
of the EDI effort. Exhibit 3-2 is an appropriate check list which
identifies necessary actions which should be completed to in-
crease the likelihood of success of the EDI effort. Furthermore,
the size and complexity of the exisiting system will influence
the degree of difficulty of implementing EDI.
Robert M. Monczka and Joseph R. Carter, Electronic D*taJnt/: rch*"?e/
Managing Implementation in a purchasing Environment, Michigan State




Does your firm have an EDI opportunity?
Has management support been obtained?
Has purchasing department support been obtained?
Has cost/benefit analysis been completed?
Has commitment to EDI been obtained from appropriate
organization personnel (legal, auditing, accounting, materials)?
Has an appropriate organization structure for the EDI effort been
established?
Have legal considerations, policies and practices been
developed?
Has support for transactions document standards (ANSI X12)
been established?
Have auditing policies and practices been considered?
Has the system application capability been evaluated?
Has a pilot program been established?
Has a method for reviewing the results, as well as modifying
results, of the pilot program been developed?
Have all systems design decisions been established?
Have policies and procedures for both purchases and suppliers
been finalized?
Has broad-based implementation been established?
Have plans been developed to review and measure benefits and
costs?
Has a system for continual monitoring and improvement of EDI
been developed?
Robert M. Monczka and Joseph R. Carter, Electronic Data interchange:
Managing Implementation in a Purchasing Environment . Michigan State
University, East Lansing, Michigan, 1987
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Has management support been obtained?
Has purchasing department support been obtained?
Has commitment to EDI been obtained from cross functional
organization personnel?
Has an appropriate organization structure for the EDI effort been
established?
Has a pilot been established?
Has a method for reviewing the results, as well as modifying
results, of the pilot program been developed?
Have policies and procedures for both purchases and suppliers
been finalized?
Has broad-based implementation been established?
Have plans been developed to review and measure benefits and
costs?
Has a system for continual monitoring and improvement of EDI
been developed?
Robert M. Monczka and Joseph R. Carter, Electronic Data Interchange:
Managing Implementation in a Purchasing Environment , Michigan State
University, East Lansing, Michigan, 1987
147
148
APPENDIX C. USMC I&L ORGANIZATION CHART
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APPENDIX D. USMC HCA CHAIN OF COMMAND AND EC
POLICY FLOW: SEPARATION BETWEEN
POLICY & IMPLEMENTATION EFFORTS
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APPENDIX E. U.S. ARMY EC/EDI EXECUTIVE SUPPORT &
COMMITMENT DIRECTIVE
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY





SARD-PC ! 7 m m
MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF CONTRACTING ACTIVITIES (HCA)
SUBJECT: Electronic Commerce in Contracting
A key initiative of the Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994, was the directive to
transition our contracting operations from a paper-based
system to one which takes full advantage of Electronic Data
Interchange (EDI) . The Army potentially will save millions
of dollars annually through the use of EDI in our
contracting process. These dollars are significant as we
attempt to modernize and sustain force structure. While
many MACOMs have eagerly embraced this technology, Army-
wide, much remains to be accomplished.
I am requesting that each HCA become personally
involved in the deployment of EDI, utilization of EDI, and
the Federal Acquisition Computer Network (FACNET)
certification of tneir subordinate contracting offices. In .
addition, HCAs must pay particular attention to Command-wide
class-exemptions and exemptions granted at the contracting
officer level. Unless one of these two types of exemptions
has been issued, ALL procurement actions between $2500 and
siook must be solicited through FACNET. These efforts
should be monitored on a frequent basis. MACOMs which have
not developed HCA level class-exemptions must complete this
task as a condition of Interim FACNET certification.
Several HCAs with Interim FACNET certified contracting
offices have not completed this requirement. MACOM
Commanders can expect that exemption policies will be
audited by external agencies such as the General Accounting
Office, the Department of Defense Inspector General, and DA
Procurement Management Reviews. MACOMS failing to use
FACNET as intended by FASA, run the risk of having their
FACNET certification revoked, resulting in the loss of the
$100K Simplified Acquisition Threshold.
With approximately 135 Army contracting offices
presently conducting electronic commerce via EDI, we have
come a long way in a short period of time. With your
management oversight, the Army can take full advantage of
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the potential cost avoidance. Collectively, we must make
every effort to effectively employ this enabling technology
.




Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Research, Development and Acquisition)
Distribution
Deputy Chief of Staff for Acquisition, HQ, U.S. Army
Materiel Command, ATTN: AMCAQ, 5001 Eisenhower Avenue,
Alexandria, VA 22333-0001
Commander, U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical
Command, ATTN: AMSMC-CG, Rock Island, IL 61299-6000
Chief, National Guard Bureau, Department of the Army and Air
Force, ATTN: NGB-ZA, Washington, DC 20310-2500
Commander, U.S. Army Depot System Command, ATTN: AMSDS-CG,
Chambersburg, PA 17201-417
Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command, ATTN: AFCG,
Ft. McPherson, GA 30330-6000
Commander, U-S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, ATTN:
ATCG, Ft. Monroe, VA 23651-5000
Commander, U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command
ATTN: MCMR-ZA, Ft. Detrick, MD 21702-5012
Commander, U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command,
ATTN: CSSD-ZB, P.O. Box 1500, Huntsville, AL 35807-3801
Commander, U.S. Army Missile Command, ATTN: AMSMI-.CG,
Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898-5000
Director, U.S. Army Research Laboratory, ATTN: 2MSRL-D,
2800 Powder Mill Road, Adelphi, MD 20783-1197
Commander, U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command,
ATTN: AMSEL-CG, Ft- Monmouth, NJ 07703-5000
Commander, U.S. Army Industrial Operations Command
(Provisional) , Rock Island, IL " 61299-6000
Commander, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command,
ATTN-. AMSTE-CG, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005-5055
Commander, U.S. Army Military District of Washington,
Ft. Leslie J. McNair, ATTN: ANCG, Washington, DC
20319-5050
Commander, U.S. Army Information Systems Command, ATTN:
ASCG, Ft. Huachuca, AZ 85613-5000
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APPENDIX F. ARPA LEGAL OPINION/APPROVAL OF
FAST ELECTRONIC COMMERCE BROKER-
ING SYSTEM
159
4g5m?&k ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
¥^W<2V9k. J70I NOKTH FAIRFAX OftlVE
ARUNOTON. VA ajta©S-l7-h4
^#
MEMORANDUM TOR THE COMPUTING SYSTEMS TEOWOLOGT OrFICE
attention i Deputy plrsotor
SUBJECT: Legal Opinion — FAST Electronic Commerce Brokering
System
This responds to your memorandum of October 11, 1994, which
indicates that certain officials in Air Faros Material command
believe Chat * legal and regulatory issues" are associated with use
of the TAST brokering system and that "legislative relief needs
to be obtained before continuing use ie made of FAST. Due to
theee comment! you are concerned about the propriety of FAST and
have aaked me to review the Air Foroe objection* and determine
whether use of fast la legal and appropriate. For the reasons
stated below, I am of the opinion that the concerns stated by the
Air Force are wholly without merit. There is no reason why AWA
for for that matter the Air Foroe) should not oontinue to utilize
the system. Mo legislative relief is necessary but legislation
which could lead to expanded use of FAST was recently enacted.
BACKGROUND
A. The FAST Electronic Brokering System - General
Prior to your memorandum, my personal knowledge of FAST was
limited to its use during development end fielding of the *ARPA
Light- ant i -fratricide device during the Gulf War. Without FAST
that development could not have moved from concept, to test, to
production, to delivery to the Gulf in a matter of a few weeks,
arpa won an Aviation Week Laurel Awsrd as wsll as praise from the
Joint Chiefs for that effort. The Office of Federal Procurement
Policy later conducted a review of that procurement aotion and
found it to be compliant with applicable law and regulations.
vou advise that FAST is s leading edge research project in
advanced electronic commerce services, developed at the
information Sciences Institute <iex> of the University of Southern
California (U6C) . By using computer networks to interconnect
buyers and vendors, it enables a buyer to actively solicit
quotations from multiple vendors and then to choose among these
one for execution as an eleotronic data ittterahange (EDI)
t ran a action. rxsT is well known for its ability to find vendors
of hard to find items, as well as to locate attractive prices for
commodity items.
To be euccassful, FAST requires a pilot operational user
community to stress the system's capabilities sad to drive further
refinement* and improvements. To date, the partnership between
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rM? and its uian within the Air force laboratory eyetem haa faaan
An effective opportunity for technology transfer within tha
Department of Defense. Tan project will now be seriously impeded
by the lose of thla cruoial uaar community due to an Air Force
daciaion to dieaontlnue uit of FAST.
FAST la nothing mora than a tool that providaa information co
buyaza and executes buyer's lnatructiona basad on their commands
and established praferenoea. The ayaten can implement virtually
any policy established by the using organisation. The specific
difficulty within the Air Force laboratories appears to have been
the raaiatance or the on-site contracting officea to delegate
contracting authority to the laboratory personnel/buyers who
participate as users of FAST. X8X personnel are not making
contractual daoisions en hahalf of government personnel.
FA.BT la currently being used within the Army by the
Department of Logistics at Ft. Kuachuca. In thie ease,
contracting authority haa been delegated to the Army personnel who
are users of the system. To insure that all regulatory and
statutory requirements are met, the Directorate of Contracting haa
published detailed guidelines for Government customers of FAST
both Inside the Army as well as elsewhere within Defense. These
Iuidelines clearly state that "Orders placed against FAST are
.
nitiated by Government peraonnel. Individuals placing auoh
order* must cither do appointed Ordering Officers, or be working
under the direct authority and aupervlaion of a Contracting
Officer. It is the reaponalbility of the uaer activity to
coordinate FAST acquisitions with their designated Contracting
Office to enaure compliance with applieabie Federal Acquisition
Regulations! and supplements thereto/ that govern the acquisition
process." To insure proper oversight , FAST produces a detailed
monthly acquisition report for review by the appropriate Ordering
Officer who ia monitoring the eoqulsitlen activity. Counsel at
Ft. Kuaehuoa has ruled that FAST, when ueed in this fashion/ is
compliant with Federel Acquisition Regulations.
B. statutory/Regulatory Issues
in a letter dated Auguat 12/ 1994, HQ atmc/pk. Brigadier
General Malishenko states; "Since FAST substitutes a contractor's
judgement for that of the government contracting officer (CO) , it
la an unlawful method of procuring supplies and sarvio»i," The
aome letter alao assarts that the "use of PACT raises many issues
of a statutory nature ... which would involve legislative review and
approval to continue the system." This stetement references an
attachment which cites the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act/ the
Competition in Contracting Act, and Small Business Act (synopsis
requirements and set asides)
. The comments in the attachment and
the comments in the body of the Letter concerning contracting-out
inherently governmental functions are the legal and regulatory
isauas upon which HQ AFKC/ST (lettar dated August 26, 1994)
supported the decision to terminate Air rorce uae of tha fast
ayatem.
The commants in the above refarenaad attachment are quoted in
full here:
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1. Walah-Heeley Public contracts Aot. This not
requires us to purchaae from manufacturers or regular
dealers, and the employees of these companion mutt b« .
paid at least tha minimum wages tat by the Department of
Labor, to purchase from an "electronic broker" would
require an exemption from tha Act because tba broker
would not Qualify aa a regular daalar or manufacturer.
Requiring tha broker to apply tba Aot to tba vandore
•elected would still not comply because wa are buying
the items from, and paying, tha broker, not tha vendor*.
2. Competition in Contracting Act (CXCA). CICA requires
us to compete purchases over 52300. Directing all
purchases to a broker would violate CXCA, unless
appropriate approvals sra obtained. Two remotely
possible exceptions to CXCA erex 10 use 2304 <e) (1)
"only one responsible source" and 10 use 2304 (a) (2)
"unusual and compel lino urgency". Neither could easily
be applied to tha instsnt oasa.
3. Small Buainass Aot (synopsis requirements) . Sole
source action* over 910*000 must be aynopslaed,
effeotivtly delaying the purchaae by 21 days or more.
Caae-by-oaaef waivers would be labor-intensive and would
probably reduce the responsiveness of the system
uneceeptably, a periodic synopsis (i.e. every six
months) of projected requirements might satisfy ths
intent, if not the letter of the Act. All respondents
to the synopaia could then be considered for inclusion
in the broker's system. This may not technically
satisfy all of the Act's requirements since actual (vs.
planned) requirements would not be individually
eynopeized.
4. Small Business small Purchase Set-Asides. There is
a requirement to reserve all purchases 423,000 or less
exclusively for small business oonoerns. Tha FAST
vendor base containa both email and large businesses but
oan be aoded to seleot only small businesses. However,
if no quotations are received from small businesses, tha
set-aside must be dissolved by the contracting officer
and the purchase made frost a large business
.
In a December 1993 letter HQ AFMC/PX Stated its objections to
FAST as follows:
a. It is not an approved decentralised contracting
technique;
b. Buyers have not been delegated contracting authority
nor have they been appointed as ordering officers;
a. Procedures are not in place to insure compliance
with regulatory and statutory requirements; and
d. There la no training or oversight by local
contracting offioea.
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That: sema i«tt«r provided for s six month phase-out of the
fast system within Mr Fore* Material Command.
C. FAST System Benefits - Impact
Information from usc/xbi, Ft. Kuachuca's contracting office
and afmc dooumanta indicata the following.
Within the Air Force, Roma Laboratory and Kright Laboratory
became FAST customers several yaara ago under an AFSC directive to
uee FAST to streamline local procurement. Robins AFB and Kill afb
started uaing FAST a year and a halt *9o. During FY 94 , Rome
Laboratory, Wright Laboratory and Robins AFB were FAST'S three
largest customers
. They have cited documented speedups of up to
643% for FAST procurement compared to traditional Base Contracting
procurement methoda.
In July 1993, the Operational Contracting Division at 3Q ATMC
initiated a review of FAST to determine If its use should continue
within AFMC. The afmc review concluded that "FAST provides a
streamlined, user friendly way for ouatomers to purchase items...''
Nonetheless the decision was made to terminate the ayataa'a use in
AFWC.
Rome Laboratory, "Wright Laboratory and fast's customere at
Robina AFB immediately reaponded with atrong objections to HQ
AFMC's recommendations. They voiced serious concern over not beinc
able to support critical (mainly AR7A sponsored) research projects
.
Robina afb, as well as Rome Laboratory and Wright Laboratory have
•repeatedly requested thet the onsite buyers interacting with FAST
be granted contracting authority. These requests have bean denied
by the onsite Contracting Offices. The FAST buyer at Bill AFB had
contracting authority.
Rome Laboratory submitted an initiative under the Laboratory
Quality Improvement Program along with a request to extend the
Laboratory' s use of the FAST system for small purchases . This was
danied.
in summary, it appears that FAST haa an excellent record of
performance both as an acquisition support tool and at a computer
networking research project. Termination of its use within Air
Force Material Command will adversely affect the Air Force
acquisition mission as wall as ARFA'e reeearch projeot
.
QUESTION PRESIMTED
Do che legal and regulatory conoerns raieed by Air Force
Material. Command aonetltute a basis for terminating the use of the
FAST Electronic Brokering System?
DISCUSSION
This la fag too serious a matter for me to ascribe motives to
the pereone who have raised the Issues being considered in this
opinion. I am nonetheless struck by the impression that there ere
those in the Air Force contracting community who do not Mont FAST
to be uaed and therefore hava sought reasons why it c ,nrit;>f; be used.
With respect to th« four objections stated in the December
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1993 AFMC/PK letter quoted aoove, X not* that all of them era
within the control of AFMC/PK itself to remedy unltu there ere
legal and regulatory violations that cannot possibly be corrected
short of legislation. If that was- tha view of AFMC/FX than it
should hava terminated Air rorea uaa of FAST immediately upon
discovery of tha illegality. Tha December 1993 latter etatea,
tiowtvir, *thet a aix months phaae out period of FAST la
appropriate." Zf there was no irremediable illegality those same
six months oould have been uaed to correct the other deficiencies
noted in the letter. Ft. Kuaohuca has implemented measures similar
to those that the Air Force felt were needed.
Tnhmrmn* e^fwwitm- Tnni»E inn
, with reepect to the allegation
that the TA8T aystam involves non-government pereonnal perforadeg
inherently governmental functions, this simply misconstrues the
FAST function. FAST does not involve judgmenta over the government
contracting proceas - which would indeed constitute an inherently
governmental function. FAST is a tool. True it is highly
aophiatioated and uses advanoad technology but qualitatively it is
not fundamentally different from government contracting peraonnel
reading a very large volume of catalogues or making numerous
telephone or facsimile machine inquiriee.
w.uh.Hiiii» BBfalifi Caotoagfel »"«••• The discussion of this
atatute quoted above omits two key poiata. First, tha statute is
not applicable to contract notions below $10,000 (41 O.S.C. 35).
'Furthermore, the atatute *ahali not apply to purohaaea of euoh
materials^ auppliaa, articlea or equipment as may usually be bought
in the open market..." (41 U.S.C. 43). Thus, even assuming that
the discussion of this statute contained in AFMC/PK letter is
accurate, .there ere numexoue opportunities to uae tha fast system
without violating the statute* specifically all purchases below
$10,000.
ffnmpif-jf Anr\ Tr; Cnflfr»ef 4 ny Art*. The dldCUSSion Of t&is
statute is incorrect in that atmc/vk states that CiCA' s competition
requirements is applicable to purchases above 42,500. in fact the
threshold ia $25,000 (10 U.S.C. 2304 (g) ) . The discussion Of
exception* to the full and open competition requirement of CXCA ia
not applicable to purchases below $25,000. The use of FAST could
alao constitute a market survey and provide factual information
that would aid in justifying limitations on competition for
purchaaea in exceaa of 925,000.
Saajj nU Hin<*«« »ftf caitoapaJLa aauiXMamoxal The diacuseion of
this provision states: "sole source actions over $10,000 must be
aynepaized. . ." That is not an adequate reading of the statue*.
The general synopsis requirement of tha Small Business Act la
$25,000 (15 U.S.C. 637(e) (1) (A) (i)> . In addition for actions over
$10,000 there is a synopsia retirement "if there is no reasonable
expectation tha; at least two offers will be received..." (if
U.S.C. 637 (e) (A) (X) (iii)) . Thus, there is no CBO synopsis
requirement for purchases under S10,0OO and, if fast reveals two or
more responsive and responsible offerors, there ia no synopsis
requirement for purchases under $25,000. The delays and pitfalls
suggested in the AFMC/5K analysis are not valid.
ftme^? auajjasaa fiej aSkJitea- There ia no impediment to tha use
of fast oauaad by the requirement to set eside purohases below
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32 5,000 for small businesses. As the ATMC/PK analysis states
i
*The FAST vendor base contains both amell and large buainessaa but
oan ba codad to select only small buaineaaea. However, If no
quotations ace raeaivad from small buainassas* ths sat aside must
ba diaaolvad by tha contracting officer and tha purchase made from
a large business." Thus, TAST oan help effectuate the polioies of
the small Business Act.
All of the legal objection* eantainad in tha ATNC/PK analyaia
either mlaconatrue tha facts, misstate the law, or dlscuas problems
that, if they exist at ail, are quite capable of being managed. In
fact by dalagating authority, providing guidelines and training,
afkc/pk could manage the uae of the FAST aystem in a way which is
both highly useful and efficient as well aa legal and in oomplianoe
with applicable regulation*.
With regard to leglalative reliaf, it hea to a aignificant
extent alraady bsan made available. Section 7201 of the Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Aat of 1994 <S. 1567, 103d CCngraaa,
signed Oct. 13, 19 94) amends tha Walsh-Healey Act by deleting the
terms "manufacturer" end "regular dealer" and substituting
"supplier," This legislation was introduced in 1993 and was
pending at the time that AFMC decisions were being mads. Tfte
ATMc/ST latter which refers to wths substantial time and effort
.involved in obtaining legislative relief* is dated 26 August 1994.
At that time the final conference agreement had already been
reached and the Senete had voted to accept the conference report.
When the Houee of Representative? voted on the conference report in
September 1994, it paaaed unanimously. Apparently AFMC waa
completely unaware of the proviaions of the most Important piece of
procurement legislation in the last forty years.
Other provisions of the streamlining Aet such as "Title IV -
Simplified Acquisition Threehold" will have a signifiosnt impact on
acquisitions of less than $100,000. 'Regulations authorized under
that section may make the Welsh-Healey Act completely inapplicable
to such procurements. Other proviaions of the new law amend
pertinent sections of the Small Business Act and the Competition in
contracting Act. While the final impact of these changes may not
be fully known until the implementing regulations are iaaued, the
prospect is that FAST will be able to be' an even more useful tool
unuer the recently enacted law.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, it i" «y opinion that the
concerns and objections raised by the Air Force concerning the FAST
electronic brokering aystem are net valid as a matter of feet end
law. There is no reason, based on the Air Force objections, for
ARPA or other users of FAST to terminate such use.
It might be useful at soma point to carefully analyze FAST
utilisation in light of legal and regulatory requirements to
determine if modifications to the FAST system could increase its
utility while complying with current legal requirements. Likewieo,
regulations to be issued governing simplified acquisition under the
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 may increase the
applicability of FAST. A report on FAST should be provided to tha
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group charged with writing the new regulation* on commercial
practical and aimplified acquisitions a© that thay can accommodate
the ua« of FAST to tha maximum extent.
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